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Abstract
This thesis presents analyses of households' decisions regarding housing and pension
wealth accumulation, in forward-looking models.
The ¯rst of three chapters on housing presents a model of housing demand over the
life cycle, and examines its sensitivity to prices and borrowing constraints. Demand
responses can be unusual: when the price of housing goes up, the demand for starter
homes may increase if enough people \downsize" their homes.
The next chapter involves carefully matching a life cycle model of consumption and
housing choices, to recent episodes in the U.K., and using this structure to understand
why house prices and consumption growth are strongly positively correlated. The
model provides a good match to data on home ownership and consumption growth.
The analysis gives a ¯rmer theoretical footing to the claim that wealth e®ects from
house prices are unlikely to have been the main driver of the correlation with con-
sumption growth.
The third housing chapter presents a model in which the prices of two types of
home are endogenous. A perfect foresight set up is used, and transitions between
steady states following shocks to income and mortgage markets, are studied. The ¯nd-
ings suggest that credit shocks are more promising than income shocks as a potential
explanation of large house price °uctuations and housing transactions level that covary
positively with prices.
The ¯nal substantive chapter uses a di®erence-in-di®erences strategy to evaluate
the e®ect on private pension coverage of a recent U.K. reform to private pensions and
pension contribution limits. The reform is seen to have had a positive e®ect on pension
coverage for lower earners. This pattern is consistent with forward-looking responses
to the ¯nancial incentives involved.Contents
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Introduction
The work presented in this thesis separately analyses the decisions that households
make about whether to own the house that they live in, and whether to save in a
private pension. The behavioural model underpinning the analyses is the \lifecycle
model" of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), which has become a workhorse of modern
macroeconomics and public ¯nance. This model shares with the Permanent Income
Hypothesis of Friedman (1957) the idea that individuals allocate resources over time
(and therefore determine current consumption and saving - or, equivalently, present
and future consumption) taking into account the resources available over a long period
of time and the possibility of moving them over time through saving or borrowing.1
The model provides a structure within which we can think about what would be the
optimal choices for households to make regarding their savings and asset choices.
Analysis of the lifecycle framework quickly becomes analytically complex. In par-
ticular, with a realistic speci¯cation for uncertainty regarding the arrival of resources,
for the markets within which intertemporal trades are possible, and for the way in
which consumption is converted into `utility', the model of optimal choices does not
have any known closed form solution. At least since the contributions of Deaton (1991)
1A discussion of the model, and a survey of the literature describing our understanding of its
implications, is available in Attanasio and Wake¯eld (2008 and forthcoming).
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and Zeldes (1989), numerical methods have been used to analyse models of this kind.
A recent literature has begun the task of adding a housing good/asset to such a
computational framework, and the analyses of chapters 2 - 4 represent a contribution
to this literature.2 While these chapters are written to be self-contained and free-
standing, it is worth saying a few words about their content, how they relate to each
other and how the models used are modi¯ed for the particular research questions
analysed.
The aim of chapter 2 is to model carefully the demand for home ownership over the
life-cycle and to show how sensitive demand is to price °uctuations and to changes in
capital market imperfections. A related recent paper regarding the price °uctuations
topic is Li and Yao (2007), which considers the behavioural and welfare consequences
of house-price shocks.3 As explained in the chapter, as well as its broader remit, the
analysis presented here is distinguished from theirs by modelling choices regarding the
nature of the housing asset and a focus on capturing mortgage constraints.
In addition to being interesting in themselves, the set up and results of chapter
2 are useful as background to the subsequent two chapters. The model shares many
features with the set ups used in the following chapters, including that the housing
good is modelled as taking one of two sizes (a `°at' or a `house'), and a realistic form for
the mortgage borrowing constraints. The chapter looks at `elasticities' of housing and
consumption demands to various parameters in the model and to shocks in housing
prices and incomes. An interesting ¯nding is that when the price of housing (i.e. for
both °ats and houses) goes up permanently, the demand for °ats can increase as the
number of households that `downsize' from houses exceeds the number who exit the
2The most related papers are mentioned in this introduction, and fuller references are provided in
each chapter.
3Other papers that build a housing good/asset into a lifecycle framework have focussed on di®erent
topics. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) and Flavin and Nakagawa (2004), for example,
address how patterns of non-durable consumption over time are a®ected by the existence of a durable
or housing asset, while Yao and Zhang (2005) and Cocco (2005) both consider how ¯nancial asset
portfolios interact with decisions over housing wealth, and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) and Bottazzi
et al. (2007) consider the relationship between housing and labour-supply decisions.1 Introduction 16
°at market. The results of this chapter regarding how house prices and income a®ect
consumption choices are useful background to the analysis of chapter 3, while the
results on how housing demand responds to incomes, credit conditions and house price
°uctuations, is relevant to the model of housing prices presented in chapter 4.
Chapter 3 involves applying a model similar to that outlined in chapter 2, to the
analysis of the extent to which movements in house prices might be driving the changes
in aggregate consumption growth with which they are strongly correlated. As such the
chapter is an addition to a hotly contested literature on whether there are strong
wealth e®ects from house prices to consumption (see Muellbauer and Murphy (1990)
and Campbell and Cocco (2007)), or whether it is more likely that common causes are
at work (King (1990), Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Attanasio et al. (2009)).
To address this issue, the model is adapted to include aggregate income and house
price shocks, and to capture (both in the modelling of expectations, and in the sim-
ulation of the model) correlation between these shocks. Simulations of the model are
carefully matched to recent episodes in the U.K. economy by inputting observed ag-
gregate shocks when simulating the model for individuals in di®erent cohorts. These
simulations can then be aggregated up to assess the extent to which the °uctuations in
the input aggregate processes can explain °uctuations in aggregate consumption. To
my knowledge, at least in the consumption literature, it is an innovative contribution
to aggregate up simulations of individual behaviour in this way, to check whether the
model of individual choices is consistent with aggregate evidence. The model provides
a good match to U.K. data on home-ownership and aggregate consumption growth.
The second contribution of this paper lies in the use of counterfactual simulations to
help us understand whether house price movements are likely to have driven a substan-
tial part of °uctuations in aggregate consumption. The ¯ndings support the argument
that since the observed correlation between house-price growth and consumption is
particularly strong for the young, it is unlikely that wealth e®ects have been the key
factor driving this correlation.1 Introduction 17
The third chapter on housing - chapter 4 - involves constructing a model in which
the prices or °ats and houses are endogenous, determined by the decisions of non-
owners concerning whether to buy, and the decisions of owners about whether to supply
their property to the market. This model does not include aggregate °uctuations,
and so steady states involve constant house and °at prices. However, we do use the
framework to consider dynamics in the housing market, by modelling the transition
path for the economy following unforeseen shocks to income and mortgage market
conditions. This analysis is a contribution to the literature on whether housing market
°uctuations can be explained by the interaction between aggregate shocks and the
institutions of the housing market (see Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (2006), who suggest
one mechanism that might generate the right properties for volatility in prices and
transactions, and also Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (In Progress)). The ¯ndings
suggest that credit shocks might be more promising than income shocks as a potential
explanation of large house price °uctuations and transaction levels that are pro-cyclical.
This chapter is a preliminary application of the model with endogenous house and °at
prices, and the ¯nal part of the chapter considers how work with this model might be
extended.
The ¯nal substantive chapter of the thesis is concerned with pension saving rather
than housing choices, and involves a di®erent set of techniques as policy evaluation
methods are used to analyse the e®ects of a particular reform to the U.K. pension
system. In April 2001, the U.K. government introduced Stakeholder Pensions - a
new private pension arrangement. The reform also changed the structure of tax-
relieved pension contribution ceilings, increasing their generosity for lower-earners.
The chapter examines the impact of these changes on private pension coverage using
individual level data. The analysis therefore provides U.K. based evidence on the
important policy question of whether adjustments to ¯nancial incentives can induce
extra retirement saving, a question which has been extensively addressed in a north-
American literature (the paper that is most related to chapter 5 in terms of the type1 Introduction 18
of reform analysed, is Milligan (2003)).4 The assessment presented in chapter 5 uses
a di®erence-in-di®erences strategy with an estimator that is modi¯ed to allow for
dichotomous outcomes (the method follows Blundell et al. (2004a)). Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that the Stakeholder Pension reforms had little or no impact
on saving behaviour, our results indicate that the change to the contribution ceilings
a®ected private pension coverage rates among lower-earners, especially among women.
This is in line with the nature of the reform to incentives implicit in the change in
tax relief. While we do not formally test these ¯ndings against the predictions of
the lifecycle model, this pattern is at least consistent with the idea that savers make
forward-looking decisions about pensions provision.
The ¯nal chapter of the thesis is a conclusion. Rather than repeating the conclu-
sions of each of the substantive chapters (which have been summarised in this intro-
duction), the conclusion focuses on some developments and further work that would
build on the analyses presented in the thesis.
4Other recent related papers include Benjamin (2003) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004), and
the literature builds on a stream of research summarised in Journal of Economic Perspectives (1996).Chapter 2
Modelling the Demand for
Housing over the Lifecycle
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to model carefully the demand for home ownership over the
life-cycle and to show how sensitive demand is to price °uctuations and to changes in
capital market imperfections. As explained in chapter 1, the exercise is of interest in
its own right, but it also provides useful background to the material in the following
two chapters.
We present a model where households choose throughout their lives whether or not
to own a home, and choose between houses of di®erent size. These choices are made in
the face of uncertainty about earnings and about house prices and in the presence of
various capital market imperfections. Capital market imperfections are widespread in
the housing market: individuals are able to borrow only a fraction of the value of the
house, and only able to borrow up to a multiple of their earnings; there is very little
insurance provided against house price risk, and the lack of insurance against earnings
risk makes housing more risky.
Our analysis is related to a growing set of recent papers that have built a house
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type asset into a lifecycle consumption saving framework.1 Distinguishing features of
our model are: careful modelling of mortgage-related borrowing constraints so that
these are only checked when the household buys or has to renegotiate the mortgage
with the bank to increase its value (see subsection 2.2.1 for a fuller discussion of this
point); and, the modelling of housing as an asset that takes a discrete number of
possible sizes so that there is a housing \ladder" but the dwelling is not continuously
adjustable (even at cost). The contribution of Nichols (2005) used a similar two-size
structure for the housing asset, but did not have the detail in modelling borrowing
constraints that we have. Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008, In Progress) have a
similar structure to ours but embed it in an equilibrium setting and concentrate on
macroeconomic outcomes, rather than lifecycle decisions and welfare.
Section 2.2 presents the life-cycle model in detail, and, where relevant, relates
it more closely to existing literature. Section 2.3 discusses how lifecycle decisions
and welfare are a®ected by the parameters of the housing market (including credit
constraints and ¯xed costs as well as the house price) and of the income process.
Section 2.4 instead discusses how decisions are a®ected by shocks that occur during
the lifetime. A ¯nal section concludes.2
2.2 Life-cycle model
We start from a standard model of lifecycle consumption in a dynamic stochastic
environment. We add to this model several features that capture the complexity of
the consumer decision environment with regard to housing and debt choices.
1One example is Li and Yao (2007), which addresses issues related to those that we consider as
they consider the behavioural and welfare consequences of house price shocks. Our remit is rather
wider than this, and the nature of our housing asset and our realistic modelling of mortgage borrowing,
distinguish our model from theirs.
2There is also an appendix with some supplementary material and computational details2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 21
2.2.1 Model Structure
A household lives for T periods. In every period t · T; the household maximizes
lifetime utility by choosing consumption, ct; and whether to own a \°at", or to own a
\house", or to own neither, with ht 2 f0;1;2g (where 0 is non-ownership).
The household value function in period t is given by:
Vt (At;ht¡1;pt;wt) = max
fct;htg
u(ct;ht) + ¯EtVt+1 (At+1;ht;pt+1;wt+1) (2.1)
subject to
At+1 = Rt+1
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
At + wt ¡ ct ¡ ·pt(1 + F)I(ht = 1) ¡ pt(1 + F)I(ht = 2)
if ht¡1 = 0
At + wt ¡ ct + ·pt(1 ¡ F)I(ht 6= 1) ¡ pt(1 + F)I(ht = 2)
if ht¡1 = 1
At + wt ¡ ct ¡ ·pt(1 + F)I(ht = 1) + pt(1 ¡ F)I(ht 6= 2)
if ht¡1 = 2
(2.2)
where At is the start of period asset stock and Rt+1 = 1+rt+1 and rt+1 is the interest
rate on the liquid asset; pt is the price of housing which is realised at the start of
period t; F is the proportional ¯xed cost which is assumed to be the same for both
buying and selling a house or °at; wt is household earnings in period t. Equation
(2.2) is a standard intertemporal budget constraint, augmented by terms re°ecting the
house price and transaction costs that must be borne when trading housing. For ease
of exposition, we distinguish between beginning of period assets At and end of period
assets st:
In our model, there are two di®erences between a °at and a house: ¯rst, owning
a house gives more utility than owning a °at, and second, a house is more expensive
than a °at. However, there is no explicit modelling of the size of °ats or houses and2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 22
so the increased utility associated with housing in our model can be thought of as a
reduced form for a preference for space driven by, for example, demographics. The
price of a °at is a fraction, ·; of the price of a house, and so the ¯xed cost of buying
or selling a °at is a fraction of the ¯xed cost of buying or selling a house.
We allow only for collateralised debt, such that households are able only to have
negative ¯nancial assets when they are home owners, so that when they do not own a
house (ht = 0) they are subject to the constraint
st ¸ 0: (2.3)
Home owners can borrow, and when they do so they are subject both to a terminal
asset condition, sT = 0, that translates into an implicit limit on borrowing,3 and to
two explicit borrowing constraints. The ¯rst of these explicit constraints is a function
of the value of the house and the second is a function of household annual earnings.
These determine how much a household is able to borrow at the time of purchase or
when remortgaging, and translate into the following constraints on saving:
st ¸ ¡¸h·pt; · =
8
> <
> :
0 < · < 1 if ht = 1
1 if ht = 2
(2.4)
where the value (1 ¡ ¸h) can be thought of as a downpayment requirement, and:
st ¸ ¡¸wwt (2.5)
The explicit constraints on the downpayment and the debt to income ratio only
apply when households buy the property or remortgage. That is to say, if at period t
the household continues to own the property that they owned at period t¡ 1, then as
long as they service the interest on any outstanding mortgage debt (the next but one
3The speci¯cation of marginal utility becoming in¯nite at 0 consumption means this terminal
condition prevents households borrowing more than they can repay with certainty.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 23
paragraph describes this interest repayment), then the debt that they hold will not be
limited by the mortgage-related borrowing constraints. This means that these formal
borrowing constraints will not force households to shrink their mortgage rapidly, or
sell their home, in periods when they are hit by large negative shocks to the house
price or income, which would make the formal constraints tighter.
The structure of the constraints just described adds to the computational di±culty
of our problem. It means that convexity preserving techniques cannot be used since
there are known `kinks' in the conditional value functions for owning a home, at least
at points in the state space where this choice involves continued ownership.4 This
computational di±culty is probably the key explanation of why it has been almost
standard in the literature modelling housing and consumption choices to assume that
mortgage constraints, (if any, and often represented only by a collateral constraint)
must be satis¯ed in every period.5 We were not willing to make such an assump-
tion. The ability to borrow more when house prices and income move up and loosen
borrowing constraints, without a concern that a subsequent falls will require a large
debt repayment, is sure to be of ¯rst order importance for young individuals deciding
whether or not to buy, and how much to consume, in periods when their incomes
°uctuate.6
4By a kink we mean a point at which the derivative of the value function is not de¯ned. To see why
there must be kinks, note that continuing owners who hold some debt will have their assets constrained
either by their existing stock of debt, or by the formal borrowing constraints, depending on whether or
not they choose to remortgage. Which of these will be binding is a function of the control variable of
the dynamic optimisation problem, the level of assets (debt). At the point in the asset range where the
most binding constraint switches between these two, the value function will be kinked. Heuristically,
this can be thought of as having constraints on the optimisation that switch over within the state
space of the problem, at a point at which the Lagrange multipliers on both constraints are strictly
non-zero and will not be equal to each other (except by chance). Since one of the constraints ceases
to apply without its associated multiplier declining smoothly to zero, this gives a kink in the value
function.
5Examples include the model of Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (2006) in which the assumption is an
analytical convenience, and computational contributions such as Li and Yao (2007), Cocco (2005),
Yao and Zhang (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004).
6The modelling becomes even more complicated, but the issue perhaps even more pertinent, in a
situation in which income is a®ected labour supply choices as well as random shocks; see Bottazzi,
Low, and Wake¯eld (2007) for a model of this situation which includes mortgage constraints that only
apply when buying or increasing the value of the mortgage, as described here.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 24
Turning to the cost of servicing the mortgage, the interest due on outstanding debt
at the start of period t is de¯ned as:
mt = rtst¡1 (2.6)
There is no ¯xed mortgage repayment schedule. However, if the household does not
repay at least the interest, mt, on their outstanding debt, they have to remortgage.
Remortgaging does not incur a cost but, as discussed above, any new mortgage has to
satisfy the two formal constraints.
(a) Utility function
The within period utility function is a CRRA function in current consumption, aug-
mented by additive and multiplicative terms to capture the value of home-ownership:
u(ct;ht) =
c
1¡°
t
1 ¡ °
exp(µÁ(h)) + ¹Á(h)
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
Á = 0 if ht = 0
0 < Á < 1 if ht = 1
Á = 1 if ht = 2
(2.7)
The parameters µ and ¹ are housing preference parameters which determine the
utility premium that households derive from owning their home; they are calibrated in
our model. The exponential in the multiplicative term for the value of ownership is a
convenient way to express that this term represents a proportional scaling of the utility
from consumption. When ht = 0, the exponential term has value 1 and the additive
term value zero, and thus utility is only derived from non-durable consumption. Á
determines the relative utility from owning a °at versus a house. The additive term
means that we do not impose housing and consumption to be homothetic, and the sign
of ¹ a®ects whether housing is a luxury (¹ > 0) or a necessity (¹ < 0).2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 25
(b) Stochastic processes
In the model households face uncertainty in two dimensions: idiosyncratic uncertainty
over earnings and aggregate uncertainty over house prices.7
Following MaCurdy (1982), the idiosyncratic income process is assumed to follow
a random walk:
lnwt = at + vt where vt = vt¡1 + »t; »t » N
Ã
¡
¾2
»
2
;¾2
»
!
and ½w = 1 (2.8)
and at is the deterministic growth in earnings over the life-cycle and has a hump shape
(at = a1t + a2t2).
The house price is assumed to evolve as an AR(1) but in this case the deterministic
element re°ects upwards drift over time:
lnpt = d0 + d1t + ½h lnpt¡1 + "t "t » N
µ
¡
¾2
"
2
;¾2
"
¶
(2.9)
The price of a °at is assumed to be a proportion · of the price of a house.
2.2.2 Model Calibration
We now estimate the parameters required for analysis. We impose values for some
parameters, such as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption and
the discount rate, using values from elsewhere in the literature. Some parameters
we estimate directly from the data. These `externally ¯xed' parameter values are
reported in table 2.1. The rest of the parameters we obtain through calibration using
the structural model outlined in section 2.2. These parameter values are reported in
table 2.2.
7In fact it is not a di±cult extension to include iid noise in the interest rate, but results were not
sensitive to this and so we removed this dimension of uncertainty from our ¯nal runs; in equation (2.1)
we implicitly assumed that the interest rate was not a stochastic state variable.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 26
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
House Price Process
½h 0.94 ODPM
¾2
" 0.008 ODPM
d 2.32% ODPM
· 0.6 BHPS
p22 4.67 BHPS
Income Process
½w 1.0 (By assumption)
¾2
»HE 0.035 BHPS
¾2
»LE 0.044 BHPS
(a1HE;a2HE) (0.042, - 0.00082) BHPS
(a1LE;a2LE) (0.022, - 0.00037) BHPS
w22HE 1.0 BHPS
w22LE 0.8 BHPS
Preference Parameters
° 1.43 (Attanasio and Weber, 1995)
Á 0.6 BHPS
Other parameters
¸y 3.0
¸h 0.9
¯ 1.02¡1
r 0.018 B.o.E
Notes: BHPS indicates that source is survey data from the British Household Panel
Study; ODPM indicates data that were provided by the then O±ce for the Deputy
Prime Minister, these data are now available from Communities and Local Government
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1165366).
(a) External Parameter Values
Borrowing limits
The parameters that determine the fraction of the house price (¸h) and the multiple
of earnings (¸y) that households can borrow are chosen to match institutional features
of the UK mortgage market. Households can borrow up to whichever amount is lower
between three times household earnings (¸y = 3) and 90% of the house price (¸h = 0:9).2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 27
House price process
Estimation of the parameters of the house price process is based on the O±ce of the
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) national and regional house price series for the UK,
years 1969-2000.8 We estimate an AR(1) process, with linear trend (equation 2.9), for
the logarithm of real house prices, where the conversion from nominal house prices was
made using the Retail Price Index (RPI, all items). The result of the estimation is a
persistence parameter (½h) of 0.94 and a standard deviation of the shock (¾") equal to
0.089. A unit root test on the persistence parameter does not reject the null hypothesis
(½h = 1). We treat house price shocks as aggregate.
The ratio of the price of a °at to the price of a house, ·, is set by dividing all
houses and °ats in the data into two categories by the number of rooms. The ratio ·
is therefore the ratio of the average price of a home with less than 5 rooms (including
kitchens and bathrooms) to the price of a home with more than ¯ve rooms.
Income process
We estimate the parameters of the income process (¾» and a1 and a2) using data from
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1991-2002. Since the decision
making units in our model are best thought of as families, the process that we estimate
is for household (non-investment) income. To obtain an estimate of the variance of
the permanent shock in the income process (¾2
»), we follow the estimation procedure
proposed in Blundell et al. (2004b). We separately estimate the parameters for high
and low education groups. The results in table 2.1 show ¯rstly that high education
individuals can expect a more hump-shaped income pro¯le than their less educated
counterparts during their working lives (both a1 and a2 have a bigger magnitude for
the high education group), and secondly that the high education group have a lower
variance in permanent shocks to their income.
We model retirement as being a period of 15 years in which households' income
8We use the series reporting average house prices for all dwellings.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 28
is given by a replacement rate of 70 percent of their last annual income. Income is
not subject to risk during retirement. Having retirement income allows households to
continue owning their house when they stop working, and therefore home ownership in
our calibration is still close to the levels observed in the data around age 60. However,
since we do not model bequests, households run down all assets by the end of life
(age 81), leading to an overestimate of the amount of selling of homes towards the
end of life. Our calibration and comparative static exercises focus on home-ownership
behaviour up to age 60.
Interest rate process
For interest rates we use the average 90 day Treasury Bill discount rate in years 1968-
1997,9 which gives a rate of 1.5%.
Utility function
The preference parameter ° in the utility function is set to match the consumption
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.7 in the data (see Attanasio and Weber
(1995) and the survey by Attanasio and Wake¯eld (2008 and forthcoming)). This
corresponds to a curvature parameter ° = 1:43 for our within period utility function.
The parameter Á indicating the relative utility value of a °at to a house is set at 0.6.
Initial Wealth
We set the initial distribution of ¯nancial assets for the two education groups to match
data on 22-26 year olds in the 2000 wave of the BHPS,10 and we assume that households
have zero housing endowments at age 22.
9We stop in 1997 since in that year the interest rate setting regime was changed when the Bank of
England became independent with a remit to set interest rates to achieve a target in°ation rate.
10These data are discussed in Banks et al. (2002b).2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 29
(b) Calibrated parameters
Given the parameters above, we set the remaining parameters to ¯t the model to data
on life-cycle home-ownership pro¯les for household heads aged 26-60 between 1991 and
2000,11 by education group. Our approach is to choose the parameters to minimise the
sum of squared deviations between moments calculated in the data and corresponding
simulated moments. The moments we use are the average home-ownership rates for
households in low and high education groups, for those aged 26-35 and those aged
36-60. The statistics from our model are measured across 40 di®erent simulation runs
(i.e. 40 di®erent realised sequences of the aggregate house price process), each of which
simulates the behaviour of 1000 individuals. We set the calibrated parameters to be
common across the two education groups.
We use this calibration process to pin down the transactions cost of buying or
selling, F; and the parameters specifying the utility bene¯t of home ownership, ¹ and
µ. Parameter values from the calibration are summarised in table 2.2. Table 2.3
presents the calibration statistics, showing how home-ownership rates predicted by the
model match those observed in the data.
Table 2.2: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value
µ 0.026
¹ 0.11
F 0.05
When assessing the plausibility of our (proportional) ¯xed cost parameter, it is
necessary to bear in mind that there is a ¯xed cost of buying and of selling, so an
agent who trades up or down while continuing to own will pay a transaction cost equal
to ¯ve percent of the sale price plus 5 percent of the purchase price. Our ¯xed cost
11Data come from the years 1991-2000, as years prior to 1991 are a®ected by the large-scale selling
o® of local authority housing.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 30
Table 2.3: Calibration Statistics
High Education Low Education
Statistic Data Model Data Model
Ownership rate (percentage)
Age 26 - 35 65.4 68.2 49.5 49.2
Age 36 - 60 81.1 76.5 62.7 62.8
Sum of squared deviations 28.74
Notes: The data ¯gures for home-ownership rates are based on the years 1991-2000 of the FES.
parameter of 5% seems plausible given the costs of employing estate agents, lawyers,
surveyors, removal companies, and other specialists, when moving house house in the
UK. In addition, residential property transactions incur stamp duty, a transactions tax
which has rates varying between zero and 4% of the price of the property (the rate
increases with the house price) and which is formally paid by the house buyer. Since
the ¯xed cost is a®ected by tax policy, it is interesting to know how it a®ects behaviour
and welfare, and we shall consider these issues in the next section.
Unlike with the ¯xed cost, we do not have strong priors about the plausible level for
the calibrated utility parameters. The calibration runs showed that a range of di®erent
combinations of ¹ and µ (with higher ¹ associated with higher µ) would result in a
very good ¯t for home-ownership for the low education group. Finding the values
that worked best across the two education groups involved ¯nding a (¹;µ) pair that
produced a reasonably good ¯t for the high education group while also being close to
a point of good ¯t for the low education group.
The housing utility parameters determine whether home ownership is a luxury or
a necessity, and whether home ownership and consumption are substitutes or comple-
ments in utility. As mentioned above, ¹ being positive means that home ownership is
a luxury in utility: given that the risk aversion parameter ° is greater than one, the
utility from consumption is negative and decreasing in absolute value as consumption
increases; the constant, positive additive term is thus a bigger proportional shift in
utility at higher levels of consumption, and this is the sense in which home ownership2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 31
is a luxury. The positive value of µ implies that home ownership and consumption are
complements in utility, in the sense that that cross-partial derivative of utility with
respect to c and h is positive.
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Figure 2.1: Home Ownership in Baseline Run
Figure (2.1) shows pro¯les of °at and house ownership for both education groups
in our baseline simulation. These plotted pro¯les are not completely smooth because
in the calibration we have averaged over a relatively small number (40) of realisations
of sequences of house prices. This is done because the house price is thought of as an
aggregate variable (and the parameters of the house price process are calibrated from
aggregate data). Since this price is aggregate, data for a given set of years contain in-
formation on only a relatively small number (equal to the number of cohorts observed)
of realisations of the house price at each age. In the next chapter we will be even more
careful about the aggregate nature of the house-price process, inputting observed re-2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 32
alisations of the house price in each year into our simulations for the calibration and
thus capturing that di®erent cohorts experience the same shocks at di®erent ages. As
well as ¯gure 2.1 charting ownership by age, in appendix table A2.1 we also report
ownership rates in certain age bands. This table supplements the ¯gure and the re-
ported ownership rates are useful when interpreting the elasticities described in later
sections.
To assess our calibration, it would be useful to compare the predictions of our model
concerning the pattern of non-housing wealth holdings over the lifetime, to patterns
observed in data. Unfortunately it is hard to get such numbers from the data, since
private pension wealth is rarely well measured in survey data. One exception to this
is the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, which started in 2002 and measures
detailed information on di®erent elements of wealth portfolios for households that
include individuals aged 50 or older.12 Data from this survey in 2002/03 indicate that
the mean (median) family wealth held in ¯nancial assets and private pensions was
approximately 9.2 (4.7) times median income for low income individuals aged 51 -60,
and for high education individuals the ¯gures were 16.8 (11.0). The nearest equivalent
measures for the low education group in our baseline simulation are 9.5 (7.2), which is
a reasonably good match. For the high education group the simulation numbers are
8.2 (5.8).
The less good match for the high education group may be partly due to the fact
that the pension replacement rate in our model is 70% for all individuals, and this is
higher than the replacement rate that higher income individuals can expect from state
pensions in the UK. The absence of inheritances (apart from some initial wealth) and
bequests from the simulations may also be a simpli¯cation that is less realistic for the
high education group.
12For more details on this, see Banks et al. (2005). Thanks to Gemma Tetlow for help dealing with
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2.3 Sensitivity to income and house-price parameters
In this section, we use our calibrated model to show how housing demand depends on
the level of income, the house price and on capital market imperfections and on frictions
in the economy such as the ¯xed transactions cost. We focus on changes to parameters
that a®ect individuals across their entire lifetime, and ¯rst consider parameters that
relate to the income process, before addressing parameters of the housing market. In
the ¯rst two subsections we consider how the parameters in question a®ect housing
and consumption demand. There are two di®erent aspects to housing demand that we
consider: one is the demand for ownership of any size house; the second is the demand
for °ats versus houses. A ¯nal subsection looks in more detail at the importance of
¯xed costs, focussing on the welfare consequences of changes in this parameter.
To look at housing and consumption demand responses, we utilise elasticity mea-
sures. Since consumption is a continuous variable, we can calculate the responsiveness
of consumption to changes in the parameters of our model using a standard elas-
ticity measure. Since home-ownership is discrete, we calculate the responsiveness of
home-ownership through \quasi-elasticities", measuring the proportional change in
the homeownership rate to proportional changes in a given parameter. For example, a
(lifetime) income elasticity (²Y ) measures the proportionate change in homeownership
in our simulations, to a given proportionate change in incomes within our simulated
economy. We calculate this by comparing behaviour in the baseline economy to that
in an economy with all incomes increased by one percent.13 We calculate elasticities
within particular age groups, as well as for lifecycle home-ownership. This elasticity
measure captures the e®ect of an anticipated increase in lifetime income. To aid in-
terpretation of the elasticities for the housing good, in table A2.1 in the appendix, we
report home ownership rates in our baseline run, since these enable the calculation of
quantity e®ects from the elasticity measures.
13Apart from being scaled to take account of the change in income levels in the economy, the income
and house price shocks experienced by each of the 40,000 simulated individuals are held ¯xed.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 34
2.3.1 Changes related to income
Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show the extent that home ownership and consumption respond
to a change in lifetime income, to a change in the variance of earnings and to a change
in the borrowing constraint that depends on income.
Table 2.4: Elasticities for ownership: Factors relating to income
High Education Low Education
²Y ²vY ²¸Y ²Y ²vY ²¸Y
Ownership elasticities
Age 26 - 35 0.95 -0.06 0.34 0.98 -0.26 0.24
Age 36 - 50 0.36 -0.11 0.03 0.51 -0.10 0.02
Age 51 - 60 0.43 -0.10 -0.00 0.48 -0.10 0.02
Lifetime 0.67 -0.08 0.14 0.69 -0.13 0.12
Quantity elasticities
Age 26 - 35 1.12 -0.05 0.42 1.39 -0.27 0.39
Age 36 - 50 0.49 -0.12 0.08 0.72 -0.14 0.09
Age 51 - 60 0.54 -0.12 0.03 0.68 -0.12 0.05
Lifetime 0.80 -0.09 0.20 0.92 -0.14 0.19
The main message from the results in table 2.4 is that home ownership of the
young is the most sensitive to income parameters. Higher income or a loosening of
the income constraint leads to greater home ownership among the young but makes
less di®erence to the older groups. This message remains the same if we consider the
quantity of housing bought rather than just the e®ect on ownership,14 although the
quantity elasticities tend to be somewhat larger than the ownership elasticities.15
14We de¯ne quantity by counting a °at as 0.6 of a house, as is de¯ned in the price process.
15Comparing ownership and quantity elasticities is one way to assess the importance of including2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 35
Table 2.5: Elasticities for °ats and houses: Factors relating to income
High Education Low Education
´Y ´vY ´¸Y ´Y ´vY ´¸Y
Elasticities for Ownership of a Flat
Age 26 - 35 -2.43 -0.30 -1.27 -1.65 -0.18 -0.74
Age 36 - 50 -2.27 0.17 -1.02 -1.09 0.20 -0.51
Age 51 - 60 -0.96 0.21 -0.38 -0.77 0.00 -0.19
Lifetime -1.29 -0.04 -0.64 -0.84 -0.07 -0.33
Elasticities for Ownership of a House
Age 26 - 35 1.41 -0.28 0.56 2.30 -0.30 0.73
Age 36 - 50 0.71 -0.14 0.17 1.18 -0.22 0.24
Age 51 - 60 0.74 -0.17 0.09 1.14 -0.15 0.13
Lifetime 1.04 -0.09 0.29 1.44 -0.16 0.34
Comparing quantity and ownership elasticities is one way to think about the im-
portance of including di®erent sizes of property in the model. Another is to consider
separate elasticities for °ats and houses (table 2.5). The pattern here is revealing: for
both the change in the income level, and in the income-related borrowing constraint,
the elasticity of demand for °ats is negative while for houses it is positive. These elas-
ticities indicate that the °at is an `inferior good',16 and that demand for °ats falls as
the borrowing constraint makes housing more a®ordable. These two properties of the
two sizes of property, rather than a single, uniformly sized, housing asset. In a versions of our model
with only a single property type (with value (utility and price) equal to the average of the °at and
house values in the current model, or with value equal to the value of the house), the qualitative
patterns of elasticities (both for changes related to income and changes related to house prices) were
similar to those reported for the two size model. Such a `one-size' model would not allow scope to
show that quantity elasticities are generally ampli¯ed (rather than dampened) relative to ownership
elasticities, nor to consider separate °at and house markets.
16This feature is reliant on the fact that a change in the price of housing a®ects °ats and houses
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demand for °ats arise because, as the change in question makes housing more a®ord-
able, more people upgrade from a °at to a house than from not owning to owning a
°at, and thus the demand for °ats falls. These properties of the demand for °ats would
be important in a model in which the price of housing is endogenous (see chapter 4).
The reason why this is true is discussed in the next section.
Table 2.6: Consumption elasticities: Factors relating to income
High Education Low Education
²Y ²vY ²¸Y ²Y ²vY ²¸Y
Age 26 - 35 1.02 -0.25 0.01 1.02 -0.27 0.01
Age 36 - 50 1.00 -0.09 0.00 1.01 -0.11 0.01
Age 51 - 60 0.98 -0.01 0.00 0.99 -0.05 0.01
Lifetime 0.98 -0.05 0.00 0.98 -0.08 0.00
Table 2.6 looks at the e®ects of the income-related changes on non-durable con-
sumption. We see that a change in income each period has an e®ect on consumption
that is close to one-for-one in each age range. An increase in the variance of income
shocks tends to reduce consumption, particularly for the youngest group.
2.3.2 Changes relating to house prices
Tables 2.7, 2.8 and table 2.9 show the extent that home ownership and consumption
respond to an increase in the level of house prices at all ages, to a change in the
variance of shocks to house prices, to a change in the downpayment constraint and to
a change in the ¯xed cost. The consumption responses are rather small and we shall
not comment on them further.
As with income, home ownership among the young is the most sensitive when these
parameters relating to the housing market are changed: ownership among the young
falls as the house price increases, as uncertainty about the house price increases, as2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 37
Table 2.7: Elasticities for ownership: Factors relating to house prices
High Education Low Education
²HP ²vHP ²¸HP ²FC ²HP ²vHP ²¸HP ²FC
Ownership elasticities
Age 26 - 35 -0.74 -0.18 0.15 -0.23 -0.68 -0.17 0.02 -0.31
Age 36 - 50 -0.24 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 -0.39 -0.08 0.01 -0.10
Age 51 - 60 -0.34 -0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.42 -0.00 0.01 -0.12
Lifetime -0.53 -0.06 0.10 -0.19 -0.55 -0.04 0.02 -0.21
Quantity elasticities
Age 26 - 35 -0.92 -0.15 0.17 -0.22 -1.06 -0.11 0.03 -0.36
Age 36 - 50 -0.37 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.58 -0.03 0.01 -0.15
Age 51 - 60 -0.44 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.59 0.03 0.01 -0.14
Lifetime -0.67 -0.05 0.11 -0.17 -0.76 -0.00 0.02 -0.21
the downpayment requirement becomes greater and as ¯xed costs go up. The response
to a tightening of the credit constraint is again greater for the low educated. Another
pattern that is similar to that from the changes related to income is that - with the
partial exception of the responsiveness to the variance in income shocks - quantity
elasticities again tend to be slightly larger than ownership elasticities.
As when considering changes in factors relating to income, we can look in more
detail at how housing demand changes are allocated across the two types of housing,
by considering elasticities for houses and °ats separately (see table 2.8). Again we see
that in some cases the elasticities for °ats and houses have opposite signs. This is
most evident for the elasticities when the price of housing goes up: in response to this
change the demand for houses declines but the demand for °ats increases. Given the
parameterisation, the °at in our model is a Gi®en good.17 This property is due to the
17For this conclusion it is important that there is a single price for housing, so that the prices of2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 38
Table 2.8: Elasticities for °ats and houses: Factors relating to house prices
High Education Low Education
²HP ²vHP ²¸HP ²FC ²HP ²vHP ²¸HP ²FC
Elasticities for Ownership of a Flat
Age 26 - 35 2.79 -0.68 -0.15 -0.34 1.81 -0.56 -0.02 -0.04
Age 36 - 50 2.39 -0.72 -0.17 0.16 1.05 -0.51 0.01 0.25
Age 51 - 60 1.03 -0.33 0.02 -0.11 0.60 -0.19 0.01 -0.01
Lifetime 1.52 -0.28 -0.02 -0.52 0.84 -0.29 0.01 -0.17
Elasticities for Ownership of a House
Age 26 - 35 -1.23 -0.11 0.19 -0.21 -1.92 0.03 0.04 -0.45
Age 36 - 50 -0.59 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.99 0.09 0.00 -0.25
Age 51 - 60 -0.64 0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.96 0.10 0.02 -0.18
Lifetime -0.92 -0.02 0.13 -0.12 -1.23 0.08 0.02 -0.22
fact that when the price of housing increases more people shift from house ownership to
°at ownership, than shift from °at ownership out of the housing market. In line with
the comments of the previous subsection, this property of the demand for °ats would
be important in a model in which the price of housing is endogenous (see chapter 4).
The `Gi®en good' property emphasizes how in an equilibrium setting quite di®erent
price movements will be required to choke o® (stimulate) the changes in demand for
di®erent types of property that arise from aggregate economic shocks.
2.3.3 Responsiveness to ¯xed costs
In the previous two subsections we have looked at how home ownership and consump-
tion are a®ected by the parameters of our model. In this subsection we extend the
analysis for one particular parameter, the level of the ¯xed cost, and think about halv-
°ats and houses go up at the same time.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 39
Table 2.9: Consumption elasticities: Factors relating to house prices
High Education Low Education
²HP ²vHP ²¸HP ²FC ²HP ²vHP ²¸HP ²FC
Age 26 - 35 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02
Age 36 - 50 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02
Age 51 - 60 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02
Lifetime 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.02
ing this cost from 5% to 2.5%. The ¯xed cost is the one institutional parameter that
was calibrated in our moment matching exercise, and it is also a feature of the housing
market that is directly a®ected through by tax policy.18 We look at how ¯xed costs
a®ect patterns of home ownership over the life-cycle, and at the impact of the level of
¯xed costs on expected lifetime welfare.
We know from tables 2.7 and 2.8 that increases in ¯xed costs lead to a reduction
in home ownership and to a delay in buying. Further, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that
higher ¯xed costs mean households are less likely to buy °ats before buying houses,
and less likely to trade down to a °at after owning a house. Clearly increasing the ¯xed
costs increases transactions costs, causing a substitution e®ect (demand for housing
falls, and consumption increases) and a wealth e®ect (for a given number of home
purchases at given house prices, less income is available for consumption). In this
subsection as well as looking at how ¯xed costs a®ect patterns of home ownership,
we explore which of the substitution and wealth e®ects is most important in shaping
behaviour and the welfare consequences of a change in ¯xed costs.
We separate out the wealth and substitution e®ects by ¯rst running the model
with a low ¯xed cost that is known in advance (column `c.' in table 2.10). The impact
of this low ¯xed cost relative to the baseline scenario (column `a.') combines both
18In the U.K., by stamp duty land tax.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 40
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Figure 2.2: Response of ownership to change in ¯xed costs, high education
substitution and wealth e®ects. Then we run the model with households expecting to
pay the baseline ¯xed cost, but when transactions occur the household pays only the
low ¯xed cost (column `b.'). There is therefore no substitution e®ect associated with
the lower ¯xed cost.19 The results of this exercise are reported in table 2.10, which
reports statistics for the level of consumption and home-ownership, and for the average
number of di®erent housing market transactions during the lifetime, in the di®erent
scenarios that are simulated.
The ¯nal three rows in each panel of table 2.10 report measures of the welfare
change induced by the reduction in ¯xed costs. The welfare change is reported in terms
of the amount of resources needed to compensate the agents, on average, for not being
in the low ¯xed cost scenario. The compensation is measured by a transfer of assets
19The part of the wealth e®ect which would induce an ex-ante change in behaviour is also excluded
from this experiment and so only the ex-post e®ect of higher wealth is calculated.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 41
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Figure 2.3: Response of ownership to change in ¯xed costs, low education
at the beginning of life (third from last row in each panel) and by a \consumption
equivalent", which is the proportional increase in consumption at every age that is
needed to make agents indi®erent (ex ante) between the two scenarios being compared.
Since the utility function with housing terms, and the credit constraints, means that
the model does not have a solution that is homothetic throughout, the consumption
equivalent can not be calculated analytically. Instead it is found through an iterative
procedure that relies on expected discounted lifetime utility as derived in the numerical
solution to the model for comparisons between the scenarios reported in columns a.
and c. For comparisons involving the scenario for column b. in which the low ¯xed cost
is a \surprise", there is no numerical solution for expected utility (rather the solution
for the relevant policy functions is that with the higher ¯xed costs). For these cases the
iterative procedure for ¯nding the consumption equivalent relies on simulated expected2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 42
lifetime utility. Fuller details of the computational procedure for ¯nding the welfare
measures are reported in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
Table 2.10: E®ects on consumption, homeownership, and welfare, due to changing
¯xed costs
a. b. c.
High Education Calibrated Low FC as Low FC
Run \surprise"
E(Consumption) 1.421 1.432 1.430
E(ownership rate) 0.59 0.60 0.64
E(°at ownership) 0.11 0.11 0.13
E(house ownership) 0.48 0.49 0.50
E(# Transacts in life) 2.55 2.57 3.35
% trade up at least once 8.5 8.6 21.1
% downsize at least once 13.5 13.6 42.2
Equivalent variations, wrt c.:
Initial asset measure 0.246 0.043 0
Consumption equiv (%) 1.106 0.195 0
Equivalent variations, wrt b.:
Consumption equiv (%) 0.909 0 N/A
a. b. c.
Low Education Calibrated Low FC as Low FC
Run \surprise"
E(Consumption) 0.988 0.998 0.997
E(ownership rate) 0.45 0.45 0.50
E(°at ownership) 0.15 0.15 0.16
E(house ownership) 0.30 0.30 0.33
E(# Transacts in life) 2.39 2.42 3.21
% trade up at least once 8.6 8.8 17.4
% downsize at least once 9.4 9.4 31.6
Equivalent variations, wrt c.:
Initial asset measure 0.219 0.035 0
Consumption equiv (%) 1.263 0.196 0
Equivalent variations, wrt b.:
Consumption equiv (%) 1.045 0 N/A
Notes: `Trade up' is a direct movement from a °at to a house without an intervening period of non-ownership,
and `downsizing' is the converse. The initial asset measure is expressed as a percentage of expected initial
income.
The table shows that the halving of the ¯xed cost leads to an increase in consump-2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 43
tion, and also to an increase in the expected level of home ownership (or equivalently,
in the expected number of periods of ownership), across the lifecycle. The results also
show the extent to which the cut in ¯xed cost leads to an increase in the number of
housing market transactions during the lifetime: with the lower ¯xed cost, the likeli-
hood of moving directly from °at to house ownership (i.e. of `trading up') at some age
is more than doubled compared to in the high ¯xed cost case, while the likelihood of
the converse change in ownership (`downsizing') approximately trebles. Also evident
from the table is that consumption behaviour is almost the same in the scenarios of
columns `b.' and `c.', while housing market behaviour is almost constant between sce-
narios `a.' and `b.'. That is, the change in the consumption behaviour happens even
when the change in the ¯xed cost is not expected, but the change in behaviour in the
housing market only occurs when decisions are made on the basis of knowledge of the
lower transactions cost.
The welfare measures in table 2.10 show that while a consumption increase of
slightly more than one percent at each age is required to compensate individuals for
facing a 5% ¯xed cost instead of a 2.5% ¯xed cost, only a 0.2% increase in consumption
is required to provide compensation for being surprised by the lower ¯xed cost, rather
than being able to plan on the basis of it. Overall, then, we see that a cut in the
¯xed cost leads to an increase in welfare primarily through a wealth e®ect that allows
increased lifetime consumption once the overall cost of each housing market transaction
is reduced. That is not to say that the substitution e®ect is unimportant. Being able to
plan on the basis of the lower ¯xed cost leads to an important reshaping of individuals'
housing market choice functions, and the increased °exibility of trading in housing
markets also increases welfare appreciably.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 44
2.4 The Response to Shocks
In the previous section (subsection 2.3), we saw how responsive housing demand and
consumption are to changes in house prices or income that a®ect the entire lifecycle.
In this section, we contrast those results with the e®ect of a small shock to the house
price or income that strikes during the lifecycle. That is to say, we calculate ´H;t;
(´Y;t;) the e®ect on home ownership at t of realised house prices (income) being 1%
higher than in the baseline.20 We consider the e®ect on ownership and consumption
of house price and income shocks occurring at age 30, 40 or 50.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show, for high and low education respectively, the average
e®ect on home ownership (panel `a.') and consumption of a 1% upwards shock to the
house price at age 30, 40 and 50.21 The results show larger percentage impacts for
the low education group, as the fact that the house price is a bigger proportion of
lifetime wealth in the low education group (on average) outweighs the fact that fewer
low education individuals own.
Though the size (in percentage terms) of e®ects is di®erent across the two educa-
tion groups, patterns of results are rather similar. The e®ect of the shock on home-
ownership rates is an initial decline, with the largest reduction in home-ownership (of
around 1% for the high education group, and 1.2% to 1.5% for the low education group)
experienced around ¯ve years after the shock. The peak decline does not occur in the
year of the shock because an initial contraction in the number of buyers has a lasting
e®ect on the stock of home owners, and this is compounded by the persistence in the
house price process, meaning that the shock continues to discourage new purchases
for several years after it is initially felt. In the longer term the home-ownership rate
20Since income is stochastic, the experiment is that the realisation of income is 1% higher than a
draw from the distribution would imply.
21Each of the lines plotted in ¯gures (2.4) and (2.5) shows the percentage di®erence in a. the home
ownership rate or b. average consumption in two simulation runs between which the only exogenous
change is to the house price shock at the given age such that the level of the house price at that age
is increased by one percent. The simulation runs are based on 5000 sequences of house price shocks,
and each of the 5000 drawn prices at the relevant age are increased by exactly one percent.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 45
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Figure 2.4: E®ect of 1% house price shock at 30, 40 or 50, on: a. home ownership and
b. consumption; High education.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 46
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Figure 2.5: E®ect of 1% house price shock at 30, 40 or 50, on: a. home ownership and
b. consumption; Low education.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 47
recovers towards where it would have been without the shock, and this re°ects the fact
that the house price displays persistence, but not permanence in shocks (appendix
¯gure A2.1 shows the rate at which the e®ect of a shock dissipates from the expected
level of the house price). It also re°ects that over time agents can modify their saving
behaviour to mitigate the shock.
Turning to the e®ect on consumption, we see that in the model the positive house
price shock increases average consumption regardless of the age at which the shock is
experienced. The increase in consumption is seen to be strongest for the eldest group
who are most likely to have large equity in their home, and who have the shortest
horizon (on average) over which to spread extra wealth. This pattern across age-
groups con¯rms the intuition behind the empirical analyses of Attanasio and Weber
(1994) and Attanasio et al. (2009, 2005b) investigating why house price shocks have
been strongly correlated with consumption growth in the U.K. over the past 30 years;
we shall return to that issue (and a fuller discussion of related literature) in the chapter
3.
The e®ect on consumption tapers o® over time. It is worth noting that the positive
e®ect when the house price shock occurs becomes a negative di®erence some time
in the 50s for those experiencing a shock aged 30, particularly in the low education
group. Many of this group would be credit constrained at the time of the shock and
so the opportunity to borrow more when the house price increases can be exploited
by young individuals taking out mortgages and bringing forward some of their lifetime
consumption in order to °atten out the lifetime consumption pro¯le and so move
towards the non-constrained optimum.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show, for high and low education respectively, the e®ect on
average on home ownership (panel `a.') and consumption of a 1% upwards shock to
income at age 30, 40 and 50.22 As with the house price shocks just discussed, the
22Each of the lines plotted in ¯gures (2.6) and (2.7) shows the percentage di®erence in a. the home
ownership rate or b. average consumption in two simulation runs between which the only exogenous
change is to the income shock at the given age, such that the level income at that age is increased by2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 48
patterns of results for these income shocks are similar for the two education groups.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show that income shocks at the given ages lead to increases
in both home-ownership rates and non-durable consumption. The increase in con-
sumption is immediate and (since income shocks are permanent23) persistent. The
proportionate increase in consumption is somewhat less than the proportionate in-
crease in income. One reason for this is that some of the increase in lifetime wealth
is spent on housing. A second reason also explains why older groups of individuals
increase their consumption less (in proportionate terms) on average when the income
shock occurs. These individuals enjoy the income shock for a smaller proportion of
their lifetime, and experience it when they have already built up some positive (¯nan-
cial plus housing) wealth. This wealth means that these individuals will consume more
than the sum of their remaining income during the remaining part of their life. Thus
the one-percent increase in (expected) remaining lifetime income can fund an increase
in remaining lifetime spending of somewhat less than one percent. Since this e®ect
gets more marked as age and wealth increase, we see smaller proportionate increases
in per period consumption, the later in life the income shock occurs.
Whereas the increase in consumption after the income shock is rapid, the increase
in the level of home ownership is more gradual. The random walk nature of the income
process means that the income shock at a given age a®ects the income level throughout
the rest of the lifetime. Thus, while for some individuals the initial shock is enough
to induce them to become owners or to upsize straight away, for others some years
of increased resources are required to allow a change in housing market choices. This
explains why the ownership rate tends to drift up, rather than immediately jumping
to a given higher level, after the shock to incomes.
exactly one percent for every individual. The simulation runs are based on 5000 individuals each with
their own realisation of the (idiosyncratic) income process.
23Income is a random walk.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 49
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Figure 2.6: E®ect of 1% income shock at 30, 40 or 50, on: a. home ownership and b.
consumption; high education.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 50
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Figure 2.7: E®ect of 1% income shock at 30, 40 or 50, on: a. home ownership and b.
consumption; low education.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 51
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen a life-cycle model of households choosing how much to
consume or save, and whether to own a °at, a house or no housing, in each period
of life. The model was carefully constructed to realistically capture mortgage-related
borrowing constraints, which are often represented in a stylised way in existing litera-
ture.
Within the model we have examined how sensitive households choices are to the
parameters of the house price process, and the income process, and also to tightness
of mortgage-related borrowing constraints. We found that the level of the house price
and income have marked e®ects on behaviour and that when incomes go up, and when
the price of housing (i.e of houses and °ats goes up) this leads to an increase in demand
for houses, but to a fall in the demand for °ats.
We have also seen that for a given level of house prices the level of (proportional)
¯xed costs in the housing market can have a noticeable e®ect on consumption and
welfare (primarily through a lifetime income e®ect) and on housing market behaviour
(a substitution e®ect). In the ¯nal part of the chapter we saw that shocks to house
prices or income during the lifecycle will have somewhat di®erent e®ects on behaviour
depending on the age at which they occur.
As mentioned in chapter 1, the exploration of the model in this chapter, as well
as being interesting in itself, can be seen as a preparatory exercise for the work in the
next two chapters.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 52
A2 Appendix to chapter 2
A2.1 Extra tables and pictures
Appendix Table A2.1: Ownership rates
Quantity Proportion
owned owners
High education
Age 26 - 35 0.65 0.68
Age 36 - 50 0.73 0.76
Age 51 - 60 0.72 0.77
Low education
Age 26 - 35 0.43 0.49
Age 36 - 50 0.55 0.63
Age 51 - 60 0.54 0.63
Table A2.1 shows ownership rates by age group in the calibration run.
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Appendix Figure A2.1 E®ect of HP shock at age 30 on expected HP at older ages
Figure A2.1 shows the e®ect on the expected house price at ages 31 to 60 of a 1%
house price shock at age 30.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 53
A2.2 Computational methods
The setup of our model, with a discrete choice concerning home-ownership, coupled
with ¯xed costs and the particular form of the borrowing constraints, means that the
functions of the household's optimisation problem are not `well behaved' and we cannot
rely on the existence of smooth ¯rst-order conditions that could otherwise have been
exploited to improve e±ciency in solving the problem.24 Instead we rely on robust
techniques which involve solving using iteration on the value function (rather than the
¯rst order condition), and ¯nding di®erent \conditional value functions" (one for each
of the current choices of house ownership, °at ownership, and non ownership) which
can be compared in order to determine the discrete choice.25
As is standard for these dynamic problems, the solution for consumption and home-
ownership is found recursively from the last period of life, T, backwards. In the ¯nal
period of life the value function consists of current utility from home ownership and
consumption, and behaviour in this period is constrained by the necessity that assets
at the end of life be non-negative. Given the optimal choices at t + 1, t < T, the
backwards recursion then proceeds to choose home ownership, consumption and saving
that maximise period t's value function, subject to the borrowing constraints.
In order to compute the solution, we solve at a ¯nite number of points in the asset
dimension. We store optimal decisions and value functions at grid points but in our
simulations households' choices are not restricted to coincide with these points. We
perform linear interpolation in all the cases in which choices lie between points.
We also use discrete approximations to the speci¯ed continuous processes for id-
iosyncratic income and the house price. This involves modelling these processes using
¯nite state Markov chains that mimic the underlying continuous-valued univariate pro-
24The combination of the two borrowing constraints mean that we can show not only that the value
function will not be universally concave, but also that the derivative (with respect to assets) will not
be de¯ned at all points in the support of this function.
25The development of these techniques was a key part of the research for the project RES-000-23-
0283, funded by the U.K. Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), (Attanasio et al., 2005c).2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 54
cesses. This is done as described in Tauchen (1986). We preferred Tauchen's method
of equally spaced nodes over the quadrature based method proposed by Tauchen and
Hussey (1991), because this has been shown to be more robust to very high persistence
in the modelled processes (Floden, 2007).
For the runs presented in this draft of the paper, we have used 105 nodes in each
`conditional' asset grid (we have separate grids underlying each conditional value func-
tion, since assets are limited by di®erent borrowing constraints depending on the home-
ownership choice). Points are more dense in the lower range of the asset grids, to make
sure that non-convexities in the value function are not overlooked in the maximisation
process. Income and the house price are each represented by a grid of ¯fteen nodes.
Monte-Carlo experiments showed that these grid sizes were su±cient to capture the
modelled processes to a high degree of accuracy. With this set up, the model solution
and simulation takes around 3 hours on a desktop PC.
Method for deriving consumption equivalent measures
When constructing welfare measures in subsection 2.3.3 we adopt a standard approach
of expressing these as a \consumption equivalent". This measures the proportionate
increase in consumption every period that is required to compensate the individual
in terms of ex-ante expected utility for some welfare reducing factor, in this case
higher ¯xed costs in the housing market. In a lifecycle consumption/savings model
with constant relative risk aversion utility and without the complications of a discrete
housing choice and its associated borrowing constraints, such a measure can be found
analytically. It is derived from the \target expected utility" U0 and the expected utility
in the less preferred state of the world before compensation, U0, as:
¿ = (U0=U0)(1=[1¡°]) (2.10)
where ° is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion.2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 55
In our case with the housing choice and mortgage borrowing constraints, the (ex-
pected) value function does not inherit homogeneity properties from the utility func-
tion, and so equation 2.10 cannot be applied and instead the value must be found
numerically. As mentioned in the main text, for the case of comparing two fully opti-
mised solutions, this iterative procedure can compare numerical solutions for ex-ante
expected utility; but in the case where one of our comparison cases is low ¯xed costs
arriving as a `surprise', the values of expected utility must come from averaging across
many simulations of the lifecycle. Whichever way we arrive at the expected utility lev-
els, the iterative procedure we adopt to ¯nd the consumption equivalent is as follows:
1. Find the baseline expected utility levels U0, for the case in which compensation
is needed, and U0, the target utility. Use these to calculate an initial guess for
the consumption equivalent (¿) by applying equation 2.10.
2. Re-solve the compensated case, with consumption in every period multiplied up
by the factor ¿.
3. Find (from the solution or from simulation as appropriate) the expected lifetime
utility in the compensated case.
4. Compare this to the target expected utility. If it is su±ciently close, stop.
5. If the level of expected utility is not su±ciently close to the target, then readjust
¿. To readjust, calculate the amount by which expected utility exceeds (or falls
short) of the target, as a proportion of the change in expected utility due to
the latest change in ¿, and use this proportion to scale ¿ to its new value. For
example, if the change in expected utility has been two percent too large to hit
the target, then reduce ¿ by two percent.
6. Return to step `2.', and keep repeating the procedure until step `4.' is satis¯ed.
This procedure turned out to be reliable and quite rapid. For the cases we consid-
ered the initial guess for ¿ based on equation 2.10 was a good guide to the ¯nal value2 Modelling the Demand for Housing over the Lifecycle 56
of the compensating equivalent (the initial adjustment being less than ten percent in-
accurate compared to the correct adjustment) and iteration to the solution generally
took no more than half a dozen steps.
Method for implementing later shocks
When implementing one percent shocks in income or the house price at ages 30, 40
and 50 (see section 2.4), we had to set up the discrete approximation to the relevant
price in such a way that an increase of exactly one percent could be implemented.
This required altering the grids underlying our Markov chain approximations, and in
particular a move away from the evenly spaced grids that we adopted for our baseline
solution and simulation. In order to maintain the accuracy of the approximation, we
increased the number of points in the relevant grid.Chapter 3
The Coincident Cycles of House
Prices and Consumption in the
U.K.: Do House Prices Drive
Consumption Growth?
3.1 Introduction
Over much of the past thirty-¯ve years, the cycles of house prices and consumption
have been relatively closely synchronised in the UK. Figure 3.1 shows the remarkable
comovements of house price growth and consumption growth (notice however that the
scale of house price movements is two and half times that of consumption growth) .
The correlation between house prices and consumption makes changes in house prices
an important indicator for those wishing to judge in°ationary pressures within the
economy. Indeed, this indicator is closely watched by the Bank of England's Monetary
Policy Committee precisely because, in the words of Nickell (2004), \... The evidence
suggests that house price in°ation is signi¯cantly related to household consumption
573 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 58
growth and hence to aggregate demand growth and future consumer price in°ation in
the economy". The perceived importance of this indicator is also illustrated by recent
press discussion of what could happen if house prices were to decline or stagnate from
current levels after an extended period of real growth (see Economist (2007), Giles
(2008)).
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Figure 3.1: Growth in real consumption and house prices
To understand the implications of house price movements for consumption levels
in the economy, and therefore the appropriate policy response to conditions in the
housing market, it is necessary to understand what drives the link between house
prices and consumption. Three main mechanisms to explain this co-movement have
been proposed in the literature:
1. A \wealth e®ect": increases in house prices raise households' wealth, raising their
desired level of expenditure.
2. A \credit constraints" channel: house price growth increases the collateral avail-
able to homeowners, thus loosening borrowing constraints and facilitating higher3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 59
consumption (see Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and particularly Muellbauer
and Murphy (1990) for a discussion of mechanisms 1. and 2)1.
3. A \common causality" model: factors such as changes in expected income growth,
tax changes or changes in credit market conditions lead to increases in both
households' expenditure and house prices (see King (1990) and Pagano (1990)).
It has been argued that these di®erent mechanisms might have e®ects that are
observationally equivalent if one looks only at macro-data, and so researchers must use
data on the behaviour of individuals or households in order to disentangle the di®erent
e®ects. Attanasio and Weber (1994) (hereafter AW, 1994) used such micro-data in
order to examine the consumption boom of the late nineteen-eighties, which coincided
with a rise on real house prices of slightly more than 40% in the space of four years. In
order to identify what features of the micro-data they should look for, these authors
drew on insights from a life-cycle model. AW (1994) argued that if wealth e®ects were
important, then these were likely to have the biggest e®ects on the consumption of
older individuals who are most likely to have equity in any housing assets, and who
have a relatively short time horizon over which to distribute the consumption of the
extra wealth. They also simulated a simple lifecycle setup (with no housing asset)
and showed that an upward revision of expectations of future income (productivity)
could lead to the consumption of the young (with longer to enjoy the higher income
stream) responding more strongly than that of the old. The ¯nding that the eighties
consumption boom was driven in a large part by strong consumption by the young,
was therefore a key component of an argument that this boom, and the simultaneous
boom in house prices, may have owed much to common causes. AW's exercise was
recently extended in a variety of ways by Attanasio et al. (2009, 2005b), (hereafter
ABHL), who, by and large, con¯rmed the results in AW (1994).
The complicated nature of the relationship between housing assets and non-durable
1Recent evidence relating to this issue can be found in Aron et al. (2007)3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 60
consumption means that it may be perilous to rely on a stylised model for insights.
AW themselves acknowledged this when mentioning that the consideration of credit
constraints, and modeling of housing decisions and house price booms, would be in-
teresting extensions that were beyond the scope of their model. The purpose of this
paper is to derive the implications of changes to house prices and earning innovations
for the consumption of di®erent groups in the population. We can therefore check in
a rigorous fashion whether such a structural model con¯rms intuitions about how and
why the consumption of di®erent groups might correlate with house prices, intuitions
which have formed the basis of past empirical tests. We will also explore whether
our model can be used to add to our understanding of what has driven consumption
growth during °uctuations over the last 35 years in the U.K. economy, and by per-
forming counterfactual simulations attempt to quantify the e®ects of di®erent factors
that move consumption.
Our central contribution comes from our systematic use of a realistic structural life-
cycle model of consumption, savings and housing choices, to inform the interpretation
of empirical analyses intended to distinguish between the three mechanisms proposed
to explain the correlation of house prices and consumption. The ¯rst part of the ex-
ercise that we undertake involves constructing and numerically solving the structural
model which is the main tool of our analysis, and calibrating this model to match U.K.
data. The model, which we describe in detail in section 3.3, includes some innovative
features. We model the ¯nancial markets available to the agents in our model to be
a realistic representation of the U.K. mortgage market. We calibrate the stochastic
processes faced by our agents to include both idiosyncratic and aggregate components.
The former are calibrated using micro data. The latter include aggregate shocks to
house prices and incomes (which are experienced by everyone in the economy at the
same point in time). We estimate the parameters of the time series processes for house
prices and aggregate earnings using data covering the last 35 years in the U.K.. We
are not aware of other studies that use this combination of aggregate and micro data3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 61
in the calibration of an individual-level model and yet it is, in our opinion, important
given that we want to understand aggregate °uctuations by aggregating individual
consumption.
We choose the parameters of our individual model (such as the preference for hous-
ing services) to reproduce some cohort level facts, such as the level of home ownership
and its evolution over the life cycle. Having successfully matched these moments, we
can simulate individual behaviour given the set of aggregate innovations to house prices
and earnings that we estimate on our time series data. Aggregating up the simulated
behaviour of heterogenous individuals, we are able to check the extent to which our
model is able to reproduce the features of aggregate consumption growth in the U.K..
Notice that the moments of aggregate data are not used to calibrate our individual-
level model. Thus this type of comparison to aggregated data forms an extra check on
the validity of our model (alongside comparison to micro data moments), and such a
check might be used in other contexts where micro models should reproduce patterns
of aggregated, as well as individual, behaviour.
The next step of our analysis is to simulate behaviour under a set of counterfactual
scenarios in which the mechanisms that might drive the link between house prices
and consumption are shut down in turn. The construction of these counterfactuals is,
by de¯nition, an exercise that cannot be undertaken using data and (as explained in
section 3.4) forms our main means for exploring how we might disentangle the in°uence
of the di®erent mechanisms that might drive the link between house price shocks and
consumption growth.
Our results (see section 3.4) provide a ¯rmer theoretical grounding for reduced form
empirical analyses of the type conducted by AW and ABHL. We show that in a model
with credit constraints and simultaneous housing and consumption choices, a house
price shock that drives consumption changes through a wealth e®ect will lead to the
biggest consumption responses from older groups. As documented in AW and ABHL
(whose results are described in more detail in section 3.2), this age pattern of responses3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 62
is the reverse of that observed in data. Our model also shows that the pattern in the
data could instead be explained by a shock to aggregate incomes of the kind that has
been suggested as a possible common cause of house price and consumption growth.
In addition to these basic intuitions, we can quantify the size of these e®ects in the
model, within a framework that is shown to ¯t the data in a number of dimensions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides a fuller description
of evidence which points towards the conclusion that factors other than wealth ef-
fects have driven the recent correlation between house price shocks and consumption
growth in the U.K.. Section 3.3 describes the lifecycle model that we use, and how
we calibrated this model to match recent U.K. history. Section 3.4 contains our main
analyses of di®erent scenarios within the model, and discusses how the analysis of these
scenarios relates to empirical results. The ¯nal section concludes.
3.2 Existing evidence
Amongst recent papers that have used micro-data to assess the relationship between
house prices and consumption in the U.K., there appears to be little consensus. Camp-
bell and Cocco (2007), argue that their empirical results suggest that wealth e®ects are
the most likely explanation of the correlation between house prices and consumption.
They ¯nd that increases in consumption observed during recent house price booms,
were mainly driven by increases in the consumption of home owners (rather than
renters) and older consumers rather than younger ones. Campbell and Cocco (2007)
also use a structural model to assess whether endogeneity of the home-ownership de-
cision might bias their empirical results. By contrast, ABHL ¯nd the relationship
between consumption growth and house prices to be strongest for younger individu-
als as argue that the common causality channel is most important. Both papers use
micro-data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey / Expenditure and Food Survey3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 63
and yet reach very di®erent conclusions.2
To be more precise about the ¯ndings, we summarise the exercise of ABHL. Their
baseline speci¯cation is the following:
lnXch
t = ®c + f(age) + °0zch
t + "c
t + uch
t (3.1)
where c stands for cohort and h stands for household; X is non-housing expenditure,
®c a cohort-speci¯c intercept, f(age) is a quintic in age, zch
t are a set of demographics,
and "c
t and uch
t are cohort-speci¯c and household-speci¯c error terms.
The purpose of running this baseline consumption function, is to look at which
groups deviate most markedly from predicted consumption levels in times of consump-
tion boom or consumption bust. ABHL look at this question by calculating residuals
from the regression, averaging these residuals by year and age-group, and then plotting
the results. We have updated this analysis using data from 1978 to 2005/6 (ABHL had
data running until 2001/2), and the results are shown in ¯gure 3.2. The ¯gure shows
that in times of large consumption boom or bust - particularly the late 1980s boom
and the mid 1990s slump - it is the consumption of the young that most deviates from
expected levels. These are also times of unusually strong house price growth. Thus
the ¯gure is a good indication that it is the consumption of the young that is most
strongly associated with house price growth. To anticipate section 3.4, a tool in our
analysis of how our model relates to the data will be to recreate ¯gures similar to 3.2,
but using simulated data.
To look in more detail at the role that house price shocks have in explaining these
patterns in residuals, ABHL extend the speci¯cation 3.1 to explicitly control for the
2It is unclear why this is the case, though there are several methodological di®erences between the
papers. A comparative study by Cristini and Sevilla (2008) attempted to replicate both studies as
closely as possible. The ABHL results were found to be robust, whereas the Campbell and Cocco
results were sensitive to the speci¯cation.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 64
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Figure 3.2: Consumption function residuals, by age group
in°uence of (regional) house prices. The speci¯cation is extended as follows:
lnXch
t = ®c + f(age) + °0zch
t + µ
0
agg(hp) + "c
t + uch
t (3.2)
where ag are three age groups: young (aged less than 35), middle-aged (aged between
35 and 60) and old (aged over 60).
Given the potential for complicated interactions in the relationships being analysed
using equation 3.2, ABHL try a number of di®erent speci¯cations for the function
g(hp) in an attempt to capture the relationship between house prices and consumption
in a °exible fashion. Table 3.1 reports the coe±cients of interest for two of their
speci¯cations.3 The `shocks' speci¯cation reported in table 3.1 includes as regressors
predicted (log) house prices4 and the di®erence between predicted and realised (log)
3The full set of independent variables in the regressions is: a quintic in age of head of household;
cohort dummies; occupation dummies; region and month dummies; controls for family composition;
educational attainment dummies.
4Where house prices are predicted from real interest rates and regional incomes.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 65
house prices. The latter term is intended to capture the e®ect of unexpected house price
growth for these three age groups. The house price terms in the `growth' speci¯cation
reported in table 3.1 measure the e®ect on consumption of proportionate growth in
house prices. The strongest associations between unexpected and proportionate house
price growth and consumption are seen to show up for young individuals. Since this
group contains individuals who are unlikely to hold large amounts of housing wealth,
and this is also the group for which (due to the planning horizon) wealth would have
the smallest immediate e®ect on consumption, these results have been interpreted as
suggesting that wealth e®ects have not been the main driver of the correlation between
house prices and consumption.
Table 3.1: ABHL house price terms by age groups: predicted price speci¯cation
Estimated Coe±cients
House Price Terms Shocks spec Growth spec
Predicted log house price
Young 0.291*
Mid-age 0.292* N/A
Old 0.294*
Shocks to log house price
Young 0.188*
Mid-age 0.088* N/A
Old -0.012
Proportional growth in house price
Young 0.209*
Mid-age N/A 0.127*
Old 0.042
Notes: These results are taken from Attanasio et al. (2009).
The empirical evidence indicates that, in the recent past, it has been young indi-
viduals (those aged 35 and under) who have had the biggest deviations (on average) of
consumption from expected levels in times of boom and bust. The young group are also
the group for which swings in house prices are most able to explain such deviations of
consumption from expected levels. Section 3.4 will use graphical analysis of residuals,3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 66
plus counterfactual simulations (i.e. without some of the aggregate shocks), to look at
whether our model produces similar patterns and to analyse how we can understand
what could be driving such patterns in the data. Before that, it is necessary to outline
the structure of the model.
3.3 The model
As discussed in section 3.1, our central contribution lies in our systematic use of a
realistic structural lifecycle model of consumption, savings and housing choices, to
disentangle and distinguish the three mechanisms that have been proposed to explain
the correlation of house price shocks and consumption growth. As such, our work is
building on several recent contributions that have examined the relationship between
housing (or durables) and consumption in structural frameworks.5 Such analyses have
found that the nature of housing as consumption good, asset, source of collateral,
and potential intergenerational heirloom, makes the relationship complex. Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2005), for example, argue persuasively that a housing asset
may have an important role in explaining the observed \hump shape" of pro¯les of
consumption and durable consumption over the lifecycle. Flavin and Nakagawa (2004)
discuss the fact that when the amount of housing can only be adjusted at cost, this
may explain why both housing and non-durable consumption tend to be smooth over
time apart from at infrequent periods of large adjustment. Similarly, the analysis of
Li and Yao (2007) shows how a housing asset can result in consumption behaviour
(including for housing consumption) that is very insensitive to income in some ranges,
but very sensitive in others.
Our contribution to this literature comes in a large part from the way we apply
our model to match features of aggregate data, as we simulate the behaviour of a
5As mentioned in the previous section, Campbell and Cocco (2007) makes some use of a structural
model, while Cocco (2005) is a contribution to another growing literature on portfolio choice in the
presence of housing.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 67
series of cohorts designed to resemble cohorts of the U.K. economy. The model is
constructed with some of the stochastic elements faced by the agents - the process for
house prices, and a component of the income generating process - that are thought of
as aggregate in that they a®ect all members of the population at the same time. As
well as using data to estimate the parameters of the processes generating shocks to
these aggregate features, we also have estimates of the path of aggregate shocks that
have been experienced in the U.K. economy since the beginning of the 1970s, and we
use this path as an input into our simulations.
More precisely, we take the data on actual growth rates in house prices and aggre-
gate earnings in the economy each year, and input these into our simulations at the
correct age for the particular cohort that we are simulating. We repeat this process
for each ¯ve year cohort born between the 1910s and the 1970s, and create simulated
data for a large number of di®erent households (i.e. realisations of the idiosyncratic
shocks) in each cohort given the house prices and the aggregate income that they ac-
tually faced. These simulated data are the basis for our comparisons to data on the
U.K. economy, including to household survey data which incorporate the same set of
cohorts.
It is important to stress that our simulations take as an input the actual path of
prices and incomes in the U.K. economy. Since the relationships between choices, prices
and income in our model are not linear, simulating for a speci¯c path of prices and
aggregate income as we have done gives di®erent results from simulating behaviour on
average (across di®erent levels of the house price and aggregate income) for particular
shocks. Our simulations based on actual shocks to house prices and incomes also form
the \baseline" against which we can compare counterfactual scenarios in which the
mechanisms that might drive the link between house prices and consumption are shut
down in turn; these scenarios and how they compare to our calibrated baseline are the
subject of section 3.4, below.
In order to carry out the exercise described in the previous paragraph, our model3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 68
had to be carefully constructed with certain novel features, and is therefore a contribu-
tion in its own right to the understanding of lifecycle choices in the face of uncertainty.
The model is of a household's lifecycle choices concerning consumption and saving,
and whether or not to own housing. Since we want to capture how aggregate shocks
feed in to aggregate consumption, we are careful to model aggregate income and house
price uncertainty in a way that re°ects the data. We are particularly careful to model
correlation in the shocks in the two processes since house prices and incomes both tend
to go up (down) when the economy is performing strongly (poorly), and this must be
re°ected in agents (rational) expectations. To our knowledge, building these aggregate
shocks, and their empirical correlation, into a model of the kind we construct has not
been done previously. In addition, building on the models presented in Bottazzi et al.
(2007) and in chapter 2 and Attanasio et al. (2007), we are careful to model mortgage-
related borrowing constraints as realistically as possible since these are likely to have
¯rst-order e®ects on behaviour. We now describe the model, and its calibration to UK
data, in detail.
3.3.1 The household maximisation problem
The households in our model are (ex-ante) heterogeneous in one dimension: their level
of education. In practice this will imply the calibration of di®erent earning processes for
households with di®erent level of education. In addition, each household experiences
di®erent idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. And at a given point in time, households of
di®erent ages are present.
A household lives T = 59 periods (ages 22-80). In every period t · T; the household
maximises utility by choosing consumption, with ct 2 R+; and whether to own a °at, a
house, or no housing (which may be thought of as costless rental), with ht 2 f0;1;2g.6
6Recently we have been exploring the e®ect of adding a rental price (linked to the house price to
avoid the addition of an extra state variable) to the budget constraint. This changes the properties
of the calibration since ownership becomes ¯nancially more attractive and so the housing preference
and discount parameters must be adjusted to match proportions of house and °at owners. However
the change in parameters has no e®ect on the results regarding price shocks and the consumption of3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 69
The household value function in period t is given by:7
Vt (At;ht¡1;Pt;Yt;Zt) = max
fct;htg
u(ct;ht) + ¯EVt+1 (At+1;ht;Pt+1;Yt+1;Zt+1) (3.3)
subject to
At+1 = Rt+1
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
(At + Wt ¡ ct ¡ ·Pt(1 + F)I(ht = 1) ¡ Pt(1 + F)I(ht = 2))
if ht¡1 = 0
(At + Wt ¡ ct + ·Pt(1 ¡ F)I(ht 6= 1) ¡ Pt(1 + F)I(ht = 2))
if ht¡1 = 1
(At + Wt ¡ ct ¡ ·Pt(1 + F)I(ht = 1) + Pt(1 ¡ F)I(ht 6= 2))
if ht¡1 = 2
(3.4)
where At is the start of period asset stock and Rt+1 = 1+rt+1 and rt+1 is the (real)
interest rate on the liquid asset; Pt is the price of housing which is realised at the start
of period t; F is the cost of selling or buying a house, which is proportional to the
price; Wt is household income in period t, while Yt and Zt are the idiosyncratic and
aggregate components of the income.8 The number of state variables in this problem
(with four continuous states plus the current home ownership and time) means it
is computationally demanding to solve; for more details on the solution method see
appendix section A3.1.
We only allow for collateralised debt, i.e. households are only able to have negative
¯nancial assets when they are home owners, so that when they do not own a house
di®erent age groups, which will be discussed in section 3.4.
7Throughout this description of the household's problem, I will stick to the notation of having
only one index, t, that captures both time and age (for an individual born at a given date). In
the simulations that produce the results reported from section 3.3.3, a key feature is that observed
aggregate shocks are input for the date at which they hit each cohort. Thus for the simulations we
have to be careful to keep track of the relationship between age and time for each simulated cohort.
8The household is assumed to be fully aware of the separate stochastic processes that generate
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(ht = 0) they are subject to the constraint
At ¸ 0: (3.5)
Home owners can borrow, and when they do so they are subject both to a terminal
asset condition that translates into an implicit borrowing constraint, and to two explicit
borrowing constraints. In particular, we impose the terminal condition AT+1 = 0. The
speci¯cation of marginal utility becoming in¯nite at 0 consumption means this terminal
condition prevents households borrowing more than they can repay with certainty. In
addition to this implicit borrowing constraint, we model two explicit constraints. The
¯rst is a function of the value of the house and the second is a function of the household
annual income. They determine how much a household is able to borrow at the time
of purchase or when remortgaging, and translate into the following constraints in the
period after the new mortgage is agreed:
At+1 ¸ ¡¸h·Pt(1 + r); · =
8
> <
> :
0 < · < 1 if ht = 1
1 if ht = 2
(3.6)
The value (1 ¡ ¸h) can be thought of as a downpayment requirement.
At+1 ¸ ¡¸wWt(1 + r) (3.7)
The explicit constraints on the downpayment and the debt to income ratio only
apply when households buy the property or remortgage. Formulating the constraints in
this way complicates the model solution (for details see section 2.2.1). In particular, it
makes the model more complicated to solve numerically than, for example, having only
an downpayment constraint that must be satis¯ed every period (as, for example, in
Campbell and Cocco (2007), Li and Yao (2007) Cocco (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz
(2004)). However it seems important to us to capture the institutional features of the3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 71
U.K. mortgage market, since these are likely to a®ect how house price shocks feed into
consumption. The correlate of only applying the constraints in periods of buying or
remortgaging is that when a household continues owning without remortgaging, they
can keep their existing debt if they have negative ¯nancial assets:
At+1 ¸ At (3.8)
Although there is no mortgage repayment schedule, the household does have to
pay o® mortgage interest each year in which it does not remortgage.
Utility and bequest functions
Households get utility from consumption, from home-ownership, and from leaving
bequests.
The within period utility function is CRRA in non-durable consumption. This is
augmented by a term re°ecting the value of home-ownership:
u(ct;ht) = exp(µÁht)
c1¡°
1 ¡ °
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
µ; Á 2 Rnf0g if ht = 0
µ 2 R; 0 < Á < 1 if ht = 1
µ 2 R; Á = 1 if ht = 2
(3.9)
The parameter µ is a housing preference parameter which determines the utility
that households obtain from owning a house rather renting it. Á determines the relative
utility from owning a °at versus a house. These parameters are calibrated in our model;
further discussion of the preferences just discussed can be found in chapter 2.9
The utility from leaving a bequest is described by a second iso-elastic function:
b(!) = ¿ ¤
(!=¿)1¡°
1 ¡ °
(3.10)
9Similar forms for preferences regarding housing are used by Ejarque and Leth-Petersen (2008) and
Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008).3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 72
Where ! is the value of wealth (both ¯nancial and housing wealth, net of the ¯xed
cost of selling a property) left over at the end of life T, after all shocks to resources
(income and the house price) have been realised, and all consumption decisions have
been made.10 The parameter ¿ is calibrated. A bequest motive, although not central
to our analysis, is crucial to match certain features of the life cycle pro¯le of home
ownership, particularly at later ages.
3.3.2 The environment: exogenous stochastic processes
Households face three dimensions of uncertainty: shocks to house prices, which are
aggregate (i.e. common across all properties in the economy); aggregate shocks to
income; and idiosyncratic shocks to income. In the present version of the model, the
interest rate on liquid assets and debt is ¯xed.11
If we take the income generating process ¯rst, this may be thought of as being
composed of three parts:
lnWt = dt + yt + zt (3.11)
where lower case has been used for logs, and dt is a deterministic part to the income
generating process, yt is a persistent idiosyncratic stochastic element; and, zt is the
aggregate stochastic component.
The deterministic component dt is hump-shaped over the working lifetime and is
captured using (the log of) a polynomial. The coe±cients of these polynomial are
calibrated for the two education groups we consider. In practice, to ¯t the observed
data we need a cubic speci¯cation (see Appendix A3).
10For more motivation of the modelling of bequests, see, for example, De Nardi (2004).
11It is a relatively simple extension to add i.i.d shocks to the interest rate. Early experiments
indicated that such a change has no qualitative impact on our results.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 73
The idiosyncratic stochastic component yt is modelled as an AR(1) process:
yt = ½yyt¡1 + »t; »t » N
¡
0;¾2
»
¢
(3.12)
The parameters of dt and yt are set based on a single estimation that is described
in Appendix A3.
The stochastic aggregate component to income is modelled jointly with the stochas-
tic house price price using a ¯rst-order vector auto-regression with correlated innova-
tions. When we used data to estimate this process, we could not reject the hypothesis
that lagged income does not a®ect current house prices and similarly that lagged house
prices do not explain current income. However, we ¯nd a signi¯cant and sizeable cor-
relation between house price and earnings innovations. As for the e®ects of own lags,
we could not reject that these coe±cients were equal to unity: we therefore impose
this value.
If we let HP stand for the house price and again use lower case letters to represent
logs, this can be written as:12
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The value of modelling these aggregate processes jointly as a VAR, rather than as
separate autoregressions, is that the joint distribution of the error terms will capture
correlation between aggregate shocks to house prices and incomes. Capturing this
correlation is valuable since it will a®ect the degree to which individuals will choose to
modify their asset accumulation as a means of self insurance against shocks. The joint
12Given the unit persistence in this equation, the constant terms ®
z
0 and ®
h
0 capture drift over time
even though there is no time trend in equation 3.13, see Davidson and Mackinnon (2004), pp.606f.
Since the process is in logs, the constant terms measure the trend growth rate.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 74
distribution of the shocks is assumed to be normal:
ut » N(0;­) (3.14)
where
­ =
2
6
4
¾2z ¼¾z¾h
¼¾h¾z ¾2h
3
7
5
with ¼ measuring the correlation between the shocks.
3.3.3 Calibration and estimation
The parameters of our model can be divided into three categories: those we take from
other studies, those we estimate outside the model and those we calibrate to ¯t some
moments of the micro data we consider. We estimate the parameters of the exogenous
stochastic processes faced by the agents in our model using time series data. Our
calibration exercise, instead, involves matching moments for life cycle levels of home
ownership status in the U.K. for those aged 26-60 in 1990-2006. Since we simulate
cohorts born between the 1910s and 1970s, we match the ownership levels for the
cohorts in the relevant age range in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Parameters ¯xed or estimated outside of the model
For inputs into the calibrated model, we need to use data on earnings, the house price
process and the interest rate on liquid assets. Values for parameters ¯xed or estimated
outside the model are summarised in table 3.2.
Utility function
The preference parameter ° in the utility function is set to match the consumption
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.7 found in data (see Attanasio and Weber
(1995)). This corresponds to a curvature ° = 1:43 for our within period utility function.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 75
Table 3.2: Estimated / Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value Source
Estimated/Fixed Parameters
Utility Parameters
° 1.43 Attanasio and Weber (1995)
¯ 1:0358¡1
Aggregate House Price and Income Process
®z
0 1.66% FES
¾z 0.033 FES
®h
0 3.58% DCLG
¾h 0.091 DCLG
¿ 0.645 FES / DCLG
· 0.6 BHPS
Idiosyncratic Income Process
Deterministic component: cubic in age BHPS
High Edu Low edu
½y 0.76 0.77 BHPS
¾» 0.39 0.41 BHPS
MedianP22
MedianY22 3.3 4.4 BHPS
Credit market Institutions
¸y 3.0
¸h 0.9
¹ r 0.03 B.o.E.
Notes: FES indicates that the source is Family Expenditure Survey / Expenditure and Food Survey data, BHPS
means British Household Panel Survey and DCLG indicates the use of data published by the Department for
Communities and Local Government.
The parameter Á indicating the relative utility value of a °at to a house is set at the
same level as the price ratio of °ats to houses, ·, so that Á=0.6. We also choose a
baseline discount rate of 3.58%, which matches the expected rate of return on housing.
Aggregate Processes: The house price and aggregate income shocks
As described by equations (3.13) and (3.14), the aggregate house price and income
processes are speci¯ed in logs as a vector autoregression of order one (a VAR(1)), with
drift. To estimate this process we use: data on the national mix-adjusted house price3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 76
series for the U.K.13, which are the same data underlying ¯gure 3.1 and are freely
available from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG); and,
data on the UK Family Expenditure Survey / Expenditure and Food Survey (FES).
Since our model is set up in terms of real prices, we de°ate both series to prices for
the latest year using the all item Retail Prices Index, and we use data for the years
1969-2006. As anticipated in section 3.3.2, estimation of this process does not reject
unit persistence, and so we impose that aggregate shocks are permanent as in equation
(3.13). The other parameters returned from this estimation are trend growth rates for
the house prices (3.58%) and income (1.66%), and standard deviations of the shocks
to the processes of 0.091 and 0.033 respectively for the house price and income. The
correlation of the shocks for the two processes is approximately 0.65, and our model
assumes that people know this correlation and build it in to their expectations.
It is important to realise that in our simulation exercises, in addition to inputting
the parameters we have been discussing to solve the model, we use as inputs the
estimated income and house-price shocks that are derived from the estimation of the
aggregate time series processes in equation (3.13). These processes are treated as
aggregate so that the same shocks hit all individuals in a given period, and thus a®ect
di®erent cohorts at di®erent ages. We feel that it is important that our simulations
re°ect actual realizations of aggregate shocks to drivers of consumption, since the
complicated nature of the relationship between house prices and consumption choices
is likely to mean that how this shows up in data will depend on the actual path that
prices follow and not just the processes generating prices. The growth rates in house
prices and aggregate income that we input into our model as aggregate shocks are
shown in ¯gure 3.9 in the appendix.
13We use the series reporting average house prices for all dwellings.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 77
Idiosyncratic income process
On top of the aggregate income process, there are two further elements to the household
income generating process (see equation (3.11)). These are a deterministic process,
which captures the hump-shaped pro¯le of household incomes over the working life
and a 60% replacement rate in retirement, plus a persistent stochastic component
which is described by a ¯rst order autoregression (equation (3.12)). The deterministic
component plus the process generating shocks to the stochastic component are both
education group speci¯c, and the realised shocks to the stochastic component are
idiosyncratic at the household level.
Parameters for both processes are estimated together as described in Appendix 3.5.
Since this involves estimation of a dynamic process at the household level, we require
panel data and so use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which is available
for the years 1991-2005. The estimation yields that the deterministic component can
be approximated as a cubic that shows a hump-shape over the working life which is
slightly more pronounced (in particular with a steeper slope at the beginning of the
working life) for the college educated group than for those with only compulsory level
education. The process generating stochastic innovations is quite similar across groups
with a persistence parameter of slightly more than 0.75 and a variance of the shock of
around 0.16 (exact values are in Table 3.2 or Appendix A3).
Credit market institutions
The parameters that determine the fraction of the house price (¸h) and the multiple of
earnings (¸y) that households can borrow are chosen to match the U.K. institutional
features. At the time of taking out a new mortgage (i.e. of buying or remortgaging)
households can borrow whichever amount is lower between three times household earn-
ings (¸y = 3) and 90% of the house price (¸h = 0:9). The interest rate on the liquid
asset / debt is taken to be ¯xed and is set to match the average of 3% for the real
interest rate on 90 day treasury bills for the period since 1990 (i.e. the period for our3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 78
calibration).
Calibrated parameters
We select the preference parameter for housing, µ,14 plus the parameter ¿ that de-
termines the bequest motive, and the ¯xed cost of housing, F, by matching average
life-cycle home-ownership rates between ages 26 and 35, and 36 and 60, for our two
education groups. We assume that the parameters are common across the two educa-
tion groups. As reported in table 3.3 we obtain values such that owning a house raises
utility by approximately 1.5% and owning a °at raises utility by approximately 1%,
the ¯xed cost of buying and selling is 3% of the property price, and the parameter ¿
takes a value of 4. Table 3.4 compares home-ownership rates predicted by the model
to those observed in the data15; we do a reasonably good job of matching the moments
of interest, particularly for the high-education group.
Table 3.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value
µ -0.015
Á 2
3
¿ 4
Fb = Fs 0.03
3.3.4 Model ¯t
Since we do not match any moments of consumption, the properties of the evolution
of consumption provide a useful check on whether our calibrated model of overlapping
cohorts is doing a good job of matching data on the U.K. economy. To the best of our
knowledge, at least in the consumption literature, it is an innovative contribution to
14Since the estimate of the intertemporal elasticity is taken from a paper which does not condition
on home-ownership, there is a possible bias.
15Data come from the years 1990-2006, as years prior to 1990 are a®ected by the large-scale selling
o® of local authority housing.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 79
Table 3.4: Calibration Statistics
High Education Low Education
Statistic Data Model Data Model
Ownership rate
Age 26 - 35 0.558 0.584 0.474 0.423
Age 36 - 60 0.794 0.822 0.632 0.681
Notes: The data ¯gures for home-ownership rates are based on the years 1990-2006 of the FES.
aggregate up simulations of individual behaviour based on observed aggregate shocks,
in order to check whether the model of individual choices is consistent with aggregate
evidence. In the present context, it is particularly sensible to check the properties of
simulated consumption in this way, since the question we wish to address concerns the
evolution of aggregate consumption.
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Figure 3.3: Growth in real consumption: Data versus model
In fact the model does a good job of matching the aggregate consumption growth
rate. This is shown in ¯gure 3.3 which compares the actual growth rate of aggregate
consumption in the U.K. economy to that in our simulated data for the years 1975-3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 80
2006. The correlation between these two series is 0.75. To provide a benchmark of
how good a match this is, the ¯gure also includes simulated data for the growth rate
of consumption based on a counterfactual scenario with no house price shocks (i.e. the
innovation to the house price is set to zero every period). In this case the correlation
to the data series is 0.58.
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Figure 3.4: Model consumption growth by cohort: 1980s boom
This good match for the consumption growth rate is an indicator that our model
might be useful for drawing quantitative, as well as qualitative conclusions. However,
unfortunately the model does less well capturing patterns at a more disaggregated
level, particularly by age group. For example, in the late 1980s consumption boom
we know (from Attanasio and Weber (1994)) that the strongest consumption growth
was from young groups. Figure 3.4 shows modelled consumption growth during this
boom for di®erent cohorts. During the middle years of the decade the model does
indeed predict the fastest consumption growth for the young, but in 1988, the year
of strongest consumption and house price growth, all cohorts are seen to have strong3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 81
consumption growth and the eldest cohort shown (aged in their late 50s - the black,
long-dashed line) is predicted to have consumption growing just as rapidly as those
cohorts in their 30s. This counterfactual pattern leads us to be cautious in drawing
quantitative conclusions from our model about the extent to which house prices have
caused shifts in aggregate consumption. Nonetheless the model is still useful for ex-
ploring the qualitative properties of consumption growth driven by increased housing
wealth or by increased permanent income.
3.4 Booms and busts in house prices and consumption
The main motivation of our analysis using the calibrated life-cycle model is to explore
how we can distinguish between the mechanisms that have been proposed to explain
the correlation of house price shocks and consumption growth. The ¯rst part of this
section looks at decomposing what is driving consumption growth in the model. The
latter part of the section considers how patterns of consumption growth vary with age
when house price or income shocks are more important. In each case the issues are
explored through using our model to simulate counterfactual scenarios in which the
possible mechanisms driving consumption growth are shut o® in turn.
3.4.1 What is driving consumption growth in the model?
To disentangle what is driving consumption growth in our model, and why house-price
and consumption growth are strongly correlated in the simulations, we compare a base-
line run of our model to runs in which aggregate shocks to house prices and to incomes
are switched o® in turn. This method of decomposing the drivers of °uctuations is very
much related to that outlined by Chiari et al. (2007) in a business cycles context.16
16Those authors emphasize that in computing the decomposition, the analyst wants to switch o®
shocks to variables in turn, but not to eliminate any e®ect of the level of other aggregate processes on
expectations of shocks to the process whose in°uence is to be measured: one wants to isolate the e®ect
of shocks each period, given rational expectations based on the observed state of the economy. In
many cases this involves switching o® the shocks, but having expectations based on the (multivariate)
aggregate state of the economy that was actually observed. In our case with unit persistence (and zero3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 82
The aggregate shocks to income and house prices are the only drivers of changes
in aggregate consumption growth in our model. We start by comparing aggregate
consumption growth across simulations. This approach will give us a good idea of
which factor is more important in driving swings in aggregate consumption growth in
the model economy. We then examine the simulated data in a more disaggregate way
to explore what micro-data on consumption can tell us about the relative importance
of house prices in driving aggregate consumption growth.
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Figure 3.5: Model consumption growth: di®erent scenarios
We saw in the previous section that our model appeared to generate a series for
aggregate consumption growth that closely tracked that seen in aggregate data. Figure
3.5 shows the growth rate of aggregate consumption using di®erent runs of the model
in which the aggregate shocks are switched o®. The\baseline" results are the growth
rates we saw previously in ¯gure 3.3, and the results with only the income shock were
cross terms) in the process generating aggregate states, the level of the house price or of aggregate
income does not a®ect expectations about how the other aggregate state variable will move, and so
our simulations do not need to keep track of an aggregate state measuring \where the economy would
have been". Thanks to Roman Sustek (Bank of England) for pointing out the parallel with this paper.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 83
also reported in that ¯gure. Figure 3.5 illustrates that when both house price and
income shocks are shut down, consumption grows at the constant rate of approximately
1.7%. The other lines show consumption growth rates in the presence of only income
shocks and only house price shocks. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is clear
that income shocks are driving much of the movement in consumption growth: the
growth rates when only house price shocks hit are typically closer to the constant level
whilst growth rates when only income shocks hit are closer to those in the baseline
(i.e. full shocks) economy. However, by the latter 1980s, the e®ect of changes in house
prices on consumption growth becomes more substantial. By the house price boom of
the late 1980s, more of the total consumption growth is driven by house prices than
by incomes; similarly the house price bust of the early 1990s drives almost all of the
negative consumption growth rates observed. Since then, house price shocks appear to
have been the predominant factor driving aggregate consumption growth in the model.
The relatively modest in°uence of income shocks in the later years modelled is due to
the fact that aggregate income shocks, set to match the data shown in ¯gure 3.9 in
the appendix, have become rather weak since the late 1990s, compared to the volatile
years of the 1970s and early 1980s.
One way to quantify \how much" of consumption growth is being driven by house
price or income shocks, is to look at the proportion of the deviation of consumption
growth in our baseline run from that in our run with no shocks, that is accounted for
by the deviation in the modelled economy with only a single aggregate shock. Doing
this over the whole period shown in ¯gure 3.5, we ¯nd that house price shocks explain
away about 55% of the deviation, while income shocks explain away about 35%.17 In
line with the descriptive analysis of the previous paragraph, this di®erence is stronger
after 1990 (for which period the proportions are 73% and 17% respectively), but is
reversed (40% and 50%) for the 1978 to 1990.
17Though the income and house price shocks are the only aggregate shocks in the model, these two
factors might also have a joint e®ect on consumption, and so there is no reason why these to numbers
should sum to 100%.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 84
3.4.2 How do the shocks a®ect di®erent age groups?
The above analysis looked at aggregate trends in consumption growth under di®erent
versions of the model where house price and income shocks were present or absent.
A more disaggregate analysis looking at these results for di®erent year of age-groups
will allow us to examine how the response to shocks varies for households at di®erent
points in the life cycle.
To carry out this exercise in a way that is directly comparable to the data, we use
the kind of regression analysis that was described in section 3.2 and that generated ¯g-
ure 3.2, to generate similar pictures based on model data. The pictures show residuals
from a consumption function, averaged by age at each point in time. The estimated
consumption function controls for variation in demographic factors and skill levels.18
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Figure 3.6: Residuals for log consumption: Model Results, Baseline
Figure 3.6 shows such averaged residuals for simulated data from the baseline run
18In the model we do not have all the demographic variables that can be measured in data, and the
the regressors are a subset of those mentioned in footnote 3. Speci¯cally, we include a polynomial in
age, plus measures of education and cohort.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 85
of the model that featured both aggregate income and house price shocks. In contrast
to the data picture (¯gure 3.2) that showed the young group experiencing the biggest
swings in deviations from expected consumption, this ¯gure shows three lines that
generally move together. Indeed, if anything the biggest residuals at the top of peaks
and the bottom of troughs, are for the oldest group. This is another example of
the model predicting \too much" variation in the consumption of older groups of the
population, a phenomenon discussed at the end of section 3.3.4. The results in ¯gure
3.6 provide a useful baseline against which to compare the results for runs in which
the only house price or income shocks are experienced.
−
.
0
8
−
.
0
4
0
.
0
4
.
0
8
.
1
2
A
v
e
 
l
n
 
c
o
n
s
 
r
e
s
i
d
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Young Mid Old
Figure 3.7: Residuals for log consumption: Model Results, House Price Shocks Only
Figure 3.7 shows the averaged residuals for simulated data based on an economy in
which house-price movements are the only aggregate shocks. The results clearly show
that, in the model economy, it is the consumption of the older group that responds
most strongly to house price shocks. Individuals in this group tend to have high equity
in housing, and have a short horizon over which to spread any new wealth. In times3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 86
of large shocks to house prices, the average consumption residual in the older group
can be as much as two to three times larger than the same statistic for the young.
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Figure 3.8: Residuals for log consumption: Model Results, Income Shocks Only
Figure 3.8 shows the averaged residuals based on a simulated economy in which
income changes are the only aggregate shocks. In this case average residuals tend to
be smaller than when house-price shocks operated, and the pattern is also reversed as
the younger group have the largest deviations of consumption from expected levels.
The contrast of this pattern to the case with house-price shocks, is important for the
analyst who wants to understand why aggregate consumption and house prices tend
to be positively correlated.
In sum, these age-group analyses have shown that di®erent shocks translate into
consumption responses that di®er across groups. Younger individuals tend to respond
more to aggregate-income shocks whilst older groups respond more to house price
shocks. In a stylised lifecycle model, it is possible to see an intuition for why this
occurs. A permanent income shock e®ectively acts as a shock to lifetime wealth, and3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 87
younger cohorts have a longer horizon over which to enjoy a positive shock (or su®er a
negative shock) and so will adjust their consumption by more. Older cohorts respond
more to house price shocks as they are more likely to have positive equity in their
homes and so bene¯t from a wealth channel that allows them to adjust consumption.
They would also respond more to this one o® wealth shock simply because they expect
fewer periods of life over which they can spread extra consumption.
However, without the kind of analysis that we have conducted, one could not
be sure that these intuitions would carry over to a more complicated model with
credit constraints and simultaneous housing and non-durable consumption decisions.
In particular, the possibility that house price shocks might a®ect consumption through
altering collateral and so borrowing possibilities, would seem more pertinent for the
young than the old. This implies that relative to the case of just a wealth e®ect,
collateral e®ects might complicate the pattern across cohorts of changes in consumption
following a house price shock. Our analysis shows that even with this factor in play,
it is the old whose consumption is most responsive to the house price shocks.
What we can draw from our analyses is the importance of using micro-data to try
to infer whether income shocks or house price shocks are responsible for consump-
tion growth that we observe. If consumption shocks appear particularly strong for
the young, that would suggest changes to aggregate incomes are most important in
explaining consumption movements whereas if the shocks are strongest for the old,
the housing wealth channel is likely to be most important. The earlier reduced form
studies by Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Attanasio et al. (2009) and considered
in section 3.2, indicated that excess consumption growth has been strongest for the
young, which was taken to imply that a wealth e®ect was not the main driver of the
observed correlation between house-price growth and consumption growth. Our results
put this interpretation on a stronger theoretical footing.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 88
3.5 Conclusions and further work
Our analysis has aimed to provide a deeper understanding of how we can distinguish
between the mechanisms that have been proposed to explain the correlation of house
price shocks and consumption growth. In particular, through our systematic use of a
realistic lifecycle model, we have investigated whether structural modelling con¯rms
the intuitions about how and why the consumption of di®erent groups might correlate
with house prices. These intuitions have formed the basis of past, reduced form,
empirical tests. Our analysis has involved some methodological innovations in the
way we have constructed our model and particularly in the way we have applied it to
simulate the behaviour of a series of cohorts, designed to resemble cohorts of the U.K.
economy.
Our analyses have in fact con¯rmed the intuitions in question. In particular, we
have seen that if a house-price shock is driving changes in aggregate consumption
growth, then these changes will be most evident in the consumption paths of older
groups. In our simulations the deviations of consumption from expected levels caused
by a house price shock were more than twice as strong for those at the end of their
careers and in retirement, as they were for those at the start of their careers. To get the
opposite pattern of stronger deviations for younger groups required some other type of
aggregate shock. In the model, and plausibly for many episodes in the data that have
coincided with periods of house price booms or busts, this could be a shock to incomes
and expected permanent incomes throughout the economy. Thus we have given a more
solid footing to the view that micro-data can be useful for disentangling the possible
mechanisms underlying the correlation between house prices and consumption growth,
and to the interpretation of Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Attanasio et al. (2009)
that a stronger correlation for young groups is powerful evidence against the hypothesis
that wealth e®ects from house price changes have been the main mechanism driving
the correlation.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 89
The exercise we have constructed has returned interesting results, but can also
be seen as a ¯rst step of a research agenda that aims at explaining the behaviour of
house prices as an equilibrium process. We have, in e®ect, modelled the demand side
of the housing market. In order to do this we have made a set of assumptions about
the process generating house prices which have facilitated an empirical speci¯cation
that could be approximated in our simulations. In doing this we have learnt that the
precise shape and parameterisation of this process is an extremely important driver of
the evolution of the joint decisions of housing demand and consumption expenditure,
both at the household and the economy-wide level.
It is possible that building a set up with endogenous prices would help us to un-
derstand why consumption, and particularly the consumption of the old, seems to be
less responsive to house-price shocks than is predicted by the current model. But
more than that, it is a major research challenge to assess whether the volatile house
price process we observe, and other features of aggregate consumption and housing
market behaviour, can be obtained from a uni¯ed framework in which house prices are
determined endogenously.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 90
A3 Appendix to chapter 3
A3.1 Solution method
The setup of our model, with a discrete choice concerning home-ownership, coupled
with ¯xed costs and the particular form of the borrowing constraints, mean that the
functions of the household's optimisation problem will not be `well behaved' and we
cannot rely on the existence of smooth ¯rst-order conditions that could otherwise
have been exploited to improve e±ciency in solving the problem.19 Instead we rely on
robust techniques developed in previous ESRC-funded research (ESRC grant RES-000-
23-0283, led by Attanasio) which involve solving using iteration on the value function
(rather than the ¯rst order condition), and ¯nding di®erent \conditional value func-
tions" (one for each of the current choices of house ownership, °at ownership, and non
ownership) which can be compared in order to determine the discrete choice.
As is standard for these dynamic problems, the solution for consumption and home-
ownership is found recursively from the last period of life, T, backwards. In the ¯nal
period of life the value function consists of current utility from home ownership and
consumption, plus the utility from leaving a bequest, and behaviour in this period is
constrained by the necessity that assets at the end of life (after leaving the bequest) be
non-negative. Given the optimal choices at t+1, t < T, the backwards recursion then
proceeds to choose home ownership, consumption and saving that maximise period t's
value function, subject to the borrowing constraints.
In order to compute the solution, we solve at a ¯nite number of points in the asset
dimension. We store optimal decisions and value functions at grid points but in our
simulations households' choices are not restricted to coincide with these points. We
perform linear interpolation in all the cases in which choices lie between points.
We also use discrete approximations to the speci¯ed continuous processes for id-
19The combination of the two borrowing constraints mean that we can show not only that the value
function will not be universally concave, but also that the derivative (with respect to assets) will not
be de¯ned at all points in the support of this function.3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 91
iosyncratic income, and for the house price and aggregate income. This involves
modelling these processes using ¯nite state Markov chains that mimic the underly-
ing continuous-valued univariate or bivariate processes. This is done as described in
Tauchen (1986). We preferred Tauchen's method of equally spaced nodes over the
quadrature based method proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991), because this has
been shown to be more robust to very high persistence in the modelled processes
(Floden, 2007).
For the runs presented in this draft of the paper, we have used 105 nodes in each
`conditional' asset grid (we have separate grids underlying each conditional value func-
tion, since assets are limited by di®erent borrowing constraints depending on the home-
ownership choice). Points are more dense in the lower range of the asset grid, to make
sure that non-convexities in the value function are not overlooked in the maximisation
process. Idiosyncratic income is represented by a grid of eight nodes, while there are
13 nodes in each of the grids for the house price and aggregate income (or, e®ectively
169 nodes for the joint process). Monte-Carlo experiments showed that these grid sizes
were su±cient to capture the modelled processes to a high degree of accuracy. With
this set up, the model solution and simulation takes around 30 hours.
As explained in the paper, the pro¯les of behaviour that we simulate are obtained
by simulating a series of cohorts designed to resemble cohorts of the U.K. population.
Every member of a particular cohort experiences the same shocks to aggregate income
and the house price at each age. Members of subsequent or earlier cohorts experience
the same series of aggregate shocks, but at the relevant ages so that every cohort
experiences the same shocks at the same point in time. The aggregate shocks that
are input in our baseline run are designed to match actual shocks to house prices and
aggregate incomes in the U.K., and these correspond to the growth rates shown in
Figure 3.9.
The pro¯les of behaviour reported in the paper are obtained by simulating 13 co-
horts (born between the 1910s and the 1970s) each containing 2000 individuals split3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 92
evenly between two education groups. Within education group, households di®er ac-
cording to their initial ¯nancial wealth and the idiosyncratic income shock that they
face at each period.
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Figure 3.9: Growth in real house prices and "aggregate income"3 Do House Prices Drive Consumption Growth in the U.K? 93
A3.2 Estimating the idiosyncratic part of the income process
The estimation of the idiosyncratic element of the income process required panel data
on family incomes. We used data from the British Household Panel Survey 1991-2005,
and a measure of family (or, more properly, tax unit) non-investment income.
The estimation proceeded in two steps and was carried out separately for each
education group. The ¯rst step was to regress income on a polynomial in age, and
it turned out that in order to capture noticeable di®erences across education groups
a cubic speci¯cation was required, but higher order terms did not enter signi¯cantly.
Having ¯tted this regression, the persistent element of the process was then estimated
as an AR(1) on the residuals from this regression. Results from this exercise are
summarised in table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Estimated parameters of the idiosyncratic income process
Low Education High Education
age -0.01068 0.01724
age squared 0.00184 0.00037
age cubed -0.00005 -0.00002
½y 0.76771 0.76365
¾2
» 0.16580 0.15471
BHPS data were also used to ¯xed the initial level of the house price relative to
expected income (this was matched to the ratio of average income to the average house
value for those aged 22-26). The 2000 BHPS dataset was our source for the distribution
of ¯nancial assets for the two education groups at the beginning of adult life. This
distribution was matched to that of individuals aged 22-26 in the relevant education
group and we assumed that households have zero housing endowments at age 22.Chapter 4
Modelling House Prices with
Shocks to Income and Credit
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we have considered lifecycle models that incorporate a
housing choice alongside the consumption/savings decision, with the process generating
house prices taken to be exogenous to the model. Since the decisions of individuals
about buying and selling property are key drivers of the demand to buy properties,
and of their supply for sale, it seems desirable to endogenise property prices.1 This
chapter presents an overlapping generations model of heterogenous agents in which
households' decisions in the housing market determine the prices of houses and °ats,
and the volume of transactions each year.
The model does not feature any aggregate uncertainty, so an assumption of rational
expectations amounts to perfect foresight regarding the housing market. The steady
states that we describe involve no growth in the economy or the population, so that
1Other factors that might a®ect demand and supply would be trends in the number of households
in the economy, and the number of properties being built. Factors that alter house purchase and sale
decisions of the existing population are perhaps the most likely to cause short term °uctuations in
demand and supply, and therefore in prices.
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house prices are constant. However, there are some dynamics in our analysis. We
consider unanticipated shocks to incomes, and to the parameters of the mortgage
market, and analyse transition paths to a new steady-state equilibrium after these
(permanent) shocks. This analysis allows us to consider whether there are plausible
mechanisms through which shocks to incomes, and to the mortgage market, might
have contrasting impacts on prices and transactions in the housing market.
The interest in the exercise is not only to see whether these di®erent shocks would
have di®erent e®ects, but also to see whether either could explain certain patterns in
the dynamics observed in housing markets. In particular, house prices are observed
to be substantially more volatile than average incomes (or GDP) in the economy: in
the previous chapter we estimated the standard deviation of permanent shocks to the
aggregate component of (log) incomes to be a third of the size of similar shocks to
house prices. Additionally, housing-market transactions are observed to be positively
correlated with house-price changes. Figure 4.1 shows quarterly data on housing mar-
ket transactions and house price in°ation since 1977. A regression based on these data
of quarterly transactions on the house price in°ation rate, plus a time trend and a
constant, suggests that a one percentage point increase in the in°ation rate is associ-
ated with an increase in the transaction volumes of about 3400 per quarter, or almost
one-percent.2
A recent literature has emerged attempting to assess the hypothesis that, if indi-
viduals are forward looking but operate in an environment of partial insurance, then
the dynamics of the housing market could be explained by the interaction between
the institutions (¯xed costs and mortgage-related borrowing constraints) of this mar-
ket, with aggregate economic shocks. The idea was put forward by Ortalo-Magn¶ e and
Rady (2006), who used an analytic model to show certain circumstances in which an
income shock might lead to relatively large price swings, and transaction levels that
covary positively with the price level. The exercise here might be thought of as build-
2And this is strongly statistically signi¯cant.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 96
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Figure 4.1: Housing transactions and house price in°ation in the U.K
ing the thought experiment of Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (2006) into a model that is
more realistic in terms of the length of life of agents, the idiosyncratic uncertainty over
labour incomes, and the nature of preferences and mortgage constraints. The model
does though stop short of the model with aggregate uncertainty which is the aim of
Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (In Progress).3 Nonetheless, an understanding of when
and how large swings in property prices, and transactions levels that covary positively
with prices, can occur in the present model, could still be a valuable contribution to
understanding what might drive these patterns in economies including that of the U.K.
In the present version I will not try to be too precise in any quantitative assessment
of whether plausibly sized shocks can lead to changes in housing prices and transac-
tion volumes of a scale that is observed. Instead I will address whether one type of
3The theoretical and computational contributions mentioned in this paragraph present the relevant
hypothesis and attempt to assess potential magnitudes of e®ects. Some empirical contributions have
suggested that it might in fact be hard to explain housing market °uctuations from housing market
institutions and individual behaviour alone (see Davis and Martin (2008), and articles discussed there),
while there also exist theoretical contributions discussing alternative possible mechanisms (such as
Kahn (2008) concerning the housing market and non-housing productivity shocks).4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 97
shock seems a more plausible candidate than the other for generating housing market
dynamics. I will look at whether a given shock can lead to noticeable \overshooting"
of house and °at prices beyond steady-state levels, and at whether such overshooting
is associated with unusual transaction volumes. I will also try to disentangle what
drives particular mechanisms in the model.
To anticipate, the results of the comparison between the e®ects of an income shock
and of a mortgage-market shock, suggest that the shock to mortgage constraints is a
more promising potential explanation for certain patterns in housing market °uctua-
tions. It is only the mortgage shock that produces price swings substantially beyond
the post-shock steady state during transition, and a transition path in which the house
price and transaction levels are positively correlated.
The main force behind these patterns is relatively high saving (and low borrowing)
in the economy with tight credit conditions, which results in a high amount of ¯nancial
wealth in the economy immediately after a positive credit market shock. This in turn,
and through the interaction with the newly generous mortgage constraints, leads to
\excess demand" for both °ats and houses, and so to price overshoots. The overshoots
choke o® demand but also encourage the supply of properties on to the market, hence
the increase in transactions. This mechanism is di®erent from the previously suggested
(again see Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (2006)) transmission of capital gains for the owners
of starter homes into increased demand higher up the housing ladder, though this
capital gains route will also operate in the economy modelled here. Thus the analysis
suggests positive (negative) shocks that leave individuals feeling (ex-post) that they
have built up \too much" (too little) ¯nancial wealth, as situations that might produce
large housing market swings and transactions that move with prices.
The literature mentioned so far in this introductory section includes those pa-
pers that most closely relate to the exercise presented below. The work is also more
broadly related to a larger set of papers concerned with building a housing or durable
good/asset into a model of the macroeconomy. In this literature, Nakajima (2005) is4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 98
perhaps the most nearly related to the present exercise, as he focuses on house prices
and particularly the relationship between earnings risk and house-price trends.4
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model in detail,
including the method for solving for transition paths, while section 4.3 discusses the
model results for income and mortgage market shocks. The ¯nal section is an extended
conclusion. Since the current analysis is a preliminary exploration of the use of the
model, this section discusses not only the ¯ndings of the chapter, but also considers at
some length the options for further development of this research.
4.2 The Model
In this chapter we consider a model economy that is populated by N households.
Each household lives for J periods and (so) there are n households from each of J
overlapping generations (or cohorts).
Households maximize utility by choosing consumption and ¯nancial saving, and
whether to own a °at, a house, or no housing, each period.
Households face idiosyncractic uncertainty over earnings. Shocks to earnings are
mean zero and uncorrelated across families so that (in a large economy) there is no
aggregate uncertainty over earnings.
Flat and house prices are determined endogenously. The level is such that the
number of families wishing to live in each type of owner-occupied home is equal to the
¯xed stock of °ats and houses in the economy. An equivalent way to say the same
thing is that the number of families supplying °ats and houses to the market for sale, is
equal to the number generating demand to purchase each type of home in the current
4Other papers have considered how the housing/durable good in°uences the wealth distribution
(Diaz and Luengo-Prado (Forthcoming); Gruber and Martin (2005)), the issue of trends and volatil-
ity in residential investment (Davis and Heathcote (2007); Fisher and Gervais (2007)), and whether
downpayment constraints can explain a recent shift in U.S. home-ownership rates (Chambers et al.
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period.5 The assumption of a ¯xed housing stock is an extreme one, but does not seem
unreasonable in the light of evidence that the volume of new houses being built has
been relatively low and unresponsive to price °uctuations in recent years in the UK
(see Barker (2006)).
Apart from the level of income, other important factors shaping households demand
and supply decisions for °ats and houses, are income-related and downpayment con-
straints on new mortgage borrowing, and (proportional) ¯xed costs relating to trading
properties.
We assume perfect foresight so that the path of °at and house prices is known
by all agents, and this is rationally built in to expectations. That is not to say that
we do not consider dynamics.6 As well as steady states, we also consider how prices
evolve after unanticipated shocks to incomes, or to credit market conditions. We
study this by looking at transitions between steady states after these shocks. Of
course, the combination of \perfect foresight", and completely unanticipated shocks,
is somewhat uncomfortable. Nonetheless, understanding why certain trends occur on
such transition paths should still be useful for thinking about when similar patterns
could occur in a more complex economy. As such, this exercise might be considered
a useful compromise between an analytically tractable model (such as Ortalo-Magn¶ e
and Rady (2006)), and the large computational burden of an equilibrium model with
several dimensions of aggregate uncertainty.
4.2.1 Elements of the Model
In this subsection we ¯rst describe the household lifecycle problem that applies for
each household in each cohort of the the model economy, including the speci¯cation
5We will try to stick to this terminology that demand and supply are counts of the numbers wishing
to buy and sell (respectively) in the current period, while the number of properties in the economy is
termed the \housing stock".
6A related model of a perfect foresight economy with housing, is that of Fisher and Gervais (2007).
Rather than modelling price setting, they have quantities move to equilibrate markets, and analyse
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of the utility function and the structure of the income process. Second, we describe
equilibrium in the model economy and the method for solving for °at and house prices,
and in particular for a transition path for these prices after a shock to the economy.
The household optimisation problem, and constraints
As mentioned in the previous part of this section, the model is of J overlapping gen-
erations each containing n individuals, so that the total population size is nJ = N. In
each of the J periods of life, households choose consumption and saving, and whether
to own a °at, or a house, or no housing. They make these choices in order to maximise
expected lifetime utility. Thus, the household value function for a household of age j
in period t is given by:7
Vj;t
³
Aj;t;Oj¡1;t¡1;p
f
t ;ph
t ;wj;t
´
= maxfcj;t;Oj;tg u(cj;t;Oj;t)+
+¯EtVj+1;t+1
³
Aj+1;t+1;Oj;t;p
f
t+1;ph
t+1;wj+1;t+1
´ (4.1)
subject to
Aj+1;t+1 = Rt+1
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
(Aj;t + wj;t ¡ cj;t ¡ p
f
t (1 + F)I(Oj;t = 1) ¡ ph
t (1 + F)I(Oj;t = 2))
if Oj¡1;t¡1 = 0
(Aj;t + wj;t ¡ cj;t + p
f
t (1 ¡ F)I(Oj;t 6= 1) ¡ ph
t (1 + F)I(Oj;t = 2))
if Oj¡1;t¡1 = 1
(Aj;t + wj;t ¡ cj;t ¡ p
f
t (1 + F)I(Oj;t = 1) + ph
t (1 ¡ F)I(Oj;t 6= 2))
if Oj¡1;t¡1 = 2
(4.2)
where Aj;t is the start of period asset stock and Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 and rt+1 is the
interest rate on the liquid asset; p
f
t is the price of a °at in period t, and ph
t the price
of a house; F is the proportional ¯xed cost which is assumed to be the same for both
7In this chapter we have used \O" (for ownership) rather than \h" (for housing choice), in order
to avoid notational confusion with the \h" used to indicate the larger property type (house) in p
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buying and selling a house or °at, and constant; wj;t is household income; and j and
t respectively index age and year. In this chapter we have added the j index since it
will be necessary to explicitly take account of age and year separately when we de¯ne
equilibrium; in this description of the household's problem (but not in the subsequent
de¯nition of equilibrium) an index for the household (within cohort) is still suppressed
on all household speci¯c variables, to simplify the notation.
Equation (4.2) is a standard intertemporal budget constraint, augmented by terms
re°ecting the house price and transaction costs that must be borne when trading
housing.
Compared to the previous two chapters, a notable di®erence in the set up here
is that there are separate prices for the °at and the house which enter the budget
constraint and are both state variables of the household's problem: since these prices
are now set to clear the house and °at markets (see below), we cannot here assume
that the °at price is a fraction of the house price.8
The structure of mortgage-related borrowing constraints, and for interest repay-
ments, is similar to that in the previous two chapters. For ease of exposition, we again
(as in chapter 2) distinguish between beginning of period assets Aj;t and end of period
assets sj;t.
We allow only for debt that is collateralised against a housing asset, and thus those
who do not own must have end of period assets greater than zero (sj;t ¸ 0). Home
owners can borrow, though they do so subject to the implicit constraint imposed by
the terminal asset condition (sJ;t ¸ 0)9 as well as formal constraints on new mortgage
borrowing. These formal constraints are a downpayment constraint (equation (4.3),
8In the current perfect foresight setting, having separate state variables for these two prices is not
computationally burdensome, at least for solving the household's problem, since future prices are non-
stochastic. On the other hand, solving for the (known) path of prices after a shock has been the most
challenging part of the model (see section 4.2.2, below).
9This constraint, together with the speci¯cation of marginal utility becoming in¯nite at zero con-
sumption, prevents households from borrowing more than they can repay with certainty.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 102
where 1 ¡ ¸h;t is the downpayment requirement):
sj;t ¸ ¡¸h;tpx
t (4.3)
where x could be f (for °at owners) or h (house owners); and a constraint that takes
the form of a multiple of income (equation (4.4)):
sj;t ¸ ¡¸w;twt (4.4)
As previously, the mortgage-related borrowing constraints must be satis¯ed only
when the household takes on new mortgage debt, either to buy a property or to increase
the amount of debt being held. As explained in chapter 2, relative to applying the
constraints in every period this structure increases the computational complexity of
the problem because it means that the value function will not be universally concave.
We use similar techniques to those described in that chapter to overcome this issue.10
A household that already owns and has an outstanding mortgage, can retain this
debt without having to satisfy the mortgage-related borrowing constraints, as long as
it pays back the new interest on this debt (mj;t = rtsj¡1;t¡1). This means that such
a household will have end of period debt that is no greater than at the end of the
previous period.
Utility function
The within period utility function is a CRRA function in current consumption, aug-
mented by a multiplicative term to capture the value of home ownership:11
10Numerical solution of the household's problem in the current model is much faster than in the
previous chapters because of the limited number of stochastic state variables, but this speed is required
as the household's problem has to be solved many times when looking for a transition path between
steady states.
11Similar forms for preferences regarding housing are used by Ejarque and Leth-Petersen (2008) and
Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008).4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 103
u(cj;t;Oj;t) =
c
1¡°
j;t
1 ¡ °
exp(µÁ(Oj;t))
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
Á = 0 if Oj;t = 0
0 < Á < 1 if Oj;t = 1
Á = 1 if Oj;t = 2
(4.5)
The multiplicative term is such that the utility from consumption is increased by a
certain percentage for a house-owner, and a smaller percentage for a °at owner. These
percentages are, respectively, 10 and 5 in the results that follow, as this means that the
ratio of the °at price to average income ratio at the start of adult life approximately
matches that from the data.
Income Process
During the working life,12 income arrives exogenously and is assumed to be composed
of a deterministic permanent component which captures the expected pro¯le of income
over the life cycle, and a persistent stochastic component which takes the form of an
AR(1) process that is subject to idiosyncratic shocks:
lnwj;t = aj;t + yj;t (4.6)
where:
yj;t = ½wyj¡1;t¡1 + "t; "t s N(0;¾2
")
and aj;t = a0;t + a1j + a2j2 + a3j3
During \retirement", income is a given fraction of ¯nal working life income.13
Unlike in the models of the previous two chapters, in this chapter there is only one
skill (education) group and all agents are ex ante identical, but di®er in the idiosyn-
cratic realisations of income. The parameters of the income process are estimated o®
panel data for Britain (from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)), using the
12These are the ¯rst 44 periods of life (ages 21-64); there are a further 16 periods of \retirement"
and agents die after making their age 80 (j = 60) consumption.
13This fraction (the replacement rate) is set to 50%.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 104
method described in the appendix to chapter 3 (section A3.2).14 In the results we
present here, the estimated parameters are adjusted somewhat, for reasons described
in the next subsection.
Fixed Parameters
The model structure just described requires that we ¯x several parameters in order to
solve for choice functions and simulate behaviour. Table 4.1, shows the chosen values
for the main such parameters in our baseline model.
Table 4.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
Income Process
½w 0.764 BHPS
¾2
" 0.155 BHPS
a0;t ln1 Normalisation
a1 0.00379 BHPS
a2 0.00037 BHPS
a3 -0.00002 BHPS
Preference Parameters
° 1.43 (Attanasio and Weber, 1995)
Á 0.5 HP/Income target
µ -0.1 HP/Income target
¯ 1:006¡1
Credit and Housing Market Parameters
¸y;t 4.0
¸h;t 0.8
F 0.03
r 0.006
Notes: BHPS indicates that source is survey data from the British Household Panel
Study; ODPM indicates data that were provided by the then O±ce for the Deputy
Prime Minister, these data are now available from Communities and Local Government
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1165366). The parameters with a t subscript are
those that are the subject of experiments in the next subsection.
14In fact the parameters are those estimated for a separate piece of work (Attanasio and Wake¯eld,
2008 and forthcoming), and the cubic in age was used because this is better able than a quadratic to
capture the pattern of income (on average) around the ages when young children are present in the
household.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 105
The parameters reported in table 4.1 show that a1, the linear term on wage in
the wage process, is closer to zero than the equivalent parameters in the previous two
chapters. This means that the income pro¯le has low growth in the early twenties, and
by the end of a working career income is expected to be rather lower than it was at age
21. The interest and discount rates are also set close to zero in this parameterisation.
All of these choices were made in the light of the fact that house prices display zero
growth in the steady state of the economy. The income pro¯le has therefore been
adjusted to ensure that expected house price to income ratios throughout a working
life are matched by the model, and it is not the case that housing becomes more
a®ordable as agents age, in a counterfactual way. Given the potential importance
of constraints on mortgage borrowing in a®ecting housing demand, it would seem
important to capture these price/income ratios in a realistic manner. The interest and
discount rates were chosen so that housing did not seem hopelessly unattractive as an
asset.
These parameter choices for income growth and the interest and discount rates will
a®ect the utility parameters required to achieve a target house price, and so could be
important in shaping outcomes of the model analysis. It should also be noted that in
this case with utility that is not homothetic, it is not possible to normalise the model
solution by dividing through by the permanent growth in the house prices. On the
other hand, initial experiments with the parameters suggest that changing the income
pro¯le to a more standard hump-shape, for example, will not a®ect the nature of the
results reported later in the chapter.15
The parameters of the mortgage market institutions in the model, were chosen to
approximately match terms available on high street loans. The ¯xed cost (F) of 3%
applies to both buying and selling.
Having ¯xed the other parameters, the parameters on utility from housing were
15The qualitative nature of the results regarding credit constraints is robust to having a more
standard hump-shaped pattern for expected earnings, for example.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 106
chosen to achieve a °at price of around 6.7,16 thus approximately matching to ratio of
property prices to average incomes for young households in the data.
4.2.2 Solving for °at and house prices
The focus of the model for this chapter, is solving for equilibrium °at and house prices.
As mentioned above, these prices must be such that the number of families wishing
to be owner-occupiers of each type of home is equal to the ¯xed stock of °ats and
houses in the economy. An equivalent way to say the same thing is that the number
of families supplying °ats and houses to the market for sale, is equal to the number
generating demand to purchase each type of home in the current period.
The analysis is concerned not only with steady states, but particularly with transi-
tion paths between steady states after unforeseen shocks to incomes, or the institutions
(parameters) of the mortgage market. The broad strategy for ¯nding a transition path
is ¯rst to solve for the \before" and \after" steady states, and then to take a guess
at a possible path between these initial and ¯nal positions. The guess must then
be updated until the path is such that prices match expected prices along the path
(with perfect foresight) and the °at and house markets are in equilibrium every period.
Before describing this algorithm in more detail, a formal de¯nition of equilibrium is
required.
Equilibrium
The aggregate state variables that are subject to transition inducing shocks are the
level of the the borrowing constraints (¸h and ¸w) and average (or aggregate) income
in the economy, a su±cient statistic for which is a0;t.17 Notice that the model is of a
16The relatively high ratio of 6.7 re°ects the fact that this number came from 2007, a time of high
house prices.
17Changes in other common parameters of the income process, including the variance ¾
2
", would
also shift the equilibrium of the economy but it has been assumed that these are ¯xed and so this is
suppressed in the notation that follows. Similarly the exogenous ¯xed cost F will not be listed as a
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small open economy, and the interest rate is assumed to be ¯xed at level r; to simplify
the notation we omit this from the list of aggregate states in what follows.
Given the sequences of the exogenous aggregate states f¸h;t;¸w;t;a0;tg1
t=1, and of
income realisations fffwi;j;tgn
i=1gJ
j=1g1
t=1, an equilibrium for the economy is a sequence
of variables fffci;j;t;si;j;t;Oi;j;tgn
i=1gJ
j=1;p
f
t ;ph
t g1
t=1 such that:
1. households' choices of c and O optimally solve the household problem (4.1),
taking prices as given and known with perfect foresight;
2. the markets for °ats and houses clear, which is to say that at each date t the
following are sats¯ed:
J X
j=1
n X
i=1
I(Oi;j;t = 1) = Mf
and
J X
j=1
n X
i=1
I(Oi;j;t = 2) = Mh
where Mh and Mf respectively are number of houses and °ats in the housing stock,
I(¢) is an indicator function, i is a within cohort household identi¯er and j and t index
age and time as before.
Steady states
As is customary, a steady-state equilibrium is an equilibrium of the economy with
no aggregate shocks or growth, and such that the prices (ph
t ;p
f
t ) are constant over
time. The steady state also involves constant cross-sectional distributions (by age
and income) of individuals over consumption, ¯nancial wealth holdings and home-
ownership states, as each generation follows the same optimising choice functions.
Conceptually there are no major di±culties with computing the steady-state equi-
librium for the model economy. In practice, to ensure that each step in the iterative
procedure is a movement towards the equilibrium, one must be careful to take account
of cross-price e®ects (particulary from the house price to the demand to own °ats) as4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 108
well as own-price e®ects, when updating prices.
Algorithm for ¯nding a transition path
Since the method for ¯nding the transition path for °at and house prices is not entirely
standard, it is worth outlining the algorithm. The shock hits the economy (which is in
its steady-state equilibrium) at the beginning of period t = 1. The algorithm proceeds
through the following steps:
1. Solve the household's problem, and simulate the initial steady state of the econ-
omy.
² From this simulation store the distribution of households over ¯nancial asset
holdings, home ownership status, and income draws, in the initial steady
state, as this information will be used to simulate the economy immediately
after the shock.
2. Take an initial guess at the path of prices ( b ph,c pf) between steady states.
3. Solve (over a long horizon) for each cohort back to the date of the shock, given
this path of prices. Simulate to check whether the guess is a rational expectations
equilibrium. If it is, stop.
4. If it is not a rational expectations equilibrium:
² Update the guess for period t = 1 (leaving the path from period 2 forward
unchanged), re-solve to period t = 1 and simulate demand and supply for
homes in that year to check whether the new price achieves housing market
equilibrium. Keep updating the guess for this year until equilibrium is
achieved.18
18The current method for updating prices in a particular period involves exploiting information
on own and cross price elasticities, where these elasticities are computed for a one-o® price move,
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² Once equilibrium in year one is achieved, repeat the procedure for year 2,
but now aiming to achieve equilibrium in the housing market in years 1 and
2 simultaneously, given that the path of prices beyond year 2 remains ¯xed.
Note that year one is solved with expectations re°ecting the new guess for
the year two price.
² Keep repeating this procedure, but as equilibrium is achieved up to each
given year, keep increasing the number of years in the search by one year
at a time.
5. As the number of post-shock years being solved and simulated increases, so the
prices should hopefully converge towards the \after" steady-state equilibrium.
Once the prices seem to have settled at this steady state, return to step 3., and
solve and simulate for a long horizon to check that the ¯nal steady state really
has been reached. If the check is satis¯ed, stop. If not continue the search for a
longer horizon.
Each step in the algorithm involves simultaneously solving for °at and house prices
that achieve equilibrium in the housing market in each year of a set of years. As
adjustments in prices within this set of years are made to balance markets, so these
adjustments are built in to expectations for the earlier years in the set. Once equi-
librium has been achieved across a given set of years, the number of years in the set
is increased by one and the process is repeated. Following this procedure means that
once we reach a point at which prices have converged to and settled at the after steady
state, we can be con¯dent that we have found a rational expectations equilibrium
transition path.
This method is somewhat di®erent from standard procedures for ¯nding price paths
in perfect foresight economies, such as that employed by Lee (2005) and that of Auer-
bach and Kotliko® (1987). My understanding of the procedures employed by these
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forward along the transition path and achieving equilibrium in each year separately,
given the initial guess at prices beyond that year. Thus, at each step in the algorithm
one will ¯nd an equilibrium for each year, but this may not be a rational expectations
equilibrium since prices forward may not coincide with the guess being followed. After
completing this updating for a large number of years, the algorithms involve checking
whether the paths follow rational expectations, and if not the year by year equilibrium
search is repeated, but now starting from the set of (non-rational expectations) equi-
librium prices that have just been found. The di®erence from my procedure lies in not
adjusting prices and expectations earlier along the path, when solving for a given year.
I initially tried to implement an algorithm much like that described in the previous
paragraph, before settling on my current method. However, I found that this algorithm
did not reliably converge.19 Though my method is not standard, I am con¯dent that
is is ¯nding correct transition paths. The ¯nal stage in the algorithm is always to
plug is the ¯nal guess at the transition path and solve and simulate a long horizon, to
check that the economy has converged to the ¯nal steady-state equilibrium. I have not
considered analytically whether the transition path should be unique, but I have found
that the algorithm converges to the same ¯nal solution from di®erent initial guesses
at the transition path.20
Some further practical notes on the implementation of my algorithm are that:21
At each modelled date I populated the model economy with 60,000 individuals (house-
holds) drawn from 60 di®erent cohorts; and, I assumed that there are 20,000 °ats
and 20,000 houses available for owner occupation so that the owner-occupation rate is
19It is possible that this had to do with the unusual features of the demand for °ats, which were
discussed in chapter 2.
20To aid the speed of with which the model ¯nds the transition path, my preferred initial guess is
that prices go directly to the new steady state. The alternative that prices follow a linear trend over
25 years from the before to after steady states, would also be reliable.
21Another practical point is that in the current runs I have used only ¯ve nodes in the approximation
for the stochastic part of idiosyncratic income. Experiments indicate that this low number of nodes
may have a®ected the steady state solutions slightly, but the properties of the transition paths are not
altered if the number of nodes is increased.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 111
two-thirds, which is similar to the rate in the U.K. economy.
4.3 Income Shocks and Credit Constraint Shocks
In this section we look at two entirely unexpected shocks which hit our model economy.
First we look at a shock to indiosyncratic incomes, such that at a point in time,
everyone in the economy becomes 10 percent richer. Second we consider a shock to
credit constraints, such that the multiples (¸h and ¸y) that banks are prepared to
lend change from 0.7 and 3.2, to 0.8 and 4.0. Table 4.2 summarises these di®erent
model parameters before and after the shocks. Note that the experiment of a change
in incomes is described by a change in the exponent of the parameter a0 (the intercept
for the deterministic part of log income); since this is permanent, when it changes
by a given proportion, this results in the same proportionate change for all incomes
(including those of retired individuals) throughout the economy.
Table 4.2: Parameters before and after shocks
Parameter Before After
Income Shock
expa0 1 1.1
¸h 0.8
¸y 4.0
Credit Market Shock
¹ w1 1.1
¸h 0.7 0.8
¸y 3.2 4.0
It is clear from table 4.2 that the \after" steady state is identical in the two cases
that we simulate: the shocks leave the institutions of the economy (the parameters
of the model) the same for both cases. This enables ease of comparison between the
two simulated price transition paths. The comparison is also aided by the fact that
the before steady states in both the \income shock" economy, and the \credit shock"4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 112
economy, are constructed to have the same °at price. Thus between steady states the
adjustment of the °at price is the same in both of the modelled economies. This is not
quite true for the house price: between steady states the house price adjusts slightly
less in the credit shock economy than it does in the income shock case. The steady
state prices are reported in table 4.3. We see that the change in the °at price between
steady states is an increase of slightly more than 9%, while the change in the house
price is slightly less than 9% in the income shock case, and around 5.4% in the credit
shock case.
Table 4.3: House and °at prices before and after shocks
Price Before After
Income Shock
pf 6.67 7.28
ph 11.43 12.45
Credit Market Shock
pf 6.67 7.28
ph 11.81 12.45
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show how home ownership at di®erent ages in the steady states
is a®ected by the change incomes or credit markets, and therefore in house prices. In
the case of the income shock, the age-speci¯c ownership rates for both °ats and houses
do not change by more than four percentage points at any age, and almost do not
change at all below age 30. There is a small decrease in °at ownership between age 40
and the early 60s, o®set by a small increase in early retirement. For house ownership
the changes are in the opposite direction: a small increase in middle and late working
age, with a small decrease either side of retirement age.
The changes between steady states are more substantial for the case of a credit
market shock (though the gradient of the ownership pro¯les makes the larger di®erences
during the twenties somewhat di±cult to see). In this case, for both °ats and houses
the changes between steady states involve a shift of ownership towards a slightly earlier4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 113
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Figure 4.2: Ownership by Age: Steady states before and after income shock
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Figure 4.3: Ownership by Age: Steady states before and after credit market shock
part of the lifecycle, with increases of up to six percentage points for °at ownership
for those aged less than thirty.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 114
While table 4.3 shows prices in the before and after steady states, our real interest
is in the evolution of the economy in transition between steady states. Figures 4.4
and 4.5 respectively show the paths of (log) °at and house prices, after the shocks
to income (long dashes) and credit constraints (short dashes). We see that after the
income shock, prices move very close to the after steady state levels immediately after
the shock occurs, and do not deviate more than half a percentage point from these levels
throughout the course of the transition to the post-shock steady state.22 In contrast,
following the credit market shock, the °at price overshoots the post-shock steady state
by slightly more than 0.04 log points (4 percent), and the house price overshoots by
slightly less than 4 percent. After this initial overshoot, the prices gradually trend
back down to the steady state, dipping very slightly below this level around 50 years
after the shock, before settling at the steady state levels after around 65 years.
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Figure 4.4: Log °at price following income and credit market shocks
As a supplement to the ¯gures of the price paths in transition between steady states,
22Though the prices go very close to the steady state levels, transition to the after steady state
actually takes almost 50 periods (where being at the steady state is measured by having the housing
market in equilibrium (repeatedly) and prices in the computations ¯xed at the steady state prices).4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 115
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Figure 4.5: Log house price following income and credit market shocks
¯gures 4.6 and 4.7 show how the volume of °at and house transactions moves after the
shocks. In the steady states, transactions occur as young individuals climb on to the
property ladder while older individuals downsize in order to consume their wealth, and
due to idiosyncratic earnings shocks. In the post-shock steady state, these factors lead
to transaction rates of approximately 8% in the °at market (slightly fewer than 1600
of 20000 °ats are traded each year), and about 3.5% in the house market (700 out of
20000).23 In the ¯gures, the number of transactions is expressed relative to these post-
shock steady state values, so that a value greater than 1 indicates transactions exceed
the steady state volumes. The marked contrast between the charts for the income
shock and for the credit market shock, is that it is only in the case of the shock to
the mortgage market that we see notable increases in the volume of transactions along
the transition path.24 In particular, in the early years after the shock to credit, °at
23Summing these numbers and comparing to population size, we see that almost 4% of households
are buying a property each period.
24On the suggestion of both of my supervisors, as a sensitivity check, I repeated the income shocks
experiment for a case in which both of the mortgage constraint parameters were much tighter than in
the example reported here, even setting ¸h to 0.2 and ¸w to one. It turned out that this made very4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 116
transactions are above their steady state level by around 10%,25 and house transactions
are elevated by around 5%.
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Figure 4.6: Flat transactions, relative to after SS level, following income and credit
market shocks
A short summary of the results of these model runs is that house and °at prices
substantially overshoot their new steady state levels in the aftermath of a mortgage
market shock, but not following a shock to incomes in the economy. This overshooting
of prices following the credit shock, is accompanied by a notable increase in property
transactions when prices are high.
In the light of evidence that house prices tend to be more volatile than incomes, and
that housing market transaction levels tend to be positively correlated with property
prices, these ¯ndings, particularly for the credit market shock, are potentially inter-
esting. However, our economy is stylised. To try to understand whether the results
might generalise to a more complex economy, it is useful to try to disentangle what is
little di®erence to the pattern that prices and transaction levels do not deviate much from the steady
state after this type of shock.
25Transaction numbers in the simulated economy slightly above 1700 for °ats, rather than slightly
below 1600 in the steady state.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 117
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Figure 4.7: House transactions, relative to after SS level, following income and credit
market shocks
driving the nature of these changes in prices and transaction levels.
To think about why prices and transactions move in these ways along the transition
path, it is helpful to consider what factors shape the demand for and supply of houses in
the model economy, and how these would be balanced if the economy jumped directly
to the new steady state prices following a shock (and was expected to stay there). The
structure of the model of household behaviour is such that whether a household will be
willing to own a house or °at at given prices and expected prices, will be determined
by:
² The amount of ¯nancial wealth held, Aj;t;
² Whether or not they already own, Oj¡1;t¡1;
² The current income level of the household, wj;t;
² The parameters controlling mortgage borrowing (¸h;t and ¸y;t);
² The level of ¯xed costs.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 118
In our experiments, once the shocks have occurred, levels of income, the tightness
of mortgage constraints and levels of ¯xed costs, are all ¯xed at their post-shock
steady-state levels. Thus the factors that prevent prices and transactions from settling
immediately at their steady state levels must be those chosen by the households in
the period before the shock: At¡1 and Ot¡1. As we have seen in ¯gures 4.3 and 4.2,
ownership rates across ages are not dramatically changed between steady states. Table
4.4 shows that for the income shock, age-ownership rates almost do not change along
the transition path for the economy. Thus for this case, a good starting point for
thinking about what is driving the shape of the transition is to look at the distribution
of ¯nancial assets around the shock.
Table 4.4: Ownership Rates Around Income Shock
Age-Group Before SS Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 After SS
21-25 28.0 28.0 28.3 28.3 28.0 28.0
26-30 62.9 62.9 63.1 63.3 62.9 62.9
31-40 84.1 84.1 84.1 84.1 84.1 84.1
41-50 94.9 94.9 95.0 95.0 94.9 95.0
51-60 93.6 93.7 93.8 93.7 93.7 93.4
61-70 70.9 70.9 70.8 70.9 71.3 70.7
71-80 10.9 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.5 11.4
Rather than just considering the overall level of assets, it is more helpful to consider
asset holding for those particular groups that most a®ect the demand for, and supply
of, properties onto the market. The most active group of property buyers in the model
economy are young families, either moving onto or up the property ladder: ownership
rates increase from zero when families enter the labour market, to almost 80% (with
slightly more °at owners than house owners) by age thirty. To think about whether
more young people would (ceteris paribus) want to own properties immediately after
the income shock than in the ¯nal steady state, we can look at the ¯nancial wealth
of young individuals who do not own in the before steady state, and compare it to
the wealth of similar individuals in the after steady state. Since ownership rates are4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 119
virtually identical in the two steady states in this age range, there is no composition
problem in terms of the types of individuals in these before and after groups. Table
4.5 describes the wealth distribution for this group, in both steady states, and along
the transition path (the units are such that a value of 1 is equal to mean income at
the beginning of the economic life (age 21) in the before steady-state).
Table 4.5: Financial Asset Distribution: Non-owners aged 30 and under, around income
shock
Percentile Before SS Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 After SS
10th 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25th 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Median 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.43
75th 0.76 0.76 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
90th 1.20 1.20 1.30 1.32 1.32 1.32
Mean 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55
Looking at the steady state columns ¯rst, we do not see dramatic di®erences in
wealth levels or the shape of the distribution. Rather, wealth in the before steady state
is slightly lower at all points in the distribution than is true in the higher-income steady
state. In transition, wealth levels in general move smoothly to the new steady state,
and are very close to it after ten years when all members of this age-group are \born"
in the post-shock economy. Since wealth levels for this group are never substantially
di®erent from those in the ¯nal steady state, property demand will not be either. Since
wealth is initially slightly below the steady-state level, demand will actually be slightly
below the steady-state level, thus tending to depress prices.
While those aged under 30 who do not own are the most likely buyers of properties
in the economy, sellers are drawn predominantly from those aged above sixty and
owning either a °at or a house. Table 4.6 shows the distribution of ¯nancial wealth
for this group, again for several di®erent years after the income shock. As with the
young non-owners, this table for the older owners shows that wealth holdings before the
income shock are somewhat lower than in the post-shock steady state. At the extreme4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 120
of the distribution this could be driven by a slight shift in this age group towards °at
owning (thus converting some resources into ¯nancial wealth), but the change is clear
for a broad range of the distribution from the median upwards. This indicates that in
the after steady state individuals do hold slightly more ¯nancial wealth (saved from
their higher lifetime resources), even though their wealth has also increased due to the
property price appreciation. The fact that this group has less ¯nancial wealth just
after the shock than in the after steady state will again tend to decrease the number
of households wishing to owner-occupy, relative to the steady state level: for given
prices individuals with less wealth will be more inclined to exit the property market
and instead use ¯nancial assets to smooth out consumption over the remaining years
of life.
Table 4.6: Financial Asset Distribution: Owners aged over 60, around income shock
Percentile Before SS Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 After SS
10th -0.64 -0.64 -0.72 -0.69 -0.67 -0.69
25th 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 0.05 0.06
Median 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.01 1.07 1.10
75th 2.15 2.15 2.25 2.28 2.38 2.45
90th 3.29 3.29 3.37 3.47 3.64 3.90
Mean 1.31 1.31 1.34 1.44 1.57 1.68
This examination of wealth distributions for the young non-owners, and older own-
ers, has shown that after the income shock wealth holdings are such that, if property
prices jumped directly to the steady state level (and were expected to stay there),
then there would be fewer young households wishing to buy properties, and more
older households wishing to sell them, than would be true in the steady state. This
must mean that in the absence of any expectation of large price rises, property prices
immediately after the shock will fall short of the after-shock steady state level, other-
wise a situation of excess supply would exist. Since there is no force in play to generate
expectations of strongly increasing prices, this is indeed what we observe. The prices4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 121
do though immediately move very close to the after steady state level. This is not
surprising given that wealth levels of the key groups of potential buyers and sellers
are only slightly below the levels that will occur in the post-shock steady state. Given
that the price immediately moves very close to the new steady state, and that pat-
terns of ownership across generations are also close to the steady-state distribution,
the incentives for younger generations are such that they will make consumption /
saving and housing choices that closely match steady-state behaviour. This explains
why, following the income shock, the economy converges to the post-shock steady state
without large divergences of prices or transactions from the steady state levels.
Turning to the case of the shock to the mortgage market, we can again look at
asset holdings of the group of likely buyers (young individuals who do not own) and
potential sellers (older individuals who own) to see what might drive price and trans-
action movements after the shock. In this case we have to be a little more careful to
allow for the composition (in terms of income levels) of these groups around the time
of the shock, and in the steady state, since the proportion of owners at these ages
changes slightly along the transition path (see table 4.7). For those aged less than
thirty, ownership rates increase along the transition path, so the group of non-owners
has slightly higher income immediately after the shock than in the post-shock steady
state.26 This di®erence re°ects the fact that the credit shock shifts home ownership
towards younger individuals, but the economy does not immediately move to the new
steady state distributions. However, on its own it could not lead to overshooting of
°at and house prices, as the higher income subset who are left as non-owners will not
\over-demand" the steady state unless some factor other than income is at work. There
must therefore be some other factor that is boosting the demand to buy properties, or
depressing the supply of properties to the market, immediately after the shock.
One such factor is the asset levels of young potential buyers. The savings of these
26Average income in this group is 0.793 in the ¯rst year after the shock, and 0.784 once the post-shock
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Table 4.7: Ownership Rates Around Credit Market Shock
Age-Group Before SS Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 After SS
21-25 20.5 24.1 27.3 27.8 27.9 28.0
26-30 57.8 57.7 59.8 62.4 62.8 62.9
31-40 81.9 81.4 81.3 82.2 83.7 84.1
41-50 94.4 94.0 94.3 94.2 94.5 95.0
51-60 93.9 93.3 92.4 92.4 92.4 93.4
61-70 76.4 75.9 74.8 73.5 72.0 70.7
71-80 14.4 14.5 13.7 12.8 12.2 11.4
Table 4.8: Financial Asset Distribution: Non-owners aged 30 and under, around credit
market shock
Percentile Before SS Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 After SS
10th 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25th 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Median 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.43
75th 1.06 1.12 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.85
90th 1.63 1.69 1.43 1.32 1.31 1.32
Mean 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.55
individuals are higher at all points in the distribution immediately after the shock, than
in the post-shock steady state (see table 4.8). These individuals have been saving up to
meet a tighter downpayment requirement, and now ¯nd they have \over-saved" relative
to the optimum for the post-shock economy. Given the way that this extra wealth
interacts with the downpayment requirement in the economy, this is an important
source of extra demand to buy °ats and houses immediately after the credit shock,
compared to in the eventual steady state.
Similarly to the young potential buyers, so the older potential sellers of properties
are seen to have higher wealth immediately after the credit shock, compared to in
the eventual steady state. This group is smaller (more selected), and therefore has
higher income on average, in the ¯nal steady state than in the immediate aftermath4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 123
Table 4.9: Financial Asset Distribution: Owners aged over 60, around credit shock
Percentile Before SS Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 After SS
10th -0.42 -0.42 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59 -0.69
25th 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.06
Median 1.35 1.34 1.23 1.19 1.18 1.10
75th 2.64 2.62 2.53 2.52 2.51 2.45
90th 4.11 4.04 3.97 4.21 4.09 3.91
Mean 1.94 1.94 1.88 1.91 1.86 1.69
of the shock.27 Thus the higher wealth for this group certainly re°ects higher saving
in ¯nancial assets in the pre-shock steady state. For this group the higher ¯nancial
wealth re°ects the lower house price in the pre-shock steady state which leads to lower
borrowing at the stage in the life-cycle when property is bought, and encourages higher
¯nancial saving as a substitute for housing wealth to fund retirement consumption. The
key point of interest here is that the higher ¯nancial wealth will serve to discourage
this group from putting their properties on the market: higher ¯nancial wealth means
that there is less need to sell in order to have wealth available to smooth consumption.
Thus, given the ¯nancial wealth distribution of this group, in order to induce selling
that will reduce the proportion of owners in the group (as must happen between steady
states), a price above the eventual steady state price will be required at some point in
the transition.
Thus, the mechanism that drives price overshooting after the credit constraints
shock is based on an \excess" of (¯nancial) wealth in the economy immediately after
the shock, compared to in the ¯nal steady state. This encourages high demand to buy
houses from young households who can meet downpayment requirements, and also
discourages supply to the market from existing owners who do not need to access their
housing wealth so rapidly in order to smooth consumption. Together, these forces
would generate excess demand with prices ¯xed at the post-shock steady-state levels,
27Mean income increases from 0.294 to 0.305 between the ¯rst year after the shock, and the ¯nal
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and so this generates overshooting. That these forces generate quite a large overshoot
(around 50%) beyond ¯nal steady state prices, and also and surge in transaction vol-
umes along the transition path, indicates that the movement of prices beyond the ¯nal
steady state levels (and the associated creation of expectations of capital losses) more
rapidly encourages older owners to sell, than it chokes of demand from potential young
buyers. This partly re°ects how the interaction between the downpayment constraint
and wealth levels leads to a large increase in the home purchasing power of young
households. The elevated level of transactions, with high numbers of young people
buying as older households exit the property market, is the mechanism through which
ownership shifts down the age distribution along the transition path.
In this section we have analysed two shocks to the model economy - one to income
levels and one to mortgage-borrowing constraints - that lead to similar changes in
steady state °at and house prices. However, we have seen that the path of the housing
market between steady states is quite di®erent for the two cases: for the income shock
prices move almost directly to their new steady state levels, and transactions also
stay around steady state levels. In contrast, the shock to mortgage-market constraints
leads to prices overshooting the ¯nal steady state levels by almost ¯fty percent, and
transaction levels are also high (relative to steady state) at the time when prices are
high.
Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (2006) proposed a mechanism through which house prices
and transactions might move together, and substantially, following shocks to the econ-
omy. It is worth emphasizing that while the current model economy is similar to their
analytical framework in terms of the perfect foresight and unanticipated shocks set up,
the mechanism through which we get overshooting of house prices, and comovement of
prices and transactions, is quite di®erent. In their analysis the e®ect came from capital
gains increasing the lifetime wealth of existing °at owners by more than income gains
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these capital gains led to an overshoot of demand for houses along the transition path.
In our case the mechanism is from a high amount of ¯nancial wealth in the economy
immediately after the credit-market shock, which leads to \excess demand" for both
°ats and houses.28
Of course the capital gains mechanism does operate in our economy but is not
strong enough to generate any substantial overshoot of house prices following the
income shock, while the credit constraint shock leads to a slightly larger overshoot
for °at prices than for the price of the trade up property. In the economy we have
studied it may be that very large °at price movements would be needed to generate
capital gains that substantially outweigh the extra resources of generations that have
increased income over several periods. Also, the increased wealth from capital gains
will be o®set in our economy through reduced saving in ¯nancial assets.
The ¯nal section of this chapter considers what extensions to this work would be
needed to see whether the assets mechanism that we identify here could be important
in generating house price °uctuations in the U.K. and other economies.
28There is limited scope for this mechanism to ensue in the framework of Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady
(2006), since utility that is linear in consumption means that all consumption is postponed until the
end of life. In these circumstances there is no sense in which credit market parameters will lead to
non-owners saving more than is consistent with a new steady state.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 126
4.4 Conclusion and Next Steps
This chapter has been concerned with endogenising the prices of houses and °ats. More
precisely, a lifecycle model of consumption and saving, and decisions about owner-
occupation, has been built into an overlapping generations framework in which house
and °at prices are those that clear the property market each period.
The model has been constructed to capture certain realistic features of the housing
good/asset, and the market for properties. In particular, properties are modelled as
large (lumpy) objects that people like to own; ownership of housing can be adjusted
only if transaction costs are borne, and so adjustments are infrequent; house purchases
are often facilitated by mortgage borrowing, which is limited by downpayment and
income-related constraints applied at the time when a mortgage is agreed; the size of
the housing stock in the economy cannot be adjusted rapidly (indeed the model has a
¯xed stock of properties available to owner occupy).
The economy that is modelled contains households who are heterogenous in terms
of the (stochastic) evolution of their earnings, but there is no aggregate income growth
nor any aggregate uncertainty, so that the steady state has constant °at and house
prices. Although we have not modelled aggregate uncertainty, we have considered the
e®ects of unforeseen shocks to the economy, and analysed the transition path of the
economy to a new steady state after such shocks. The transition path is one with
rational expectations, and indeed perfect foresight, over property prices.
A key aim in studying shocks to this economy was to consider whether the inter-
action of such shocks with idiosyncratic risk in the economy, and particularly with
mortgage-borrowing constraints, could plausibly lead to patterns of house price move-
ments and housing transactions that are in line with those observed in data. Two
types of (positive) shock were studied: a shock to income levels and a shock to
mortgage-borrowing constraints. The shock to mortgage borrowing constraints seems
more promising for explaining housing market °uctuations, as it produces larger price4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 127
swings (or, more precisely, bigger swings beyond the post shock steady state), and a
transition path in which the house price and transaction levels are positively correlated.
The mechanism underlying this pattern in transition after the mortgage market
shock is that the accumulation of ¯nancial wealth in the pre-shock steady state is higher
than is consistent with the post-shock steady state. This means that immediately after
the shock, the demand from young households to buy property is (ceteris paribus)
higher than it will be once the steady state is reached, while the supply of properties
onto the market from older household is lower than at the steady state. This pushes
prices beyond the ¯nal steady state levels, and transactions are also high as high prices
not only choke o® demand but also increase the supply of properties to the market.
Understanding the nature of this mechanism should help us to think about whether
the results in our stylised economy, might generalise to a more realistic setting.
In the modelled economy, there is something uncomfortable in the combination of
rational expectations and perfect foresight, with aggregate shocks that are unforeseen
and so lie outside expectations. It would be preferable,29 to analyse an economy in
which agents form expectations over aggregate shocks and thus might be able to (in-
completely) self-insure against them. In the light of the results of the present chapter,
in such a model I would look for circumstances such that following a positive shock
(i.e. one that is expected to increase house prices) to the economy people ¯nd (ex-
post) that they have \oversaved", as this seems a good candidate for a case in which
prices might then rise substantially and transactions might increase at the same time.
An expansion in credit might generate such a situation, particularly since before the
expansion individuals who would like to borrow more cannot o®set the unavailability
of credit through their saving behaviour.30
Before attempting to analyse such an ambitious model, I think that there are
29This would also represent a move into supercomputing territory; cf. Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos
(2008) and Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (In Progress).
30Of course this is speculation based on intuition: to properly explore the evolution of such a model
economy will require getting the computer to tell us the numbers.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 128
several exercises of interest that could be carried out within the current framework
(or one very closely related to it). An obvious target for further research would be to
check the robustness of the results reported here. It would, for example be worthwhile
doing a more thorough job on matching the steady state of the modelled economy to
features of the U.K. economy, and checking that the pattern of results described still
applies with the modi¯ed preference (and other) parameters.31
An analysis that would involve some extension to the current model would be to
introduce bequests into the economy. In section 4.3, the discussion of the mechanisms
driving prices and transaction levels in transition focussed on the demand from young
households who haven't yet got onto the property ladder, and the supply of properties
to the market from older home-owners. This supply arises in the model because house-
holds get no utility from bequests, and so eventually choose to eat all their resources,
including any house or °at that they own. In reality many individuals who become
owner-occupiers while working, leave property as part of their estate. Capturing this
would change the pattern of ownership, and the age distribution of buyers and sellers,
in the model.
It is not, though, obvious that bequests would alter the patterns of results regarding
shocks to the economy. It is (perhaps) tempting to think that having bequests, such
that older owners will be much less inclined to sell, must change the results regarding
movements in the number of transactions. However, what matters in the changes in the
level of transactions is adjustments around the shock. In the economy with bequests the
low number of older sellers would be a feature of both pre- and post-shock economies
and as long as price increases reduce the incentive to buy, and increase the incentive
to sell, the patterns of results we have observed could still go through. This would
require exploration using the apparatus of a modi¯ed model.32
31As mentioned in footnote 15, we have run the credit constraints case under a di®erent assumption
about the evolution of income over the lifecycle, and this delivered results qualitatively identical to
those reported here.
32A point to add is that it might not be straightforward to add the bequest to the model. It is not
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If the results do prove to be robust to checks and to bequests, it might be worth-
while thinking whether there are implications of the model that are testable in data. In
the data there are formidable obstacles to separating the e®ects of income shocks from
the e®ects of credit constraints on house prices, since these tend to move together with
the economic cycle.33 Looking within the model at how these di®erent factors might
in°uence the distributions of consumption and ¯nancial wealth, might suggest alter-
native means to separate the di®erent possibilities (though this would need working
out). Analysis of distributions might also suggest means for investigating the nature
of the relationship between house prices and consumption growth (cf. chapter 3).
A ¯nding of robust results would also support some additional analyses using the
model. One line I intend to pursue is to use the framework that I have established to
conduct some policy experiments. Interventions in the housing market are often dis-
cussed as a means to make housing more \a®ordable", since policies such as subsidised
mortgages, or cuts in the tax on housing transactions for ¯rst time buyers, seem well
targeted at young aspiring owners. However, the e®ects of such policies on housing
demand and house prices may undo welfare gains to these groups that seem plausible
if prices are taken to be ¯xed, and in transition (particularly if prices overshoot) to
a new equilibrium it may even be that individuals in the target group lose out. Such
possibilities can be considered in the model presented.34
Another possibility that I intend to investigate is to look at the e®ect of popula-
tion growth (or more precisely, growth in the number of households in the economy)
on house prices. In this instance the population growth could be considered as an-
be captured with houses and ¯nancial assets that are fungible as a part of bequests. The model would
also need to balance the wealth of those who die and the initial wealth of the generation receiving the
bequests.
33Or, looked at another way: it may be hard to separate a credit shock from and increase in
borrowing because (expected) incomes have gone up; and, it may be hard to separate an income
shock from a second-round e®ect on incomes when borrowing activity pushes up economic activity.
There is a hotly debated literature concerned with identifying credit conditions and their impact (see
Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006), Aron et al. (2007), and Besley et al. (2008)).
34Indeed an initial analysis of a cut in the ¯xed cost (transactions tax) on °at purchases does suggest
some overshooting in prices, though a welfare analysis has not been completed at the time of writing.4 Equilibrium Prices in the Housing Market 130
ticipated, thus avoiding the issue of unanticipated shocks. The apparatus used to
compute a transition path for prices could then be used to compute a path of prices
as the population grows. The aim of the analysis would be to use the model to assess
how much of the (real) growth in house prices in the recent past can be attributed
to population growth. If the model can deliver a plausible assessment of this, then it
could be used to assess how expected future population growth might in°uence house
prices, under various assumptions about the growth of the housing stock. Since the
number of households in the U.K. is expected to grow considerably in the ¯rst half of
the current century, this issue is of considerable importance for social welfare, and for
policy makers.Chapter 5
Tax reform and retirement
saving incentives:
Evidence from the `Stakeholder
Pension' reforms in the U.K.
5.1 Introduction
Given demographic pressures on social security ¯nances in most OECD countries, a
common policy target is to encourage households to increase their own private retire-
ment saving. In the United Kingdom (UK), many households already rely on private
sources rather than social security for much of their retirement income (Banks et al.,
2005) but, as in other countries, there has been well-publicised concern as to the ex-
tent of a `savings gap' between how much working age individuals should save for
retirement and what they are actually saving.1 There is, however, little agreement
1For the UK, Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001), Pensions Commission (2004, 2005) and Depart-
ment for Work and Pensions (2002, 2006b) expressed concerns over the `adequacy' of retirement saving.
Banks et al. (2005) are more sanguine. Much the same debate has occurred over a long period in the
United States: see, on the one hand, Bernheim (1992) and, on the other, Engen et al. (1999) and
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in the evaluation literature as to what saving policies are e®ective. There has been a
substantial debate around this question in the United States (as in, inter alia, Poterba
(1994); Journal of Economic Perspectives (1996); Bernheim and Scholz (1993); Ben-
jamin (2003); and, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004)), but relatively little econometric
evidence relating to this question for the UK despite the plethora of recent reforms
a®ecting pensions and other savings instruments there.2
Greater ¯nancial incentives to encourage retirement saving are an obvious pol-
icy instrument. But it is di±cult to target incentives on the marginal saver, so that
more generous incentives may actually reduce private retirement saving for the intra-
marginal saver through a wealth e®ect. The cost to the exchequer of providing incen-
tives will also mitigate the impact of incentives on aggregate (i.e. public plus private)
saving. Several changes to the UK's tax regime governing retirement saving have been
implemented in the last two decades but, from an evaluation perspective, it is hard to
disentangle the e®ects of these tax regime changes from other reforms taking place at
the same time.
In this chapter, we consider a reform that embodied a di®erential change in tax
incentives: the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in the UK in April 2001. This
reform, which was intended to encourage overall take-up of, and contributions to,
private pensions, contained several provisions that are discussed brie°y in the next
section. An important feature of the change in the tax regime that accompanied
the reform was that it only a®ected a sub-set of the population. We can therefore
use a standard di®erence-in-di®erences evaluation technique to examine the impact of
this component of the reform by comparing the behaviour over time of those who were
potentially a®ected by the tax reform relative to those who were una®ected. The paper
closest in spirit to the present one is Milligan (2003), which focuses on di®erential limit
changes and Canadian retirement saving.
Scholz et al. (2006). The same issue has also arisen in countries such as Australia and New Zealand.
2See Disney et al. (2001), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and Attanasio et al. (2005a) for some
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The format of the chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2, we brie°y describe the overall
Stakeholder Pension reform but focus in particular on the change in the tax regime
for private pensions that occurred simultaneously with the introduction of Stakeholder
Pensions. Section 5.3 describes the data and the estimator used to examine the impact
of the change in the tax regime on take-up of private pensions. Section 5.4 discusses
the empirical results of the e®ect of the reform on pension coverage and retirement
saving. Section 5.5 provides a brief conclusion.
5.2 Stakeholder Pensions
Stakeholder Pensions were introduced by the UK government from April 2001 as a
new tax-subsidised retirement saving instrument. Like existing personal pensions, and
some occupational pension schemes,3 Stakeholder Pensions are `de¯ned contribution'
schemes (i.e. an individual's pension bene¯ts depend on the accumulated value of her
fund). Individual contributors to Stakeholder Pensions could choose to opt-out of part
of the social security programme, and also to obtain tax relief on contributions to their
Stakeholder Pension, up to an annual ceiling described in more detail shortly. Stake-
holder Pensions di®ered from pre-existing Personal Pensions (introduced for employees
in 1988) in having compulsory minimum standards, a di®erent governance structure,
guaranteed workplace access for those working for medium-scale or large employers,
and a simpler and more uniform administrative cost structure. Further details on these
aspects of the Stakeholder Pensions pension reform are given in Disney et al. (2007).
The government's Green Paper (Department of Social Security, 1998) which pro-
posed the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions identi¯ed middle income earners -
de¯ned as those earning between $9,000 and $18,500 per annum in 1998 prices - as a
target group for the reform, although Stakeholder Pensions are available to everyone.
High income earners, it was assumed, already had access to other retirement saving
3`Occupational pensions' are, in UK parlance, employer-provided pension plans.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 134
instruments, and lower-earners were generally seen by the Green Paper to be better
o® accumulating rights in the public second tier pension (the State Earnings-Related
Pension Scheme, SERPS, superseded in April 2002 by the more redistributive State
Second Pension, S2P), rather than opting for a private pension arrangement.4 Further-
more other pension reforms introduced since 2001, most notably the introduction of
the means-tested Pension Credit in October 2003, also make public provision more gen-
erous for people with low lifetime incomes, although there is a group of lower-earners
- those with rich spouses - who would be less likely to gain from the introduction of
the Pension Credit.5
The Green Paper also proposed a number of other changes to the pension regime,
including a reform to the structure of tax reliefs that was also implemented in April
2001. This reform forms the main focus of the present paper. The broad features of the
tax regime, before and after the advent of Stakeholder Pensions, are as follows. The
UK has an individual-based income tax system. Tax privileged pension contributions,
up to certain ceilings, can be made by the employer or the individual. Employer
contributions receive up-front tax relief at the individual's marginal rate against income
tax and National Insurance.6 Individual contributions receive `relief' (deferral) at the
higher-rate of income tax for higher-rate taxpayers and at the basic-rate of income
tax for all other individuals, i.e. including those with individual incomes below the
threshold at which income tax becomes payable. Returns are broadly tax-exempt and
4Under the United Kingdom's social security programme, individuals can choose to opt-out of the
second tier of the public programme. In the case of a personal pension, the DWP pays part of the
social security contribution (which is a proportion of earnings within a given range) into the opted-out
pension account in return for the individual forgoing that part of second-tier pension bene¯t that
would have accrued had they remained 'contracted-in'. The employee can then contribute further
amounts to their account, accruing the tax reliefs described in the text. The individual is not required
to opt out of the social security programme to open a de¯ned contribution pension plan. For further
details on opting-out incentives, see Chung et al. (2008).
5The need to target middle-earners had been queried at the time, since this group already had high
rates of pension coverage (see Disney et al. (1999) and Table 5.2 in the text). For the 30% who were
not covered, unstable incomes and less accessible savings made pension saving less attractive (Banks
et al., 2002a).
6'National Insurance Contributions' (NICs) is the name given to social security contributions in
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pensions are then subject to income tax at withdrawal, except for up to 25% of the
fund that can be withdrawn tax-free.
Until April 2001, as depicted in Table 5.1, the ceiling on individual contributions
to pension plans was proportional to earnings and more generous for older individuals.
Individuals without earnings could not gain tax relief on pension contributions.
Table 5.1: Pre-2001 tax reliefs for de¯ned contribution pension plans: Maximum con-
tributions as a % of earnings by age
Age at start of Maximum contributions
tax year as % of earnings
35 or under 17.5%
36 to 45 20.0%
46 to 50 25.0%
51 to 55 30.0%
56 to 60 35.0%
61 to 74 40.0%
Notes: Contributions were subject to an overall earnings cap. In 2005-06, this was set at $105,600.
Maximum contributions include contributions by both the employer and employee.
An important di®erence between the post-Stakeholder Pension tax regime (which
applied to all personal pensions including Stakeholder Pensions) and the previous tax
regime was that every individual, irrespective of any earnings, was able to make gross
contributions of up to $3,600 a year to his or her private pension (which, for an
individual receiving tax relief at the basic rate, would require a net contribution of
$2,808). In the new regime, individuals were then allowed higher contributions in
line with their earnings as in the previous regime in Table 5.1. Overall, the e®ect of
this change was to raise contributions limits signi¯cantly for lower-earners, especially
for younger age groups (since maximum contributions as a proportion of earnings
are lower). Figure 5.1 depicts the e®ect of the change post-2001 on the maximum
gross contribution limits by gross relevant earnings for the various age groups in Table
5.1. Note that individuals with no earnings could also contribute up to the $3,600
maximum. It is worth re-emphasising that the UK's tax system is individual-based so5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 136
that each individual in a couple could contribute up to this maximum.7
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Figure 5.1: Maximum annual gross contribution limit, by annual gross relevant earn-
ings and age, personal pension tax regime from 2001 to 2006
Although this change in tax regime was highlighted less than the `targeting' of
middle earners in the 1998 Green Paper (Department of Social Security, 1998) and
subsequent discussion of the legislation, an implication of it was described in the Green
Paper:
\The changes will also make it easier for partners to contribute to each
other's pensions, again within the overall contribution limits, should they
choose to do so." (p.63)
7Clark and Emmerson (2003) discuss other features of the tax treatment of Stakeholder Pensions.
An even more sweeping reform to the ceilings on pension contributions was introduced in April 2006.
Under these provisions designed to unify the tax regime for all types of private pensions - whether of
the de¯ned bene¯t or de¯ned contribution form - there is an annual limit on contributions of 100% of
earnings up to a ceiling of $215,000 (with the °oor of $3,600 remaining) and a new lifetime limit on
the value of the pension fund of $1.5m, rising over time. A further change which a®ected all potential
contributors, was the abolition of the 'carry-over' provision for unused limits. Milligan (2003) examines
the implications for intertemporal behaviour of a similar reform in Canada.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 137
More precisely, Emmerson and Tanner (1999) noted that:
\The proposals may be of most bene¯t to high earners with non-working
spouses who have already used up their own tax-free contribution limits
or who want to maximise the value of their joint personal allowances in
retirement." (p.12)
In general, the consensus in the pensions industry and among analysts has been
that the Stakeholder Pension reform was a failure, with little impact on either the take-
up of private pensions or the real value of retirement saving. This apparent failure has
contributed to the decision to enact yet another change in the UK's retirement saving
regime, with legislation in process to enrol employees whose employers do not o®er an
occupational pension arrangement automatically in a new system of Personal Accounts,
unless the employee explicitly chooses otherwise. The rationale for this change towards
greater prescription of retirement saving has rested in part on the presumption that the
Stakeholder Pension episode illustrated the limited e®ectiveness of retirement saving
policies that relied wholly on individual responses to perceived incentives.
Nevertheless, the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions provides a policy `experi-
ment' with, in e®ect, both a visible targeting of a new retirement saving instrument on
a speci¯ed group and a change in the tax regime for pensions for another group; the
latter reform was less publicised at the time but for those a®ected had a direct impact
on ¯nancial incentives to save in a pension. We brie°y show in the next section (and in
more detail in Chung et al. (2008)) that the former aspect (i.e. the headline `targeting'
of the reform on middle earners) had no e®ect on take-up of private pensions. This
result accords with the general view on the limitations of the reform.
We then focus the rest of the paper on the impact of the change in contribution
limits on pension take-up among the a®ected group. In this latter respect, our line of
argument follows closely the literature in North America that has attempted to iden-
tify behaviour in relation to retirement saving o® di®erential changes in contribution5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 138
limits across sub-groups of the population (as in Venti and Wise (1987); Gale and
Scholz (1994); Milligan (2003)). In analysing this change in tax reliefs, we show that
the reform did indeed induce changes in behaviour, with signi¯cant increases in par-
ticipation rates among sub-groups of the population who bene¯ted from the increase
in the ceiling on contributions eligible for tax relief. The consensus that the reform
had little or no impact, and the inferences drawn from that conclusion, may thereby
have been premature.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
As mentioned in the introduction, our empirical strategy is to use a standard di®erence-
in-di®erences evaluation technique to examine the impact of the reform to pension
contribution ceilings. In this section we describe the data and methods that are the
basis of our estimations. The dichotomous nature of our outcome variable (the decision
of whether or not to save in a pension) necessitates the somewhat involved estimation
technique that we describe. Nonetheless, for interpretation of the results presented in
section 5.4 it is important to keep in mind the underlying principle of di®erence-in-
di®erences, which is to evaluate the reform by comparing the behaviour over time of
those who were potentially a®ected by the tax reform to the behaviour of those who
were una®ected.
5.3.1 Data sources and descriptive analysis
We investigate the determinants of the household decision to take-out a private pen-
sion using information from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). The FRS is a large-
scale repeated cross section survey used to construct the UK's o±cial statistics on
income inequality and income poverty and so it elicits a rich set of information on each
household's demographic characteristics, incomes (by detailed component) and other
economic circumstances. The FRS asks individual respondents who are in work or5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 139
who have ever worked (below age 65) whether they or their employer contributes to a
pension scheme. The pension arrangements that are explicitly delineated are a `per-
sonal' pension, a company-run pension scheme, or a stakeholder pension. In addition
respondents are asked whether the scheme is contributory or non-contributory, when
they joined it and if it is `portable', as well as more detailed questions about own con-
tributions, contracted-out rebates paid into a Personal or Stakeholder Pensions (since
individuals can have such schemes without making any additional contributions) and,
in the case of a Stakeholder Pension, whether it was organised by the employer or the
respondent.8
Table 5.2 Panel A provides data from the Family Resources Survey for the (tax)
years 1999-2000 to 2002-03 on pension holdings by type for all employees. According
to the table, overall coverage by private pensions has declined slightly over the period.
Coverage by employer-provided plans has been constant, and a decline in coverage by
Personal Pensions has been not quite o®set by the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions
and by a slight rise in the number of people with multiple plans.
8As a cross check, we examined responses from the General Household Survey (GHS), which asks
somewhat di®erent questions, primarily about coverage and membership, and also looks at aggregate
data on pension scheme membership and contributions from Inland Revenue sources. The FRS pro-
vides detailed information on contributions, unlike the GHS. Both household surveys give signi¯cantly
lower numbers for pension coverage and (more signi¯cantly, in the case of the FRS) for contributions
than aggregate data from the Inland Revenue, perhaps re°ecting under sampling in household sur-
veys of contributors who make large contributions (i.e. the rich) and of other groups who may be
contributing but are not asked about their contributions in the survey. However, it can be noted that
aggregate data on total pension saving has been heavily revised downwards in recent years (although
this applies more to data reported by the O±ce of National Statistics).5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 140
Table 5.2: Pension coverage by type of pension and earnings band: 1999{2000 to
2002{03
Panel A: Employees Only
Year 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Increase
Type of Pension % % % % % point
Personal Pension 11.9 10.8 10.3 8.9 -3.0
Occupational Pension 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.3 +1.3
Stakeholder Pension 50.3 50.3 50.3 50.2 +0.4
Combination 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 +0.4
Agg. Coverage (%) 64.3 63.3 63.6 62.9 -1.4
Sample size 19,549 18,711 20,418 21,648 80,326
Panel B: All aged 22 to state pension age
Year 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Increase
by earnings band % % % % % point
Zero 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.9 +0.1
Low 33.7 34.0 35.4 34.2 +0.5
Medium 61.9 60.8 61.2 60.6 -1.3
High 84.5 84.5 83.3 82.2 -2.3
Agg. Coverage (%) 47.2 46.8 47.4 46.9 -0.2
Sample size 27,259 25,887 28,026 29,657 110,829
Panel C: All aged 22 to state pension age
Year 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 Increase
by limit increase % % % % % point
Zero earnings 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.9 +0.1
Limit increase 46.8 46.1 46.9 46.5 -0.2
No limit increase 81.3 80.9 80.3 79.2 -2.1
Agg. Coverage (%) 47.2 46.8 47.4 46.9 -0.2
Sample size 27,259 25,887 28,026 29,657 110,829
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 22 and over up to the state pension age, although a
few individuals have to be excluded due to missing data. The sample in Panel B is that used for the
regressions reported in later sections. Rounding explains why ¯gures in the right-hand column may
be slightly di®erent from the di®erence between the 1999-2000 and 2002-03 columns.
Source: own calculations, Family Resources Survey 1999-2000 to 2002-03.
Panel B reveals the striking ¯nding that coverage has fallen among the high and
medium earnings groups over the period (these are the bands delineated by the Green
Paper, of $18,500+ and $9,000 to $18,500 respectively) for those aged over 21 and5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 141
below state pension age (the sampling frame we subsequently use).9 Coverage has
risen among lower-earners and even (marginally) among those reporting no earnings
who are below state pension age. Finally, Panel C splits the data by the fraction of
the sample that might potentially be a®ected by the new limit increase, as illustrated
in Figure 5.1. While pension coverage was relatively stable among those who did,
or would have, received an increase in their pension contribution limit, it was falling
among those with higher earnings.
At ¯rst sight, some of ¯ndings in Table 5.2 are paradoxical given the stated aims
of the policy. The data suggest that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions has had
no e®ect on overall coverage and indeed coverage by any kind of pension has fallen
among the initial `target' group of middle earners. Nor can these declines be explained
by a decline in employer-provided occupational pension provision, since this remains
constant. Finally, despite the Green Paper suggesting that lower-earners might be
better o® in the second pillar of the social security programme rather than opting for a
personal pension, this is the only group to see a noticeable increase in private pension
coverage.
In Chung et al. (2008) we formally test whether the reform a®ected coverage among
the `target group' of middle earners using a variant of the methodology outlined in the
next section. We show that the only earnings group for which there was a signi¯cant
positive e®ect on pension coverage were the group delineated as `low' earners by the
Green Paper, as suggested in Table 5.2, Panel B. We calculate that pension coverage
amongst this group increased by 3.6 percentage points as a result of the reform. These
results are therefore a more precise estimate of the di®erential trends that can be
observed in Table 5.2.
The discussion in Section 5.2 combined with these results lead us to think that it
9We gross up weekly earnings data to provide these annual earnings bands. This inevitably produces
measurement error - for example some people will wrongly be attributed `zero' earnings for the year
based on current zero earnings. In addition, the Green Paper sometimes refers to `$20,000' and
sometimes to `$18,500' as the highest income of `middle earners'. In general we work with the latter
de¯nition in the FRS data, revalued over time in line with average earnings growth in the sample.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 142
might be the change in the contribution limits, rather than the targeting of partic-
ular earnings bands, that had an impact on pension coverage. This possibility was
highlighted in the two quotations in section 5.2 which pointed to the intra-household
incentives to contribute to spouses' pensions. Accordingly, we examine the e®ect of
the change in the contribution limits in the remainder of this paper. This is done by
comparing the pension coverage over time of those who were potentially a®ected by
the tax reform to coverage over time amongst those who were una®ected; the data
underlying our analyses are described in Panel C of Table 5.2.
5.3.2 Modelling the pension take-up decision
Our test is whether the change in contribution limits enacted as part of the Stakeholder
Pension reform in April 2001 a®ected pension saving decisions within households. This
reform can be considered as the policy 'treatment'. Our identi¯cation strategy is
straightforward, insofar as we can broadly identify the individuals (i.e. those with earn-
ings below the limits at the time of the reform) who were, and who were not, a®ected
by the tax change. Hence, our basic method of analysis is a di®erence-in-di®erences
approach. However, our implementation strategy requires further explanation.
To formalise the test, write a general model of retirement saving in which Y ¤
it is
the outcome of the retirement saving decision of individual i at time t, related to a set
of individual and household characteristics (Xit), an appropriate measure of earnings
(Zit), and, to capture trends over time °exibly, to a vector of time dummies (dt):
Y ¤
it = ¯0Xit + °Zit + ¿0dt + ²it (5.1)
Our outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not an individual
saves in a private pension at a particular point in time. Denoting this dichotomous
outcome as Yit, then we think of the (continuous) Y ¤
it as a latent variable that measures
whether or not an individual gains positive utility from saving in a private pension.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 143
With a normally distributed error term, this set-up can be analysed using a `probit'
model.10
The hypothesis tested here is that the probability of purchasing a private pension
changed di®erently for those who were potentially a®ected by the contribution limit
increase compared to those who were not. The required counterfactual assumption is
that in the absence of the reform the purchase probabilities for those who were and were
not a®ected by the policy change would have followed a common trend. To implement
the di®erence-in-di®erences exercise, we need to de¯ne a 'treatment' variable and a
'post-reform' variable. The latter is de¯ned as the indicator It that measures whether
the individual is observed after the beginning of April 2001. The 'treatment' variable
is another 0-1 indicator, Lit, that measures whether, given an individual's age and
annual earnings, the post-April 2001 contribution limit rules would have been more
generous to him/her than the pre-April 2001 contribution limit rules.11 If we could
estimate the linear relationship (5.1), then the di®erence-in-di®erences model would be
estimated by equation (5.2) in which the extent of any di®erence-in-di®erences would
be measured by the coe±cient ® on the interaction between `had a limit increase' (Lit)
and the indicator (It) for the post April-2001 period:12
Y ¤
it = ¯0Xit + °Zit + ¿0dt + ÁLit + ®LitIt + "it (5.2)
However, in a non-linear model such as the probit (used here), calculated `marginal
e®ects' on interaction terms cannot give a di®erence-in-di®erences measure analogous
10It is important that our modelling strategy allows for the discrete nature of our outcome variable:
a linear probability speci¯cation may very likely lead to the prediction that those with zero or very
low earnings have a negative `probability' of saving in a pension.
11For example, for an individual aged 35 or younger, this variable takes the value 1 if gross earnings
are less than $20,571. This number is derived from the fact that before April 2001 individuals in this
age range could contribute no more than 17.5% of their earnings to a pension, but after April 2001 this
limit became the maximum of 17.5% of earnings or $3,600. $3,600 is (to the nearest pound) 17.5% of
$20,571. Similar values are constructed for individuals in other age bands.
12The variable It is not entered independently in this regression since the time dummies capture
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to the coe±cients from a linear model. With the discrete outcome set-up, the common
trends assumption may not hold for the expectations of Yit (the saving probabilities),
since even when a®ected by the same factors di®erent baseline probabilities are likely
to move at di®erent rates simply because they are di®erent distances from the bounds
on probabilities of zero and one. Rather, common trends may hold for a transformation
of the distribution of the outcome variable and speci¯cally for the inverse probability
function, which is assumed to be known and for the probit is ©¡1(¢).13 In other
words, the assumption of common trends is made for the index rather than for the
probability itself. Following Blundell et al. (2004a) this can be written formally as that
in the absence of any `treatment' the following would hold14:
©¡1[E(YitjXit;Lit = 1;It = 1)] ¡ ©¡1[E(YitjXit;Lit = 1;It = 0)] =
= ©¡1[E(YitjXit;Lit = 0;It = 1)] ¡ ©¡1[E(YitjXit;Lit = 0;It = 0)]
(5.3)
where variables are de¯ned as above.
The right hand side of this equality can be estimated from observations of the
'control group' (those not a®ect by the limit increase) before and after April 2001.
Using the common trends assumption as now formulated, this information can in turn
be used to construct a counterfactual of how the index would have evolved for each
treatment group individual had the change in pension contribution limits not occurred.
13In addition to the points raised in the text about the common trends assumption, it is also the case
that the 'marginal e®ects' on interaction terms in non-linear models that are automatically generated
by software packages (in our case by STATA version 9.2) often do not give a true measure of 'interaction
e®ects'. For more details see Ai and Norton (2003).
14Time dummies are no longer included since separate probits are run for those observed pre-reform
and those observed post-reform. Similarly analysis is done separately by whether or not the individuals
would have received an increase in their private pension contribution limit and since this depends on
earnings these are also excluded from this speci¯cation. Partners earnings, where relevant, is included.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 145
The impact of the policy can then be evaluated as15:
I(X) = E(YitjXit;Zit;dt;Lit = 1;It = 1)¡
¡©h©¡1[E(YitjXit;Zit;dt;Lit = 1;It = 0)] + ©¡1[E(YitjXit;Zit;dt;Lit = 0;It = 1)]¡
¡©¡1[E(YitjXit;Zit;dt;Lit = 0;It = 0)]i
(5.4)
Blundell et al (2004) propose a method for implementing this 'di®erence-of-di®erences'
estimator of the e®ect of the policy. A di®erent relationship between the outcome and
the observed characteristics is estimated for each group of agents de¯ned according
to the various interactions of whether or not the reform would have increased their
contribution limit (which depends on their age and earnings) and whether they were
observed before or after the reform was implemented. These relationships encapsulate
the behavioural patterns of each group and the impact of the reform once it had been
enacted. By predicting the outcomes for the 'treated, after' group (i.e. individuals
characterised by Lit = 1 and It = 1 who were observed after 2001 and whose age and
earnings were such that they were a®ected by the contribution limit increase) using
the behavioural equations for the pre- and post- reform 'control' groups, one obtains
an estimate of how the underlying index would have changed for individuals in the
treated group in the absence of the reform. This can be used in combination with the
behavioural equations for the treated group to construct the estimated e®ect (5.4).
The ¯nal estimate of the e®ect uses predictions made for the `treated, after' group and
weighted according to characteristics (Xit) in this group. It can therefore be thought
of as representing the average impact of treatment on the treated.
15Despite the similarity to the linear case, the nonlinear assumption exploited here entails two
additional restrictions on the nature of the error terms: only group e®ects are allowed for and the
groups being compared are assumed to have the same residual variance. See Blundell et al. (2004a),
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5.3.3 Implementing the estimator: data considerations
Before examining the results of the di®erence-in-di®erences exercise, we return to a
caveat mentioned in footnote 10. Weekly earnings from the FRS are grossed up to
obtain annual earnings, so there is measurement error in the indicator of whether
the individual is a®ected by the change in contribution limits. This error would be
particularly pertinent if we had sought to measure the impact of the reform solely by
identifying individuals who were on their maximum contribution limits pre-April 2001
and who then bene¯ted from the increase in limits in April 2001, since these individuals
could only be identi¯ed with error. In any event, such a limited de¯nition of the
'treated' group could lead to an underestimate of the overall e®ect of the policy since it
is not true that all of those who might respond to the policy would be observed exactly
on their contribution limit in the pre-reform regime. Some lower-earners might, for
example, have been induced to take up a private pension rather than doing no pension
saving because the large increase in their contribution limit meant that the bene¯ts
of making contributions could now outweigh the threshold ¯xed costs of purchasing a
pension.
In contrast to some studies of limit increases in the United States, therefore, we
do not see potentially `treated' individuals simply as those who individuals who we
calculate to be at the pre-reform contribution. Instead, we assume that all individuals
or households who received a limit increase as a result of the reform, irrespective of
whether their calculated contributions would have been at the pre-reform ceiling, are
potentially 'treated'. From this more general viewpoint, the change in the limits had
a large potential coverage. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2, which shows the fraction
of respondents treated by age given our more general measure.
Figure 5.2 should be read in conjunction with Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, which
illustrate that the impact of the limit increase is driven by both age and earnings
levels. At the ages of 36, 46, 51, 56 and 61 there are step changes in the likelihood
of being a®ected by the limit increase because of the higher earnings proportions that5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 147
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of individuals receiving limit increase by age and household
type
Notes: As for Table 5.2.
Source: As for Table 5.2.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 148
can be contributed at each of those ages. These steps are observable in the ¯gures,
especially at the three intermediate age ranges.
Eligibility for the limit increase is otherwise driven by two factors: the increase
in earnings with age, and the proportion of households with zero earners in each age
band. Panel A, which focuses on individuals with positive earnings, shows how rising
earnings over the life cycle and the age dependent changes (described in Table 5.1
and Figure 5.1), in the proportion of earnings that can be contributed tax-relieved
to a pension, combine to reduce the likelihood of being a®ected by the limit increase
when only own earnings are considered. This also implies that, when we consider only
positive earners, the 'control' group are on average older than the 'treated' group; an
issue to which we return later. Panel A also shows that almost 100% of individuals
aged 21 or under are a®ected by the limit increase, and so we exclude them entirely
from the regression estimates on coverage.
Figure 5.2 Panel B, which incorporates zero earners within households, gives a
somewhat di®erent picture of the impact of the changes in limits by age. Essentially
because of cohort di®erences in participation rates, a greater fraction of older house-
holds have at least one non-earner who would be eligible for the limit increase under
the reform regime even if the primary earner is above the limit threshold.16 Thus the
(negative) association of the probability of being treated by age is much less marked.
16This raises another small measurement issue that applies to those with no earnings who, pre-2001,
should not have been contributing to a private pension and receiving tax relief - see the regime described
in Table 1. Table 2 nevertheless suggests that we observe a few individuals who are contributing pre-
2001, which arises (we surmise) because they had some earnings during the year even though we observe
no current earnings at the time the individual was surveyed for the FRS. Under certain assumptions
(notably concerning the volatility of earnings), this measured proportion of take-up among those with
no earnings pre-2001 may be taken as an upper bound on the measurement error involved in grossing
up weekly earnings to obtain annual earnings, both before and after the reform.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 149
5.4 Did the reform increase private pension coverage?
5.4.1 Empirical Results
We estimate the di®erence-in-di®erences model described by equation (3). This in-
volves estimating separate probits for the treated and controls, pre- and post-treatment
date (2001), using the Family Resources Survey for the four years 1999-2000 and 2000-
01 ('pre-treatment') and 2001-02 and 2002-03 ('post-treatment'), in order to calculate
the estimated treatment e®ect, as described in the previous section.17 The regressors
comprise whether the individual is single or in a couple, age dummies of both the
individual and, where relevant, their partner (structured such that the bands coincide
with the age ranges for the contribution ceiling bands described in Table 5.1), sex, age
left school, partner's education, dummies for each period within the pre- and post-
treatment regime, earnings and a full set of age-education interactions. We consider
those aged over 21 but under the State Pension Age (65 for men and 60 for women).
Rather than present a full set of probit estimates, we provide key calculated treat-
ment e®ects in Table 5.3 along with statistical signi¯cance (which is estimated using
bootstrapping) and sample sizes.
The results in Table 5.3 con¯rm that there is a positive e®ect of the change in the
contribution limits on take-up of private pensions among the treated group. The table
further analyses the sub-groups which are disproportionately a®ected.
The ¯rst row of Table 5.3 suggests that the overall result of the reform is an
increase in private pension coverage of 2.1 percentage points among those a®ected by
the limit increase. This result averages across positive and zero earners, and indirectly
explains the result in Chung et al. (2008), insofar as this e®ect is concentrated among
a®ected positive earners (+3.3 percentage points, statistically signi¯cant) rather than
zero earners (+0.4 percentage points, not statistically signi¯cant). We did not ¯nd
any evidence that the reform had a statistically signi¯cant impact on take-up among
17Data limitations rule out using earlier years before 1999-2000 in calculating the 'pre-treatment'
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sub-groups of zero earning respondents (e.g. by sex or whether or not in a couple) and
so do not consider single zero earners further.
Among single respondents with positive earners, the total e®ect on private pension
coverage is in an increase of 3.9 percentage points, which is statistically signi¯cant at
the 5% con¯dence level. Strikingly, however, the e®ect among single women is large and
statistically signi¯cant (+5.4 percentage points) whereas among single men, the e®ect
is again positive but not statistically signi¯cant. Among couples, the overall e®ect
is also positive and statistically signi¯cant (+3.0 percentage points); again, the e®ect
is stronger (and statistically signi¯cant) in couples where the woman is the 'treated'
member (i.e. below the contribution limit), whereas the impact on treated men is
much smaller.
Finally, we disaggregate couples further by the earnings of the partner. In one
speci¯cation, we use current earnings of the partner. However since current earnings
are subject to transitory shocks we also use partner's education as a proxy for lifetime
earnings, where more years of schooling are assumed to be associated with greater
earnings and/or participation. A necessary caveat to this interpretation is that average
years of schooling have increased cohort-by-cohort. The 'treated' group of positive
earners is relatively young on average (see Figure 5.2.A) and is therefore more likely
to have greater schooling than the 'control' group, ceteris paribus.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 151
Table 5.3: Results: Impact of reform of contribution limits on take-up of private
pensions for selected groups, using Blundell et al. (2004) procedure
By zero or positive earnings: respondent
  Zero earners only  Positive earners only  All 
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
             
All  3.9%  +0.4ppt  46.7%  +3.3ppt 28.5%  +2.1ppt
             
Positive earnings only (respondent)
  Men  Women  All 
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Singles 39.2%  +3.1ppt 40.7%  +5.4ppt 40.1%  +3.9ppt
Couples  47.4%  +0.3ppt  50.3%  +4.3ppt 49.5%  +3.0ppt
           
             Couples, positive earnings only, by partner’s earnings/partner’s education
Zero earner  Low-mid earner  High earner 
  Predicted 
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
           
Couples  41.3%  +5.7ppt 49.5%  +2.4ppt  55.4%  +2.9ppt 
       
  Low education Medium education High education
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
Predicted
level after 
treatment
Estimated
impact of 
reform
           
Couples  47.5%  +3.7ppt 54.4%  +7.5ppt 51.6%  2.2ppt
           
Notes: Statistical signi¯cance estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions. Signi¯cant
treatment e®ects at 5% level in bold. Controls for age, sex, school leaving age, and full age-schooling
interactions, whether single or in a couple, and, where relevant, partner's age, partner's school leaving
age and partner's earnings. `Low-mid' earner is de¯ned as in 1998 Green Paper `low-middle' earner.
Education: `low' = leaving school age 15/16; `medium' = age 18, `high'¸18 (tertiary). For sample
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Using partner's earnings and education, we note that the largest and sole statis-
tically signi¯cant e®ect by partner's earnings group is on positive earners with a zero
earning partner. We do not ¯nd clear-cut evidence that lower-earners with high earning
partners had a particularly strong response to the reform (inasmuch as the coe±cient
for this group is positive but not statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level);18 that is, we
cannot ¯nd conclusive evidence for the suggestion by Department of Social Security
(1998) and Emmerson and Tanner (1999) - see section 5.2 above - that the reform
allowed couples jointly to utilise the increased limits by having pension coverage for
the lower-earning partner. When we use education as a proxy for long-term earnings of
the partner, we get strong but slightly hard to interpret results. Treated respondents
whose partners are educated up to 18 exhibit the largest positive responses to the re-
form (+7.5 percentage points) while a smaller estimated impact is found among those
whose partner left school at (or before) the school leaving age. The impact on those
partners have the highest education levels is actually negative, albeit not statistically
signi¯cant.
Overall, the results show statistically signi¯cant e®ects, and for some groups the
proportionate e®ects on pension coverage are substantial. In particular, we observe
large e®ects on pension coverage for lower-earning women (both single and in couples).
These results contrast with the conventional wisdom that the overall Stakeholder Pen-
sion reform had little or no impact on pension coverage. They also suggest that looking
at aggregate trends and at 'target' groups such as middle earners has led analysts and
policy-makers to overlook signi¯cant e®ects elsewhere in the earnings distribution. The
lack of e®ects on middle earners likely arose because the e®ective policy 'treatment'
was the reform of tax relief, which a®ected lower-earners. The analysis of the next
subsection is designed to increase our con¯dence that the observed e®ects really were
due to this policy reform.
18With the bootstrapped 5% con¯dence interval, we can only con¯rm that the e®ect lies between
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5.4.2 Alternative explanations and sensitivity analysis
This section considers alternative explanations for our results. In particular, it consid-
ers the plausibility in this context of the 'common trends' assumption that lies at the
heart of the 'di®erence-in-di®erences' model, and undertakes some sensitivity analysis
which focuses on possible implications of pre and post-treatment heterogeneity of the
population.
The validity of the common trends assumption
Our results assume that the trend in pension coverage (or more accurately in the
index of the underlying propensity to contribute to a private pension) among those
who received an increase in the contribution limit as a result of the reform would, in
the absence of the reform, have been the same as among those who were una®ected
by the reform to contribution limits. We are overstating (understating) the e®ect of
the tax relief change to the extent that the positive change in coverage among the
below-limit group would have been higher (lower) than that of the above-limit group
in the absence of the 2001 reform. How plausible is this common trends assumption?
Undoubtedly, the overall trend in pension coverage was a®ected by the change in the
¯nancial climate from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2002, during which the
FTSE 100 index of UK equities fell by 31% whereas, on average, UK house prices rose
by almost exactly 50% (using the Halifax plc index). This might have induced savers
to switch away from saving through private pensions (which were at this stage largely
in equity-dominated portfolios) to invest in housing. So if above-limit households
either exhibited greater substitutability in their asset portfolios, for example through
economies of scale or greater ¯nancial acumen, or had di®erent asset portfolios (i.e.
more equity-dominated) this might explain the disparate trends.
There is mixed evidence for this alternative 'story' in our data. In comparisons
of treated earners against controls (for example, of single people) it is certainly true
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the fall in potential treatment rates with age illustrated in Figure 5.2. This would
imply that treated households, with lower housing equity (and perhaps less ¯nancial
acumen, although younger households tend to have greater formal education to o®set
this factor) might be less likely to reduce their pension saving in response to house
price changes. On the other hand, it is hard to utilise this reasoning to explain away
the di®erential results by the sex of the respondent and for couples by spouses' income
and education.
If, instead, we focus on changes that might a®ect the 'treated' group rather than
the control group, there is one reason for thinking that we might understate rather than
overstate the magnitude of the e®ect. Here there is an important change in the bene¯t
regime that coincides with the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in 2001. In 2002,
the State-Earnings Related Pension (SERPS), the second tier pension, was replaced by
the State Second Pension (S2P); a change that had also been announced in the 1998
Green Paper. S2P is more explicitly redistributive towards low lifetime earners in its
design. In addition the means-tested bene¯t for pensioners was formally indexed to
earnings rather than prices from April 1999 (unlike the rest of the pension programme),
so increasing its real value for those with low lifetime incomes and reinforcing the
disincentive to save for retirement.
Analysis therefore suggests that, whereas replacement rates cohort-by-cohort for
the public pension programme have already peaked for average earners, lower-earners
are likely to see increasingly generous replacement rates from the public programme for
several decades yet (Disney and Emmerson, 2005). To the extent that single women,
or couples that include a zero earner or have low education (to take some of the groups
where we have found a signi¯cant e®ect) are disproportionately likely to gain from
these reforms to the public pension programme relative to the control group, we might
expect the treated group's take-up of private pensions to have fallen faster than that
of higher income groups, in direct contrast to the results found here.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 155
Changing heterogeneity among the treated and control groups
Another possible alternative explanation for the observed 'treatment e®ect' lies in
changes in the composition of households between the treated and untreated group.
Household heterogeneity can arise from measured characteristics and from unobserved
characteristics, such as individual preferences for saving. If it is assumed that such
characteristics are ¯xed over time then our di®erence-in-di®erences estimator should
be robust to their presence, although since our data have no panel dimension we cannot
directly control for unobserved individual e®ects and it is for this reason that we are
careful not to generalise our empirical measure of the 'treatment e®ect' to the untreated
group. On the other hand, compositional e®ects of whatever kind could potentially
bias our results if the composition of households within the treated group and the
controls changed after the reform.
This bias would be most pertinent if observed earnings are endogenous to the
reform. As demonstrated in Table 5.1, prior to 2001, an individual required some
earnings to be eligible for tax relief on retirement saving; as Figure 5.1 shows, after
2001 there is an initial lump sum tax relief independent of earnings. It is in theory
possible that some people with accumulated cash who wished to engage in retirement
saving pre-2001 had to work, at least part-time, in order to obtain eligibility for tax
relief; after 2001 this was no longer necessary. In this case observed earnings would be
endogenous to the treatment. This possibility, although unlikely, might be pertinent
for, say, older women who had low retirement savings and who were not regular workers.
If the identi¯cation of the treatment is endogenous to the outcome variable, this clearly
poses a potential problem for the analysis. Other possible scenarios, such as greater
volatility of intra-household earnings over time, might also have similar e®ects on the
composition of the treated relative to the controls.
We test this possible proposition using the FRS in a manner designed to test for
common and di®erential trends in composition across earnings groups. We pool each
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(those who would not have received an increase in their pension contribution limit)
group. Now write the model:
Jit = µLi=1 + °0
1Xit + ®0
1XitLi=1 + Àit (5.5)
Where Jit is an indicator variable of whether the observation of the individual
occurred during the period in which Stakeholder Pensions were available, L is an
indicator of whether or not the reform increased the pension contribution limit of
the individual, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables such as age, schooling and
partner's characteristics. This model tests two possibilities. First, the signi¯cance
(or otherwise) of the vector of coe±cients [°1] tell us whether the characteristics of
those observed among the pooled groups before the reform occurred are di®erent from
the characteristics of those observed after the reform was implemented. Second, the
(lack of) signi¯cance of the vector of coe±cients [®1] tells us whether any changes
in characteristics over time occurred di®erently between the control group and the
treatment group. It is this second test which is important for our analysis - our results
may not imply the policy e®ects we wish to identify if changes in the characteristics
of individuals we observe are occurring di®erentially across the treatment and control
groups. In fact the absence of di®erential changes in group composition is a more
stringent test than is required to support the common trends assumption,19 and so
passing the test would be reassuring for our analysis.
Equation (4) can be estimated ¯rst using data from the control group and the
treated group who did have some earnings, then for the treated group who did not
have any earnings and the (whole) control group. In both of these models the results
(available on request) show that our sample is, on average, slightly older and slightly
better educated in the period after stakeholder pensions were implemented. There is
19The common trends assumption could still be valid even if characteristics changed di®erentially
over time across the control and treatment groups, but these speci¯c characteristics did not a®ect the
take-up of private pensions, or if di®erential changes in characteristics just happened to cancel out in
their net impact on average take-up among the control and treatment groups.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 157
little evidence of a di®erential change in characteristics between those in the control
group and those in the treated group, especially among the treatment group with some
earnings. For positive earners, the coe±cients on the interaction terms [i.e. vector
®1] are not jointly di®erent from zero at conventional levels of statistical signi¯cance
(Â2(18) = 25:08;Prob > Â2 = 0:13). Looking at the individual interaction coe±cients,
the only signi¯cant coe±cient is on male, which is negative, suggesting slightly fewer
men in the control group relative to the treatment group after the reform. Since
men are more likely to contribute to a private pension, this might slightly o®set our
treatment e®ect. On the other hand, since men are unlikely to be marginal workers, it
provides no support for the argument that our treated group pre-treatment contained
a preponderance of earners who were only working to obtain earnings on which to
obtain tax relief for their pension contributions.20
The composition of the control and treatment groups
Our ¯nal sensitivity test attempts to handle the implication of the fact that, for positive
earners, our controls are on average older than our treated group (see Figure 5.2, Panel
A). Although we interpret our measured e®ects as a `treatment of the treated' rather
than a consequence of di®erential limits across age groups, it is interesting to see
whether the calculated e®ects are a®ected by choosing comparable controls facing a
common rate regime. To do this, we focus only on the 36-45 age group. We choose this
group because it is a relatively broad (10- as opposed to 5-year) age band that is faced
with a single pension contribution ceiling of 20% of earnings in the pre-Stakeholder
Pension regime and, conveniently, it contains around 50% of treated individuals and
20For zero earners, we have evidence that fewer low educated people are likely to be observed after
the reform. The coe±cients on the interaction terms are jointly di®erent from zero at conventional
levels of statistical signi¯cance (Â
2(18) = 34:70;Prob > Â
2 = 0:01). Inspection suggests that our
control group has a higher proportion of less educated people after the reform - that is, the overall
fall in the fraction with low education was disproportionately concentrated among the treated group.
Since people with more schooling are more likely to contribute to a pension, this facet tends to raise
the measured treatment e®ect but in fact we observe no signi¯cant treatment e®ect when looking at
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50% controls (Figure 5.2, Panel A).
The signi¯cant results for this age group can be summarised as follows. First,
as before, the results are only statistically signi¯cant for positive earners and, for
single people, only among women. The latter coe±cient is particularly large (+14.6
percentage points) and statistically signi¯cant. Among couples, the largest e®ects are
found, as in Table 5.3, amongst those whose partner is a zero earner (+5.0 percentage
points) and among those whose partner is `middle' educated - that is, educated to
age 18 (+8.0 percentage points). These results therefore lead us to believe that the
magnitudes in Table 5.3 for the whole sample are broadly correct.
On balance, therefore, we do not believe that our key results in this section are
driven by compositional changes or by the heterogeneity of our control and treatment
groups.
Re°ections on the results
Our analysis of the composition of our control and treatment groups, coupled with
careful consideration of factors that could have disturbed the crucial `common trends'
assumption, reinforces our con¯dence that the results reported in subsection 5.4.1 can
be attributed as causal e®ects of the stakeholder pension reform package. The e®ects
that we found are for lower-earners and, as argued above, the lack of e®ects on middle
earners likely arose because the e®ective 'treatment' in the policy reform package was
the change in incentives arising from the reform of tax relief on lower-earners, rather
than the highlighted targeting of middle earners.
Over all individuals a®ected by the change in contribution limits, the e®ect on
pension coverage has more or less exactly o®set what would otherwise have been a
falling trend in pension coverage (see Table 5.2 above). For some groups of the popu-
lation, the e®ects on pension coverage are substantial in proportional terms: we found
e®ects of up to 5 - and in one case 7.5 - percentage points, for coverage in groups
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is that we observe particularly strong increases in take-up of private pensions among
lower-earning women.
To supplement these results on pension coverage, it would be nice to have results
on how the reform has a®ected the level of pension saving. Unfortunately our data
provides only limited information that could be used to explore this issue, as it only
records information on individual (and not employer) contributions in to what are
reported to be personal or stakeholder pensions. Using these data, in Disney et al.
(2007) we tentatively concluded that an aggregate $160 million21 decline in reported
pension contributions of this kind might have been 30% larger in the absence of the
policy reform. This tentative ¯gure supports the strong evidence on coverage rates
presented in the current paper. The evidence shows that, contrary to the conventional
wisdom, the stakeholder pension reform package did have important e®ects on the
pension saving of some groups of the population.
21This amount is for contributions reported to the FRS, then grossed up using survey weights to
give a national ¯gure.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 160
5.5 Conclusions
Our starting point was the policy debate concerning the best ways of encouraging
people to save for their retirement. Stakeholder Pensions, introduced in 2001, were
targeted by the government on middle earners as a means of ¯lling a perceived gap
in retirement saving products. The introduction of Stakeholder Pensions was also
associated with a change in pension contribution limits which allowed lower-earners
to make larger tax-relieved contributions to private pension schemes. Our analysis
represents the ¯rst systematic attempt, to our knowledge, to examine the impact of
these policy reforms on the probability of households engaging in retirement saving.
Aggregate data suggest that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions had little im-
pact on the overall propensity to save for retirement. The number covered by private
pensions was static and there was a downward trend in pension saving over the period
1999 to 2002, either side of the reform in 2001. This apparent failure of the Stake-
holder Pension reform was one factor that encouraged the government to introduce
further pension reforms on 6th April 200622 and to announce yet more reforms to the
retirement saving regime on 22nd May 2006 (see Department for Work and Pensions
(2006a,b)) with greater emphasis on a `default option' that encourages individuals to
invest a minimum amount in a private pension plan.
Our results suggest that analysts have been too quick in assuming that the 2001
reform had no e®ect, and also in assuming that individuals failed to respond to the
changes in tax incentives. Exploiting a di®erence-in-di®erences estimator that allows
for the dichotomous nature of the saving decision, we show that these aggregate trends
conceal a more complex picture. In particular, our results show that a trend fall in
coverage was partially counteracted by the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions, pri-
marily through the associated change in contribution ceilings that disproportionately
22Notably this reform again changed the limits on the amount of tax-relieved contributions that
individuals can make in such a way that the vast majority of individuals will now be able to make
tax-relieved contributions equivalent to their full year's earnings each year.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 161
bene¯ted low and zero earners. We provide some evidence that women, both single
and in couples, have bene¯ted from the increase in the joint contribution limits within
households, which was an additional intention of the policy. To put this in context,
there was an underlying decline in private retirement saving in the early part of the
decade (for reasons that we brie°y discuss in the text) that would have been greater
had it not been for the tax changes associated with the Stakeholder Pension reform in
2001.
In general, our results also suggest that individuals respond to tax incentives in
making retirement saving decisions - a result incidentally con¯rming much of the US
literature on the impact of contribution limits on saving in Individual Retirement
Accounts (see again Journal of Economic Perspectives (1996) and the literature cited
therein). The results also highlight that it is sometimes important to know the details
of a given policy reform, rather than just the 'headline' target, in order to understand
how the policy might work in practice. Since it is common for large impacts of policy
reforms to be highlighted that turn out to be illusory on subsequent closer analysis, it
is ironic that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in 2001 was quickly written o®
as having had little impact on retirement saving: our evidence suggests that some of
the changes that were part of the Stakeholder Pension reform package had non-trivial
e®ects on particular groups of the population and thus on aggregate retirement saving.5 Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Stakeholder Pensions 162
A5 Appendix to chapter 5
  Treatment  Control 
  Before  After  Before  After 
         
All  33,987  36,619  19,159  21,062 
Positive earners  19,101  21,002  19,159  21,062 
Zero earners  14,886  15,617  19,159  21,062 
         
Positive earners, singles         
All  5,353  6,154  3,956  4,303 
Single women   3,184  3,748  1,638  1,980 
Single men  2,169  2,406  2,318  2,323 
         
Positive earners, couples         
All  13,748  14,848  15,203  16,759 
Couples women   9,666  10,327  3,969  4,562 
Couples men  4,082  4,521  11,234  12,197 
         
Couples – zero earning partner  3,163  3,405  4,105  4,453 
Couples – low/mid earning partner  6,085  6,712  7,250  7,916 
Couples – high earning partner  4,500  4,731  3,848  4,390 
         
Couples – low education partner  9,007  9,386  7,869  8,368 
Couples – mid education partner  2,553  2,950  3,502  3,786 
Couples – high education partner  2,156  2,473  3,777  4,540 
         
Appendix Table A5.1: Sample sizes for analysis in Table 5.3Chapter 6
Conclusion: Topics for Further
Work
The conclusions of each chapter of this thesis have been discussed within the relevant
chapters, and were also outlined in chapter 1 (the Introduction). Rather than repeat
these points, this conclusion suggests some topics for further work that follow from
analyses presented above.
One topic that has arisen throughout the work modelling housing demand in a
lifecycle context, is the potential importance of bequest motives. If households choose
not to downsize as they age because they have a strong preference to bequeath the
family home (or indeed for some other reason), this could well in°uence how house price
shocks in°uence consumption choices. It may also a®ect the evolution of house prices
through an in°uence on the number of houses that are supplied to the market and how
this responds to price signals. Properly understanding the operation of bequests in this
context would not be simple, since incentive issues regarding the taxation of estates and
insurance against the need for long-term health care in old age, are likely to interact
with the preference to bequeath the house. However, as a better understanding of
bequest motives and housing could signi¯cantly improve our understanding of several
issues addressed in this thesis, further work here would be worthwhile. Subject to
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concerns about selection, an empirical investigation comparing those with and without
children could be a useful supplement to structural modelling work on this topic.
A particularly fruitful area for further research could be the analysis of the equilib-
rium model for the process generating house prices, and the ¯nal section of chapter 4
has already considered several directions in which I would like to expand my research.
One focus would be to adapt the framework presented in the chapter, to compute
a path of prices as the number of households in the population grows. This would
facilitate an analysis of how much of the recent growth in real house prices might be
due to population growth, and also of how expected future population growth could
be expected to in°uence house prices. A more long term ambition for the equilibrium
model would be to build a framework that explicitly allows for aggregate shocks, the
likelihood of which would be built into expectations.
Regarding the analysis of the stakeholder pensions reforms, an obvious topic for
further research would be an analysis of further reforms to pension contribution lim-
its which were implemented in 2006 (see Department for Work and Pensions (2002)).
Having a better understanding of how contribution limits, and other ¯nancial incen-
tives, a®ect pension saving, would be very useful in an environment in which public
policy aims to increase private saving as a means to supplement state pensions. The
recent reforms also give more scope to test certain predictions of the lifecycle model,
than was possible with the stakeholder pensions reforms. In particular, one could
test whether the 2006 increase in contribution limits led any younger households to
reduce current pension contributions because the reform allowed increased scope to
exercise the option to wait before making contributions (see Milligan (2003) for a full
description of this mechanism).
The combination of work on housing, and work on saving, suggests a further topic
for future research, namely the analysis of a structural model that simultaneously
considers housing choices, private pension saving and consumption / liquid saving de-
cisions. Just as the housing good / asset adds complication to the lifecycle framework,6 Conclusion: Topics for Further Work 165
adding a pension also complicates the dynamic framework since wealth saved in this
asset is locked away until the time of retirement. However, there is great value in
studying the relationship between housing wealth and pension saving, due to its pol-
icy relevance. Recent assessments of the number of individuals in the U.K. who are
likely to have inadequate resources for retirement have been shown to be sensitive to
assumptions about how housing wealth is counted, (see Pensions Commission (2004)
and Banks et al. (2005)). It is only with a theoretical understanding of how individ-
uals substitute housing and pension wealth, that it would be possible to know what
weight should be given to housing wealth when considering this adequacy question.
The model would also be a sensible uni¯cation of the thus far separate research streams
on housing, and on pension saving.Bibliography
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